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General Introduction:  
Challenging the Difficulty of Modelling Exchange Rate Dynamics 
 
 
1. The starting point: the failure of traditional exchange rate models 
 
Paul  A.  Samuelson  was  one  of  the  first  economists  to  generalize  and  apply 
mathematical  methods  for  the  study  of  physics  and  biology  to  economics.  In  his  book, 
Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947)   derived from his doctoral dissertation at Harvard 
University     Samuelson  applies  mathematical  tools  from  the  classical  thermodynamics 
methods exposed by Gibbs (1846) to economics. Samuelson (1947) sows the seeds of agents’ 
maximising  behaviours  and  proposes  the  stability  of  equilibrium  as  the  main  source  of 
operationally meaningful theorems for economic systems. 
Later,  Muth  (1961)  and  then  Lucas  (1972)  refine  the  concepts  put  forward  by 
Samuelson and come up with the rational expectations hypothesis (REH). 
  The REH states that based on all available information It, the forecast of the price of 
an asset by an agent at time t for t+1 (s
a
t+1/t) is on average equal to its actual value in t+1 plus 
an error term εt: 
s
a
t+1/t = E(st+1/It) + εt           with  E(εt/It) = 0             
 
  Thus, REH claims that agents do not make systematic errors when they forecast the 
future value of an asset (E(εt/It)=0). Eventual forecasting errors made by agents are related to 
random unexpected information shocks εt not taken into account in the stock of information 
held by agents at time t. 
  The REH rests on several assumptions. First, REH assumes the existence of a unique 
representative agent in the market. In other words, agents have homogeneous expectations. 
Secondly, agents are supposed to know the true and unique model of asset price determination 
and  are  able  to  compute  the  fundamental  value  of  the price  of  the  asset.  Thirdly,  agents 
understand the full complexity of the world and can process all the information coming to the 
market. 
Rational expectations theory is the basis of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). 
According  to  Fama  (1965),  a  market  is  informationally  efficient  if  the  price  of  an  asset 
reflects all the relevant information. In other words, the market is informationally efficient if   2
the price of the asset st is always equal to its fundamental value ft, given all the available 
information: 
          st = E(ft/It) = Et(ft)         
 
The REH EMH paradigm has been abundantly used in economics by Neo classicals 
(Lucas, Prescott, Barro, etc.), Monetarists (Friedman, etc.) and Keynesians (Mankiw, Romer, 
Akerloff, etc.). The predominance of the REH in economics is explained by several reasons. 
First of all, the REH appeared as the first hypothesis able to counter the limits of previous 
hypotheses  on  agents’  expectations  such  as  static  expectations  or  adaptive  expectations. 
Secondly, REH is seen as an analytical condition or a technical mean that allows coordinating 
individual agents’ decisions and helps resolving general equilibrium models. Thirdly, models 
based on the REH have provided explanations of major phenomena in the field of economics 
and finance. As a result, many economists stick to the REH EMH hypotheses for lack of a 
better alternative and because assuming economic agents are rational is convenient from a 
modelling point of view. The dominance of the REH EMH paradigm has been such that it has 
concealed other alternative theories that counter the REH (such as the theory of bounded 
rationality put forward by Simon (1955)). 
 
The  REH EMH  paradigm  is  the  basis  of  traditional  models  of  exchange  rate 
determination such as portfolio balance models (Dornbush and Fischer (1980)) and monetary 
models (Dornbush (1976), Frenkel (1976), Mussa (1976)). 
Despite the attractiveness of the REH EMH paradigm, empirical works by Meese and 
Rogoff (1983) and later Cheung, Chinn and Garcia Pascual (2005) put several doubts on 
exchange rate models based on the REH EMH theory; even if some researchers (perhaps 
nostalgic ones) still try to save such models (Engle, Mark and West (2007)). These doubts are 
justified by the poor results offered by traditional models to explain and forecast exchange 
rate  dynamics.  Such  models  led  also  to  unresolved  puzzles  associated  to  exchange  rate 
dynamics such as the disconnection puzzle (why are exchange rates often disconnected from 
their fundamentals?); the excess volatility puzzle (why are exchange rates more volatile than 
their fundamentals?); the forward bias (why are forward exchange rates poor predictors of 
future exchange rates?). 
 
We claim that the REH EMH theory should not be judged by its elegance but by its 
capacity to withstand empirical testing. A majority of researchers now agree that the main   3
empirical predictions of REH EMH models have not been borne out by the facts. The failure 
of traditional exchange rate models based on the REH EMH paradigm led many researchers 
to ask about the relevance of the REH EMH hypotheses and to reconsider such hypotheses. 
 
2. Reconsidering the theoretical hypotheses of traditional models 
 
  2.1 From the reconsideration of the REH EMH paradigm… 
 
  The  reaction  to  the  empirical  failure  of  REH EMH  models  has  been  to  look  for 
alternative modelling approaches. This reaction has been stimulated by the emergence of a 
new branch of economic thinking first introduced by Simon (1955) and later by Kahneman, 
Tversky,  Thaler,  Shleifer  and  others.  We  examine  the  main  ideas  behind  this  school  of 
thought that is sometimes called behavioural economics or behavioural finance when applied 
to financial markets. The starting point of behavioural finance is the large body of evidence 
that has accumulated over time indicating that individuals do not behave in accordance with 
the REH EMH paradigm.  
 
We mention here a few anomalies relative to the REH and how those anomalies help 
understanding exchange rate dynamics empirically. 
 
The representative bias was highlighted by Kahneman and Tversky (1974). They show 
that  individuals  tend  to  set  up  general  rules  from specific  observations.  From  a  temporal 
perspective, the representative bias is translated into a momentum bias. The momentum bias 
means that agents tend to overweight the past recent information in their decisions. 
  The abundant use of chartist rules in the foreign exchange market (Allen and Taylor 
(1992), Menkhoff and Taylor (2007)) justifies this bias among market agents empirically. 
Indeed,  chartist rules such as momentum rules forecast future exchange rate dynamics by 
interpolating past movements of exchange rates. The momentum bias has become a stylised 
fact since surveys among foreign market practitioners confirm the abundant use of momentum 
rules in every foreign exchange places around the world: Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo 
(Lui and Mole (1998), Cheung and Wong (2000)); London (Allen and Taylor (1992), Cheung, 
Chinn and Marsh (2004)) and the United States (Cheung and Chinn (2001)). 
   4
  The anchoring bias was discovered by Kahneman and Tversky (1974). They show that 
in situations of uncertainty, individuals tend to proceed to a numerical evaluation by relying 
on an external number whether relevant or not. 
  The anchoring bias is illustrated into the foreign exchange market by the existence of 
psychological barriers in exchange rate dynamics. Psychological barriers are observed when 
market agents attach importance to a given threshold value for the price of a currency. The 
exchange rate fluctuates close to the threshold value and does not go beyond this threshold: 
the exchange rate volatility is low. Once the exchange rate overtakes the threshold, it wanders 
away from it and reaches another threshold. Exchange rate volatility becomes higher during 
this movement. De Grauwe and Decupere (1992) provide empirical evidence on the existence 
of psychological barriers in the foreign exchange market. Westerhoff (2003) theorises this 
stylised fact to explain volatility clustering effects in exchange rate dynamics (i.e. the fact that 
exchange rates alternate between periods of high volatility and periods of low volatility). 
 
  The  confirmation  bias  was  highlighted  by  Wason  (1960).  Wason  shows  that 
individuals tend to favour information that confirms their hypotheses or the output of their 
models regardless of whether this information is true. The confirmation bias is part of the 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger (1957)). Festinger shows that agents tend to overweight the 
information that confirms their decisions and underweight or even ignore the information that 
goes against their opinion. 
  From an empirical perspective, De Grauwe (2000) shows that because it is difficult to 
predict exchange rate dynamics, agents tend to rely on fundamentals that confirm the recent 
past  exchange  rate  dynamics  and  ignore  other  fundamentals.  For  example,  market  agents 
justify the depreciation of the euro against the dollar between January 1999 and December 
2002 by higher growth prospects in the United States than in Europe. Also, market agents 
blamed the huge external deficits of the United States relative to the euro zone to justify the 
depreciation  of  the  dollar  vis à vis  the  euro  between  January  2003  and  December  2004. 
Further, Cheung and Chinn (2001) show that fundamentals considered by market agents in the 
determination of exchange rates vary across time periods. For example, market agents gave 
higher  weights  to  money  supply  and  trade  deficits  between  1990  and  1995  contrary  to 
inflation,  interest  rates  and  unemployment.  Conversely,  between  1995  and  2000,  market 
agents gave more importance to inflation, interest rates and unemployment and less to money 
supply and trade deficits. Bachetta and van Wincoop (2005) theorise this stylised fact in their   5
scapegoat model. A fundamental variable is taken as a scapegoat to explain exchange rate 
movements in a given period of time. 
 
  Overconfidence shows that individuals’ subjective confidence in their judgments is 
reliably greater than their objective accuracy.  
The survey by Oberleshner and Osler (2004) justifies overconfidence among foreign 
exchange market practitioners. Odean (1999) uses overconfidence to justify the hot potato 
effect in the foreign exchange market. Overconfidence leads dealers to increase their belief on 
their ability to find better investment opportunities. They thus increase their portfolio turnover. 
This increased turnover hence explains the large amount of positions passed among dealers. 
Other studies like Daniel, Hirschleifer and Subramanyam (1998) or Barberis and Thaler (2002) 
use  overconfidence  to  justify  respectively  the  disconnection  of  exchange  rates  from 
fundamentals and excess volatility in currency prices. 
 
 
  Regarding the EMH, behavioural finance has also highlighted phenomena in financial 
markets that disconnect the price of the currency from its fundamental value. Hence, currency 
prices are not always equal to their fundamental value. 
One  of  the  most  popular  phenomena  is  herding  behaviour  or  mimetism  (Keynes 
(1936)).  Financial  markets  are  for  individuals  a  complex  and  uncertain  environment.  To 
survive in such an environment, agents tend to reproduce other agents’ behaviours. Herding 
behaviours  trigger  information  cascades  (Bikhchandani,  Hirschleifer  and  Welch  (1992)). 
Information cascades occur when agents follow the actions of other agents independently of 
their own private information. Osler (2002) shows evidence that specific rules (such as stop 
loss  orders)  used  by  foreign  exchange  market  practitioners  are  based  on  other  agents’ 
behaviours, and are likely to trigger information cascades. Although rational at individual 
levels,  mimetism  leads  to  irrational  phenomena  at  global  levels  such  as  bubbles  i.e. 
disconnections of asset prices from their fundamental value. 
 
The EMH assumes also that arbitrageurs erase eventual discrepancies between asset 
prices and their fundamental value. Researchers have highlighted several limits to arbitrage in 
financial markets. 
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990) show that the noise brought by 
irrational agents (noise traders) increases the risk of holding the risky asset. This increased   6
risk in turn limits the intervention of rational agents (arbitrageurs) in the market.  Besides, 
DeLong et al. (1990) show that the increased risk generated by irrational agents to hold the 
risky asset induces higher returns for noise traders than for arbitrageurs. As irrational agents 
earn higher returns than rational agents, noise traders survive in the market in the long run. As 
a result, disconnections of the price of the asset from its fundamental value do not disappear 
even in the long run. Empirically, the effect of noise traders in the foreign exchange market 
can  be  observed  through  price  manipulations  by  large  players  (Rankin  (1999),  Corsetti, 
Pesenti and Roubini (2001)), the effects of rumours (Oberlechner and Hocking (2004)), etc. 
 
 
Thus,  a  large  body  of  evidence  in  financial  markets  counters  the  fact  that  agents 
behave  in  accordance  with  the  REH EMH paradigm.  Our  research path  departs  from  the 
REH EMH hypotheses. Rather, we assume agents are bounded rational. Bounded rationality 
is a concept put forward by Simon (1955). Simon argues that in decision making, individuals’ 
rationality is limited by the information they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, 
and the finite amount of time they have to make decisions. This assumption does not mean 
that  agents  are  irrational  or  stupid.  The  paradigm  of  bounded  rationality  is  just  more 
reasonable than the REH EMH. 
Indeed, the world is too complex for human beings to know the fundamental model of 
exchange rates and to be able to process all the available information concerning an asset. 
Instead, human beings draw simple rules   heuristics   from this complexity to compute the 
price of an asset (anchoring bias). Also, human beings cannot process all the information that 
comes  to  them.  They  will  select  some  information  and  ignore  other  (representative  bias, 
confirmation bias). Besides, agents are not bereft of any psychological dimension as stated by 
the  REH EMH.  Damasio  (2003)  emphasises  the  importance  of  the  emotional  process  in 
agents’ decisions and shows that psychological factors (e.g. overconfidence) do affect market 
agents’ decisions. 
 
  2.2 … To the birth of new theories of exchange rate determination 
 
  The willingness to depart from the REH EMH paradigm has given birth to several 
promising theories in exchange rate determination. First, researchers have relinquished the 
concept of homogeneous expectations for the one of heterogeneous expectations. This turn 
has led researchers to set two theories: order flows models of exchange rate and behavioural   7
(heterogeneous agents) models of exchange rate. Secondly, the fact that agents are bounded 
rational and that they face a complex world led researchers to set the theory of imperfect 
knowledge economics. 
 
  Order flows models of exchange rate were pioneered by the work of Evans and Lyons 
(2002). These models belong to the broader field of microstructure theory. Order flows are 
defined as the net of buyer  and seller initiated currency transactions. Order flows may be 
thought  of  as  a  measure  of  net  buying  pressure.  Order  flows  theorists  emphasise  the 
importance  of  private  information  in  the  determination  of  asset  prices  relative  to  public 
information. Private information regroups the heterogeneous beliefs of market agents. Thus 
order flows can be seen as a proxy for agents’ heterogeneous expectations. 
From an empirical perspective, order flows models of exchange rate provide better 
explanatory power of exchange rate dynamics relative to traditional models of exchange rate. 
This result holds in the short run as well as in the long run (Evans and Lyons (2002, 2006, 
2008), Berger et al. (2008)). Order flows models also provide better forecasts than traditional 
models since they beat the random walk in the short run (Lindahl and Rime (2006), Rime et al. 
(2010)).  Besides,  models  based  on  order  flows  also  offer  solutions  to  the  exchange  rate 
disconnection puzzle (Bachetta and van Wincoop (2006), Evans (2010)). 
 
  Behavioural  (heterogeneous  agents)  models  of  exchange  rate  were  set  by  the 
pioneered work of Frankel and Froot (1986) and later revisited by De Grauwe and Grimaldi 
(2007). Behavioural models of exchange rate are based on the stylised fact that two major 
agents  interact  in  the  foreign  exchange  market:  chartists  and  fundamentalists.  Chartists 
interpolate  past  trends  of  exchange  rates  to  forecast  future  exchange  rate  dynamics. 
Fundamentalists forecast future exchange rates based on the spread between the observed 
exchange rate and its fundamental value. 
A large credit has been attributed to this theory since the interaction between chartists 
and  fundamentalists  allows  explaining  exchange  rate  dynamics  and  especially  the 
disconnection of exchange rates from their fundamental value. The works by Vigfusson (1997) 
and later Chan et al. (2000) validate empirically the theoretical models of Frankel and Froot 
(1986). Behavioural exchange rate models explain also other puzzles undermining exchange 
rate dynamics such as the excess volatility puzzle or volatility clustering effects (De Grauwe 
and Grimaldi (2007)). 
   8
  The approach of Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE) was set by the pioneered 
work of Frydman and Goldberg (2007)
1. Their approach follows neither REH EMH models, 
nor  behavioural  finance  models.  In  line  with  the  Lucas’  (1976)  critique,  Frydman  and 
Goldberg (2007) recognise that models that predetermine agents’ behaviours (such as REH 
EMH models and behavioural finance models) are inadequate. Indeed, such models assume 
that agents act as robots i.e. in accordance with the exogenous rules specified by the modeller. 
Such models do not allow for endogenous evolutions in agents’ behaviours and unpredictable 
changes  in  the  environment  faced  by  agents.  Instead,  Frydman  and  Goldberg  propose  to 
partially predetermine the behaviour of agents by imposing qualitative restrictions in their 
models instead of quantitative ones. 
  IKE provides a new solution to the exchange rate disconnection puzzle. IKE shows 
that with incomplete knowledge, disconnections of exchange rates from fundamentals do not 
depend on whether prices are sticky or flexible as argued by past REH EMH models. Rather, 
disconnections  arise  from  the  fact  that  market  agents  have  to  cope  with  an  imperfect 
knowledge of the structure of the economy. 
 
  Thus theories that depart from the concept of REH EMH offer a better understanding 
of exchange rate dynamics. Hence in our quest to build a robust model of exchange rate 
determination, we will take account of the lessons from the behavioural finance literature. 
Having  clarified  which  theoretical  path  we  follow,  we  indicate  in  the  next  section  the 
structures of the models that are likely to offer the best fit for our modelling approach. 
 
3. Improving the empirical structure of traditional models of exchange rate 
 
The empirical failure of traditional models of exchange rate leads us to reconsider the 
econometric structure used in these models. Traditional models assume the existence of a 
symmetric world and a linear structure between the exchange rate and its fundamentals. The 
existence of a symmetric world implies that a shock on a given fundamental whether in the 
domestic or in the foreign economies will have the same effect on the exchange rate. A linear 
structure means that there is a stable relationship between the exchange rate and a given stock 
of fundamentals through time. Both hypotheses are not verified empirically. 
                                                           
1 The ideas from Frydman and Goldberg (2007) are also shared by practitioners who have a close experience 
with financial markets, notably Soros (1987).   9
First, a lot of studies provide evidence that investors react asymmetrically to news on a 
given fundamental between two economies (Prast and De Vor (2000), Galati and Ho (2001) 
and  Andersen  et  al.  (2003)).  As  a  matter  of  facts,  empirical  results  for  the  euro/dollar 
exchange rate suggest that market agents overweight news coming from the United States 
relative to news coming from the euro area. This fact gives more credit to the assumption of 
an asymmetric world. An asymmetric structure means that agents do not react the same way 
to the same shock in the domestic and in the foreign economies. 
Secondly, a large body of literature (De Grauwe (2000), Cheung and Chinn (2001)) 
shows that some fundamentals may be important in the determination of exchange rates at 
some  periods  while  not  at  others.  De  Grauwe  and  Vansteenkiiste  (2002)  show  that  the 
dynamics of exchange rates and their fundamentals are characterised by structural breaks. 
Cheung,  Chinn  and  Garcia  Pascual  (2005)  showed  that  linear  models  with  particular 
macroeconomic variables perform well in some periods but not in others. Also, models that 
take  account  of  non linear  structures  in  the  modelling  of  exchange  rates  based  on 
fundamentals (Gandolfo, Padoan and Paladino (1990), Kilian and Taylor (2003), Cheung and 
Erlandsson (2005)) provide better explanatory and predictive results than traditional models. 
These facts give more credit to non linear models. Non linearities mean that exchange rates 
are  not  explained  by  the  same  set  of  fundamentals  through  time  or  equivalently  that  the 
relationship between exchange rates and a given stock of fundamentals is not stable through 
time. 
  Until now, econometrics offer two types of tools to model exchange rate dynamics 
based on non linear structures. On the one hand, one can use non linear models where regime 
switches  depend  on  observable  variables  (threshold  models  and  time varying  transition 
probabilities (TVTP) Markov switching models); and on the other hand, one can rely on non 
linear models where regime switches are driven by unobservable variables (hidden or fixed 
transition probabilities (FTP) Markov switching models). 
Threshold models imply that the parameters of the state equations vary according to 
the position of an observable variable relative to a threshold value. Threshold models are split 
in two categories. TAR models (Threshold AutoRegressive)   pioneered by Tong (1978) and 
Tong and Lim (1980)   imply that the transition between the state equations is sudden and 
depends on an indicative function that takes the values 0 or 1. Later Luukkonen, Saikkonen 
and Teräsvirta (1988), Luukkonen and Teräsvirta (1991) and Teräsvirta and Anderson (1992) 
propose an extension of TAR models into STAR models (Smooth Transition Autoregressive). 
In  STAR  models,  state  transitions  are  progressive  and  are  modelled  with  a  continuous   10
function bordered between 0 and 1. Generally, such models consider either a logistic function 
(LSTAR) or an exponential function (ESTAR). 
TVTP Markov switching models were pioneered by the work of Diebold et al. (1994), 
Engel and Hakkio (1994) and Filardo (1994). In these models, the transitions between state 
equations depend on an observable state variable. The transition probabilities are allowed to 
vary over time depending on the value of the observable variable. 
Hidden or FTP Markov switching models were pioneered by Goldfeld and Quandt 
(1973) and applied to time series by Hamilton (1989). Such models differ from threshold 
models and also from TVTP Markov switching models in that the transition between the state 
equations depends on an unobservable state variable that usually follows a Markov chain of 
order one. The transition probabilities are here constant through time and do not depend on 
any observable state variable. 
  Although  undermined  by  a  difficult  implementation  relative  to  linear  models, 
nonlinear models   both threshold models and Markov switching models   provide a more 
suitable framework for the modelling of exchange rate dynamics. As a result, our research 
procedure will make use of these tools to model exchange rate dynamics. 
 
4. Problematic and major challenges of the thesis 
 
The objective of the thesis is to find a robust model that determines the dynamics of 
exchange rates at short, medium and long run horizons. The imposed challenge is that this 
model has to provide better explanatory and predictive powers of exchange rate dynamics 
than traditional models of exchange rate. 
Given  the  above  arguments,  the  hypotheses  of  a  robust  model  of  exchange  rate 
determination have to depart from the REH EMH paradigm. Our modelling approach draw 
lessons  from  behavioural  finance.  Our  model  takes  account  not  only  of  macroeconomic 
fundamentals but also of behavioural and psychological components of market agents. This 
chosen path of research is justified by the importance of agents’ behaviours to understand 
exchange rate dynamics especially at short horizons. Such arguments have been emphasised 
by surveys of market practitioners (Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung and Chinn (2001), 
Cheung, Chinn and Marsh (2004)). These surveys show that market psychology plays a major 
role in the determination of exchange rates in the short run (i.e. for horizons shorter than 6 
months).   11
To build a robust exchange rate model, our modelling approach draws also lessons 
from non linear econometrics. We rely on threshold models and Markov switching models. 
The difficulty of this challenge lies in the fact that we have to avoid falling in what Frisch 
(1970)   the founder of the Econometric Society   called playometrics
2. The argument of 
Frisch means that a pure econometric model not based on any relevant theoretical concepts is 
simply not receivable. To counter this argument and to justify our econometric approach with 
regards to dubitative researchers about the use of econometrics (see also Hendry (1980)), we 
refine our research procedure. We compel to build a parsimonious and robust exchange rate 
model based on a relevant economic theory. 
 
The question that one may raise is whether lessons from behavioural finance and non 
linear  econometrics  are  sufficient  enough  to  build  a  robust  model  of  exchange  rate 
determination? This thesis puts forward some answers... but in all its modesty, this thesis 
provides only part of the answers. 
 
5. Main results highlighted by the thesis 
 
The first article analyses the environment of research that is, the foreign exchange 
market. The second article provides elements to understand the success of order flows models 
in exchange rate determination. The third article looks for the determinants of heterogeneous 
behaviours in the foreign exchange market. The fourth article proposes an unorthodox model 
of exchange rate determination based on conventions that prevail among market agents in the 
foreign exchange market. 
 
  5.1 Through the looking glass: reconsidering efficiency in the foreign exchange 
market 
 
This paper argues that market efficiency can be split into multiple and independent 
forms. We provide three definitions of market efficiency: fundamental efficiency, speculative 
efficiency and macroeconomic efficiency. 
                                                           
2 “Observations get a meaning only if they are interpreted by an underlying theory. Therefore, theory, and 
sometimes very abstract theory, there must be. And no kind of mathematical analysis in economics should be 
rejected just because it might be difficult and refined mathematics. But at the same time I have insisted that 
econometrics must have relevance for concrete realities   otherwise it degenerates into something which is not 
worthy of the name econometrics, but ought rather to be called playometrics”, dixit Frisch (1970).   12
  Fundamental efficiency (or Fama’s efficiency) holds in the market if, on the one hand, 
exchange rate dynamics reflect the evolution of fundamentals as stated by uncovered interest 
rate parity (UIP) and on the other hand, if speculation is not profitable in the market; i.e. if the 
return/risk ratio associated to a speculative strategy is not higher than the one associated to 
another investment strategy for a given amount of risk. Speculative efficiency prevails in the 
market if speculation is not profitable; that is if the return/risk ratio associated to a speculative 
strategy  is  not  higher  than  the  one  associated  to  another  investment  strategy  for  a  given 
amount  of  risk;  and  if  the  exchange  rate  is  disconnected  from  its  fundamental  value. 
Macroeconomic efficiency describes the ability of exchange rates to evolve according to their 
fundamentals.  It  implies  not  only  the  existence  of  a  long  run  relationship  between  the 
exchange rate and its fundamentals; but also the existence of correction forces that reduce 
macroeconomic disequilibria related to exchange rate movements   such as current account 
deficits. A corollary of the first and second conditions is the possibility to forecast future 
exchange rate dynamics by using macroeconomic fundamentals. 
  For each form of efficiency, we define a set of empirical tests. Fundamental efficiency 
holds if UIP and the REH hold in the market. To assess speculative efficiency, we analyse the 
profitability of two speculative strategies commonly used among foreign exchange market 
practitioners:  a  momentum  strategy  and  a  carry  trade  strategy.  To  test  macroeconomic 
efficiency we analyse the predictive performances of a fundamental model of exchange rate. 
Empirical tests are based on the euro/dollar, the pound/dollar and the yen/dollar exchange 
rates. 
Results show that in the short run (between 1 month and 1 year) pure inefficiency 
prevails in the foreign exchange market. This result is justified by the failure of UIP, the 
possibility to make profits from momentum and carry trade strategies and the existence of 
long lasting misalignments between the exchange rate and its fundamentals at short horizons. 
In the medium term (between 1 year and 2 years), speculative efficiency characterises foreign 
exchange  market  efficiency.  Indeed,  UIP  holds  thus  limiting  profits  from  carry  trades; 
forecasts based on momentum rules worsen thus limiting the profitability of momentum rules. 
In the long run (from 5 years on), macroeconomic efficiency holds in the foreign exchange 
market. Indeed, fundamental models provide significant explanatory and predictive powers 
for exchange rate dynamics. Fundamental efficiency   Fama’s efficiency   is rejected in the 
foreign exchange market whatever horizon considered. This result is justified by the failure of 
UIP in the short run (between 3 months and 1 year), the poor performances of fundamental   13
models in the short/medium term (from 1 month to 2 years) and the rejection of REH (at all 
horizons). 
 
The main point of this article is that traditional models of exchange rate perform well 
in the long run (from 5 years on) but not in the short/medium run. Therefore, at short/medium 
run  horizons,  there  must  be  other  forces  than  macroeconomic  fundamentals  that  explain 
exchange  rate  dynamics.  This  article  argues  that  market  psychology  (overreaction, 
bandwagon effects, rumours, etc.) can play the role of such forces. As a result, we claim that a 
robust model of exchange rate should include not solely macroeconomic fundamentals but 
also behavioural or psychological agents’ components to provide a relevant explanation of 
exchange rate dynamics. One may wonder whether a model of this kind already exists. 
 
5.2  Inside  the  black  box:  why  are  order  flows  models  of  exchange  rate  more 
competitive than traditional models of exchange rate? 
 
This article investigates the outstanding success of order flows models of exchange 
rate  (Lyons  (2001),  Evans  and  Lyons  (2002)).  As  a  matter  of  facts,  order  flows  models 
provide better explanatory and predictive powers in forecasting exchange rate dynamics than 
traditional models not solely in the long run, but also in the short run (Berger et al. (2008)).  
Our  intuition  is  that  the  difference  of  performances  between  traditional  models  of 
exchange rate and order flows models is due to the fact that these models may not consider 
the same stock of information. We therefore look inside the black box of order flows models 
to unveil the information contained in order flows. 
We set a theoretical model that embeds all the information available in the foreign 
exchange  market  that  is  likely  to  affect  exchange  rate  determination.  The  model  aims  at 
observing how the initial information is included into the final price of the currency. The 
model relies on a behavioural exchange rate model and a microstructure model. 
The  article  puts  forward  three  results.  First,  model  simulations  replicate  important 
stylised facts observed in the foreign exchange market. In the short run, the exchange rate is 
disconnected  from  its  fundamental  value  but  not  from  order  flows.  In  the  long  run,  the 
exchange rate returns towards its fundamental value and remains still close to order flows. 
Customer and interdealer order flows are highly correlated with exchange rate dynamics at all 
horizons.  Besides  the  hot  potato  effect  magnifies  the  amount  of  interdealer  order  flows 
relative to the amount of customer order flows. Secondly, the article argues that the foreign   14
exchange  market  is  intrinsically  inefficient.  Information  is  distorted  in  the  final  price  by 
agents’ behaviours (behavioural noise) and by the trading mechanism peculiar to the foreign 
exchange market (microstructure noise). Thirdly, the article explains why order flows provide 
an  answer  to  the  exchange  rate  disconnection  puzzle.  Order  flows  contain  information 
processed  by  agents  while  traditional  models  only  consider  raw  information.  Processed 
information in order flows includes a time varying weight of fundamental information (both 
public  and  private),  behavioural  agents’  information  (both  public  and  private)  and 
microstructure  information.  Conversely,  information  considered  in  traditional  models  only 
includes  public  fundamental  information.  The  difference  in  the  types  of  information 
considered by order flows models and traditional models explain why order flows models 
provide  higher  explanatory  and  predictive  powers  of  exchange  rate  dynamics  relative  to 
traditional models. 
 
This article claims that traditional models will never do better than order flows models 
even if we take account of alternative specifications (e.g. non linear) for traditional models. 
The advantage of order flows models is to take account of the behavioural dimension of 
agents.  Indeed,  order  flows  include  information  that  has  been  processed  by  agents 
(fundamental information plus behavioural noise plus microstructure noise) while traditional 
models  of  exchange  rate  only  consider  raw  or  unprocessed  information  (i.e.  fundamental 
information). This article thus confirms the point underlined in the first article: market agents’ 
psychology  plays  a  significant  role  in  the  determination  of  exchange  rates.  Order  flows 
theorists do not hide the behavioural dimension of order flows models. They state that order 
flow is a proxy for heterogeneous expectations of market agents. However, order flows are 
still a black box. This problem implies that order flows models do not resolve the puzzle of 
exchange  rate  determination  since  researchers  do  not  know  yet  the  determinants  of  order 
flows. One way to clarify the information contained in order flows would therefore be to 
model expectations’ heterogeneity contained in order flows. Heterogeneous agents models 
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5.3  On  the  determinants  of  heterogeneous  behaviours  in  financial  markets: 
evidence from non linear models 
 
  Following Frankel and Froot (1986) and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007), this article 
models the heterogeneity of agents’ behaviours by relying on two types of agents: chartists 
and fundamentalists. 
  The article shows that models based on heterogeneous agents significantly  explain 
exchange rate dynamics. However, the related literature does not investigate the empirical 
determinants  of  heterogeneous  behaviours.  The  paper  first  analyses  the  link  between 
heterogeneous behaviours in the euro/dollar foreign exchange market and the European and 
US  stock  markets.  Then,  the  paper  analyses  the  empirical  determinants  of  heterogeneous 
behaviours. The period of analysis spans January 1990 until December 2009. 
First, results show that the homogeneity of heterogeneous behaviours across markets 
increases all over the period. For example, at the beginning of the period, shocks affecting 
only the foreign exchange market or only the stock market did not generate homogeneous 
behaviours on the three markets, contrary to shocks at the end of the period. This observation 
justifies the increasing financial integration between stock markets and the foreign exchange 
market. This increasing homogeneity in market behaviours increases in turn the instability of 
financial  markets  in  periods  of  financial  turmoil.  Besides,  the  causality  of  behaviours  is 
significant and strong within markets that trade the same asset (here between the European 
and US stock markets) but weaker or even not significant between two markets that trade 
different assets (here between either the European or the US stock markets, and the foreign 
exchange market). 
  Secondly, we find that risk aversion (approximated by implied volatility on option 
prices)  is  more  likely  to  explain  heterogeneous  behaviours  in  financial  markets  than 
macroeconomic fundamentals. When risk aversion is high (low), fundamentalists (chartists) 
dominate  the  market.  As  a  result,  fundamentalists  dominate  in  times  of  crisis  (when  risk 
aversion increases) while chartists dominate in times of booms (when risk aversion decreases). 
From a behavioural perspective, agents seem therefore more rational in times of crisis (since 
they rely more on fundamentals to forecast exchange rates) than in times of booms (where 
agents rely more on chartist analysis and ignore macroeconomic fundamentals). 
Based on this stylised fact we build a behavioural forecasting rule. This rule provides 
better out of sample forecasts of future asset prices than the random walk. This observation 
stands in the long run as well as in the short run. This result proves that taking account of   16
stylised facts about agents’ behaviours is useful for explaining and forecasting asset price 
dynamics. This article thus confirms the underlying point of the thesis i.e. considering agents’ 
behaviours is important to build robust models of exchange rate determination. 
 
Heterogeneous  agents  models  present  however  two  major  drawbacks.  First,  these 
models  have  to  specify  an  arbitrary  value  for  the  fundamental  exchange  rate  for  the 
specification of the fundamentalist rule. Specifying a unique fundamental exchange rate limits 
the objectivity of the heterogeneous agents’ approach because empirically multiple definitions 
of the fundamental exchange rate prevail in the market. The second drawback lies in the fact 
that  heterogeneous  agents  models  fully  predetermine  the  behaviour  of  economic  agents. 
Indeed, such models associate an exogenous rule to each agent. Agents therefore have to 
comply to a given rule. The problem is that empirically, agents tend to modify their models 
through time often by following trial and error strategies. One may wonder whether one can 
find a model that allows for this endogenous change in agents’ behaviours? 
 
5.4 Conventions in the foreign exchange market: can they really explain exchange 
rate dynamics? 
 
This paper provides an unorthodox way to model exchange rate dynamics based on 
conventions that prevail among market agents. The intuition behind the convention model is 
based on a stylised fact highlighted by De Grauwe (2000). De Grauwe argues that agents tend 
to look for fundamentals that confirm the observed movements in the exchange rate. For 
instance, the large depreciation of the euro relative to the dollar between January 1999 and 
December 2002 was attributed to the strong growth performance in the United States relative 
to the euro zone. On the contrary, the appreciation of the euro relative to the dollar between 
December 2002 and December 2004 was justified by large current account deficits in the 
United States compared to the euro zone. Bachetta and van Wincoop (2005) theorised this 
idea  in  the  scapegoat  model.  A  fundamental  variable  is  taken  as  a  scapegoat  to  explain 
exchange  rate  dynamics  in  a  given  period  of  time.  Our  approach  differs  strongly  from 
Bachetta and van Wincoop (2005). Our convention model borrows more elements from the 
Imperfect  Knowledge  Economics  (IKE)  approach  pioneered  by  Frydman  and  Goldberg 
(2007). 
We first build a theoretical model to explain the mechanisms underlying the formation 
of market conventions. The simulated exchange rate from the theoretical convention model   17
replicates several stylised facts highlighted empirically in exchange rates dynamics. We then 
test this model empirically on the euro/dollar exchange rate. The period of analysis spans 
January 1995 to December 2008. We rely on two alternative methods. The first method is a 
macroeconomic analysis that aims at explaining the euro/dollar movements by relying on the 
consensus of economists. This method is based on the analysis of the fundamentals used by 
the economic and financial literature to justify the euro/dollar dynamics. The second method 
is based  on  an  econometric  approach.  We  estimate  a time varying parameters  model  and 
assess the predictive performances of the selected fundamental models to find the conventions 
that drive the euro/dollar dynamics. 
Both methods show that market switches between fundamentals considered in a bull 
convention and in a bear convention explain the euro/dollar dynamics between January 1995 
and  December  2008.  The  analysis  thus  shows  the  existence  of  a  non linear  relationship 
between fundamentals and the euro/dollar exchange rate. In other words, some fundamentals 
may  be  more  important  at  some  periods  of  time  for  the  determination  of  exchange  rate 
dynamics while other fundamentals are important at other periods of time.  
Both methods identify three major conventions in the euro/dollar market. The first 
convention is the new economy convention that covered the period January 1995   December 
2000. Investors were relatively more optimistic in the growth prospects of the US economy 
than in European economies. The dollar experiences a strong appreciating trend in this period. 
Between January 2001 and June 2003, the market relies on a bear convention based on the 
huge external debt of the US economy. The dollar starts a strong depreciating trend in this 
period. Then, between July 2003 and December 2005, two competing conventions prevailed 
in the market. A bear convention that focused mainly on the large US current account deficits; 
and a bull convention that pointed to the spectacular recovery of the US economy from the 
internet  bubble  burst.  During  this  period  the  dollar  alternates  between  short lasting 
appreciating and depreciating trends according to whether the bull convention dominates the 
bear  one.  After  January  2006,  fundamentals  worsened  in  the  US  economy.  The  bear 
convention started to dominate the bull one. The spark of the subprime crisis in June 2007 
definitely led to the domination of the bear convention in the market. 
The article then tests the predictive power of the convention model with regards to 
alternative specifications. Results show that at horizons longer than 1 month, the convention 
model provides better out of sample forecasts than traditional exchange rate models and than 
the simple random walk. As a result, this article shows that convention theory appears as a 
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Introduction Générale: 
De la Difficulté de Modéliser la Dynamique des Taux de Change 
 
 
1. Le point de départ: l’échec des modèles traditionnels de détermination des taux de 
change 
 
  Paul A. Samuelson fut un des premiers économistes à avoir appliqué et généralisé 
l’utilisation  de  méthodes  mathématiques  en  provenance  des  sciences  physiques  et  de  la 
biologie  à  l’économie.  Dans  son  ouvrage, Foundations  of  Economic  Analysis  (1947),  qui 
retrace  les  travaux  de  sa  thèse  de  doctorat  défendue  à  Harvard,  Samuelson  applique  à 
l’économie  les  outils  mathématiques  utilisés  en  thermodynamique  par  Gibbs  (1848). 
Samuelson pose ainsi les fondements de l’agent maximisateur et affirme que la stabilité d’un 
équilibre est la condition nécessaire et satisfaisante de tout équilibre économique. 
  Muth  (1961)  et  Lucas  (1972)  reprennent  et  affinent  la  théorie  développée  par 
Samuelson en posant l’hypothèse d’anticipations rationnelles (HAR). L’HAR suppose que sur 
la base de toute l’information disponible It, la prévision du prix d’un actif en t pour t+1 (s
a
t+1/t) 




t+1/t = E(st+1/It) + εt           avec    E(εt/It) = 0             
 
  L’HAR  suppose  ainsi  que  les  agents  ne  font  pas  d’erreurs  systématiques  dans  la 
prévision  de  la  valeur  future  du  prix  d’un  actif  (E(εt/It)=0).  Les  éventuelles  erreurs  de 
prévisions  faites  par  les  agents  sont  justifiées  par  des  chocs  de  nouvelles  aléatoires  non 
anticipés. 
  L’HAR repose sur plusieurs hypothèses. En premier lieu, l’HAR suppose l’existence 
d’un agent représentatif dans le marché. Elle suppose donc que les anticipations des agents 
sont  homogènes.  En  deuxième  lieu,  les  agents  connaissent  l’unique  et  vrai  modèle  de 
détermination  des  prix  d’actifs.  Les  agents  ont  donc  la  capacité  de  calculer  la  valeur 
fondamentale du prix d’un actif. En troisième lieu, les agents comprennent la complexité de 
l’environnement  dans  lequel  ils  évoluent  et  peuvent  tenir  compte  de  toute  l’information 
disponible pour prendre leurs décisions. 
  L’HAR  constitue  le  fondement  de  l’hypothèse  d’efficience  informationnelle  des 
marchés (HEM). Selon Fama (1965), un marché est informationnellement efficient si le prix   27
d’un  actif  st  reflète  toujours  la  valeur  fondamentale  ft  de  l’actif  compte  tenu  de  toute 
l’information disponible : 
          st = E(ft/It) = Et(ft)             
 
  Le  paradigme  de  l’HAR HEM  a  été  abondamment  utilisé  en  économie  par  les 
néoclassiques (Lucas, Prescott, Barro, etc.), les monétaristes (Friedman, etc.) et les keynésiens 
(Mankiw, Romer, Akerloff, etc.). Cette utilisation fréquente est justifiée par plusieurs raisons. 
Premièrement,  l’HAR  est  la  première  hypothèse  sur  les  anticipations  des  agents  venant 
contrer les limites des précédentes hypothèses (les hypothèses d’anticipations statiques ou 
celles  d’anticipations  adaptatives).  Deuxièmement,  l’HAR  apparaît  comme  une  condition 
analytique nécessaire pour coordonner les décisions individuelles des agents et pour résoudre 
les modèles d’équilibre général. Troisièmement, les modèles économiques basés sur l’HAR 
ont  permis  d’apporter  des  explications  à  d’importants  phénomènes  dans  le  domaine  de 
l’économie  et  de  la  finance.  En  conséquence,  de  nombreux  chercheurs  s’appuient  sur  le 
paradigme  de  l’HAR HEM  par  manque  de  meilleure(s)  hypothèse(s)  alternative(s)  mais 
également parce que l’HAR apparaît comme un outil satisfaisant en matière de modélisation 
économique. La prédominance de l’HAR HEM a été telle que ce paradigme a occulté d’autres 
théories alternatives telles que la théorie de la rationalité limitée développée par Simon (1955). 
 
  L’HAR HEM constitue la base des modèles traditionnels de détermination des taux de 
change tels que les modèles de portefeuille (Dornbush et  Fischer (1980)) ou les modèles 
monétaires (Dornbush (1976), Frenkel (1976), Mussa (1976)). En dépit de l’attrait de l’HAR 
HEM, les travaux empiriques entrepris par Meese et Rogoff (1983) puis par Cheung, Chinn et 
Garcia Pascual (2005) soulèvent des doutes sur la pertinence des modèles de change basés sur 
l’HAR HEM. Ces doutes sont justifiés par le faible pouvoir explicatif et prédictif des modèles 
traditionnels de change. Ces modèles ont également conduit à des énigmes sur la dynamique 
des  taux  de  change  telles  que  l’énigme  de  la  déconnexion  des  taux  de  change  (pourquoi 
l’évolution  des  changes  est elle  déconnectée  de  celle  des  fondamentaux ?) ;  l’énigme  de 
l’excès de volatilité du change (pourquoi les taux de change sont ils plus volatils que leurs 
fondamentaux ?) ; l’énigme de la prime de terme (comment expliquer que les taux de change 
à terme sont de mauvais prédicteurs des taux de change futurs ?) 
 
  La théorie de l’HAR HEM ne doit pas être jugée par son élégance théorique mais 
plutôt par sa capacité à expliquer les phénomènes observés empiriquement. Les chercheurs   28
reconnaissent que les modèles de change basés sur l’HAR HEM offrent des performances 
empiriques non satisfaisantes. Ces faits ont conduit de nombreux chercheurs à s’interroger sur 
la pertinence de l’HAR HEM et même à reconsidérer ce paradigme. 
 
2. La reconsidération des hypothèses des modèles traditionnels de change 
 
  2.1 De la reconsidération du paradigme de l’HAR HEM… 
 
  Face à l’échec empirique des modèles traditionnels de change basés sur l’HAR HEM, 
les chercheurs se sont tournés vers des approches alternatives et notamment vers la finance 
comportementale. La finance comportementale a été développée par Simon (1955) puis par 
Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler et Shleifer. La finance comportementale s’appuie sur des faits 
empiriques  (ou  anomalies)  qui  vont  à  l’encontre  du  paradigme  de  l’HAR HEM.  Nous 
mentionnons ici quelques unes de ces anomalies. Nous explicitons également comment ces 
anomalies permettent de comprendre la dynamique des taux de change au niveau empirique. 
 
  Le biais de représentativité a été mis en évidence par Kahneman et Tversky (1974). 
Les deux auteurs montrent que les individus ont tendance à inférer des règles générales à 
partir de faits empiriques spécifiques. D’un point de vue temporel, le biais de représentativité 
se traduit par un biais momentum. Le biais momentum signifie que les agents ont tendance à 
surpondérer l’information du passé récent dans leurs décisions. 
  L’utilisation de règles chartistes sur le marché des changes (Allen et Taylor (1992), 
Menkhoff et Taylor (2007)) justifie l’existence du biais momentum chez les agents. En effet, 
les règles chartistes de type momentum prévoient la dynamique future  du change à partir 
d’une interpolation des mouvements passés du change. Le biais momentum est même un fait 
stylisé puisqu’observé sur les différentes places mondiales du marché des changes: Hong 
Kong, Singapour et Tokyo (Lui et Mole (1998), Cheung and Wong (2000)); Londres (Allen et 
Taylor (1992), Cheung, Chinn et Marsh (2004)); les Etats Unis (Cheung et Chinn (2001)). 
 
  Le  biais  d’ancrage  a  été  découvert  par  Kahneman  et  Tversky  (1974).  Les  auteurs 
montrent qu’en situation d’incertitude, les individus effectuent des évaluations empiriques en 
étant  influencés  par  des  nombres  extérieurs  plus  ou  moins  pertinents.  Le  biais  d’ancrage 
s’illustre sur le marché des changes par l’existence de barrières psychologiques. Au niveau 
des barrières psychologiques, les agents accordent une grande importance à une valeur seuil   29
pour le prix de la devise. Le taux de change fluctue autour de cette valeur seuil et la dépasse 
rarement. Une fois la valeur seuil dépassée, le taux de change s’éloigne fortement de cette 
valeur  et  rejoint  une  autre  valeur  seuil.  De  Grauwe  et  Decupere  (1992)  fournissent  des 
preuves  empiriques  sur  l’existence  de  ces  barrières  psychologiques  dans  le  marché  des 
changes. Westerhoff (2003) théorise ce fait stylisé en expliquant les bouquets de volatilité 
observés dans la dynamique des taux de change (c’est à dire le fait que les taux de change 
alternent entre des périodes de forte volatilité et des périodes de faible volatilité). 
 
  Le biais de confirmation a été découvert par Wason (1960). Wason montre que les 
individus tiennent plus favorablement compte de l’information qui confirme leurs idées ou les 
résultats de leurs modèles. Le biais de confirmation fait partie des dissonances cognitives 
(Festinger (1957)). Festinger montre que les agents surpondèrent l’information qui confirme 
leurs  décisions  et  sous pondèrent  voire  ignorent  l’information  remettant  en  cause  leurs 
décisions. 
  D’un point de vue empirique, De Grauwe (2000) montre que la difficulté de prédire la 
dynamique des taux de change conduit les agents à considérer les fondamentaux qui justifient 
l’évolution  passée  des  taux  de  change ;  et  à  ignorer  les  autres  fondamentaux.  Ainsi,  les 
économistes ont justifié la dépréciation de l’euro vis à vis du dollar entre janvier 1999 et 
décembre 2002 par des perspectives de croissance plus favorables aux Etats Unis qu’en zone 
euro. Inversement, les économistes ont désigné l’importance du déficit extérieur américain 
relativement à celui de la zone euro pour justifier la dépréciation du dollar vis à vis de l’euro 
entre janvier 2003 et décembre 2004. Egalement, Cheung et Chinn (2001) montrent que les 
fondamentaux considérés par les agents dans l’explication du taux de change varient dans le 
temps. Ainsi, entre 1990 et 1995, les agents accordaient une importance forte à l’offre de 
monnaie et aux déficits commerciaux et peu d’importance à l’inflation, au taux d’intérêt et 
aux  chiffres  du  chômage.  Inversement,  entre  1995  et  2000,  les  agents  attribuent  plus 
d’importance à l’inflation, au taux d’intérêt et aux chiffres de l’emploi et moins à l’offre de 
monnaie  et  aux  déficits  commerciaux.  Bachetta  et  van  Wincoop  (2005)  théorisent  ce  fait 
stylisé dans leur modèle à variable fondamentale bouc émissaire. Les agents s’appuient sur un 
fondamental macroéconomique particulier pour justifier la dynamique du taux de change dans 
une période donnée. 
 
  L’excès de confiance s’illustre lorsque la confiance que les agents attribuent à leur 
jugement  est  excessive.  L’enquête  d’Oberleshner  et  Osler  (2004)  auprès  de  praticiens  du   30
marché  des  changes  montre  une  présence  significative  d’excès  de  confiance  chez  les 
investisseurs dans le marché des changes. Odean (1999) utilise l’excès de confiance pour 
justifier le hot potato effect dans le marché des changes. Ainsi, l’excès de confiance conduit 
les agents à croire de manière excessive en leur capacité à trouver de meilleures opportunités 
d’investissement. Les agents sont ainsi amenés à changer la composition de leurs portefeuilles 
de manière excessive; justifiant ainsi le nombre considérable de transactions entre dealers sur 
le marché des changes. D’autres études, dont Daniel, Hirschleifer et Subramanyam (1998) ou 
Barberis  et  Thaler  (2002)  utilisent  l’excès  de  confiance  pour  justifier  respectivement  la 
déconnexion du change des fondamentaux et l’excès de volatilité du prix des devises. 
 
  Concernant  l’HEM,  la  finance  comportementale  a  également  mis  en  évidence  des 
phénomènes qui remettent en cause la condition de stricte égalité entre le prix d’une devise et 
la  valeur  fondamentale  de  cette  devise.  Les  comportements  mimétiques  (Keynes  (1936)) 
illustrent  cet  argument.  Les  marchés  financiers  constituent  pour  les  individus  un 
environnement  complexe  et  incertain.  Pour  survivre  dans  un  tel  environnement,  certains 
individus ont tendance à reproduire le comportement des autres individus. Ces comportements 
mimétiques déclenchent des cascades informationnelles (Bikhchandani, Hirschleifer et Welch 
(1992)). Lors de cascades informationnelles, les individus suivent le comportement des autres 
agents sans tenir compte de leur information privée personnelle. Osler (2002) montre que 
l’utilisation de règles d’investissement telles que les stop loss orders de la part des agents sur 
le marché des changes est susceptible de déclencher des cascades informationnelles. Bien que 
rationnelles au niveau individuel, le mimétisme conduit à des phénomènes irrationnels au 
niveau du marché tels que des bulles c’est à dire des déconnexions des prix d’actifs de leur 
valeur fondamentale. 
 
  L’HEM  suppose  également  que  l’action  des  arbitragistes  conduit  à  éliminer  les 
éventuels écarts de valeur entre le prix d’un actif et sa valeur fondamentale. Les chercheurs 
ont  mis  en  évidence  plusieurs  limites  à  l’arbitrage  sur  les  marchés  financiers.  De  Long, 
Shleifer,  Summers  et  Waldmann  (1990)  montrent  que  le  bruit  généré  par  les  agents 
irrationnels (noise traders) augmente d’une part le risque associé à la détention de l’actif 
risqué et d’autre part, augmente la rentabilité de l’actif risqué uniquement pour les agents 
irrationnels.  Par  conséquent,  les  agents  rationnels  (arbitrageurs)  vont  limiter  leurs 
interventions dans le marché. A terme, seuls les agents irrationnels survivent dans le marché. 
Il  s’ensuit  que  même  à  long  terme,  le  prix  d’un  actif  peut  être  déconnecté  de  sa  valeur   31
fondamentale.  Au  niveau  empirique,  le  bruit  des  agents  irrationnels  s’illustre  par  la 
manipulation des prix de la part des gourous (Rankin (1999), Corsetti, Pesenti et Roubini 
(2001)), par l’existence de rumeurs (Oberlechner et Hocking (2004)), etc. 
 
  Au total, de nombreux faits stylisés sur les marchés financiers s’opposent au fait que le 
comportement des agents soit conforme au paradigme de l’HAR HEM. L’orientation de notre 
recherche se démarque de l’HAR HEM. Nous supposons que les agents ont une rationalité 
limitée.  L’hypothèse  de  rationalité  limitée  (Simon  (1955))  suppose  que  dans  la  prise  de 
décision,  la  rationalité  des  agents  est  limitée  par  leur  stock  d’information,  leurs  limites 
cognitives  ainsi  que  par  le  temps  qui  leur  est  imparti  pour  prendre  leurs  décisions. 
L’hypothèse  de  rationalité  limitée  ne  signifie  pas  que  les  agents  sont  irrationnels  voire 
stupides. L’idée de rationalité limitée est juste plus réaliste que celle défendue par l’HAR 
HEM. En effet, la complexité du monde ne permet pas aux individus de connaître le modèle 
fondamental de détermination du change. Les individus s’appuient plutôt sur des heuristiques 
pour évaluer le prix d’un actif. Egalement, les capacités cognitives des individus sont trop 
limitées pour qu’ils puissent tenir compte de l’ensemble de l’information disponible dans le 
marché, dans leur prise de décision. Les individus vont plutôt sélectionner les informations les 
plus saillantes et délaisser les autres informations. Par ailleurs, les agents ne sont pas dénués 
de  dimension  psychologique  comme  l’entend  l’HAR HEM.  Damasio  (2003)  montre 
l’importance des émotions des agents dans le processus de prise de décision des agents. 
 
  2.2 ... A la naissance de nouvelles théories de détermination du taux de change 
 
  Les  limites  de  l’HAR HEM  ont  conduit  les  chercheurs  à  rechercher  de  nouvelles 
théories de détermination des taux de change. Les chercheurs ont ainsi délaissé le concept 
d’anticipations  homogènes  pour  celui  d’anticipations  hétérogènes.  L’hétérogénéité  des 
anticipations constitue la base des modèles à flux d’ordre et des modèles comportementaux du 
change (i.e. les modèles à agents hétérogènes). Egalement, l’hypothèse de rationalité limitée 
et le fait que les agents font face à un environnement complexe et incertain ont donné lieu à la 
théorie IKE (Imperfect Knowlegde Economics). 
 
Evans et Lyons (2002) ont été les premiers à développer les modèles à flux d’ordre 
pour  la  détermination  des  taux  de  change.  Ces  modèles  appartiennent  au  domaine  de  la 
microstructure des marchés. Les flux d’ordre se définissent comme le flux net des transactions   32
d’achat et de vente de devises. Ils représentent donc une mesure de la pression à l’achat net de 
devises.  Les  modèles  à  flux  d’ordre  supposent  que  l’information  privée  a  une  part  plus 
importante que l’information publique dans la détermination des prix d’actifs. L’information 
privée contenue dans le flux d’ordre regroupe les anticipations hétérogènes des agents sur la 
valeur future de l’actif. D’un point de vue empirique, le pouvoir explicatif des modèles à flux 
d’ordre est supérieur à celui des modèles traditionnels de change. Ce résultat est observé à 
court terme comme à long terme (Evans et Lyons (2002, 2006, 2008), Berger et al. (2008)). 
Les modèles à flux d’ordre fournissent également de meilleures prévisions des taux de change 
que les modèles traditionnels et offrent même de meilleures performances que le modèle de 
marche  aléatoire  à  court  terme  (Lindahl  et  Rime  (2006),  Rime  et  al.  (2010)).  Enfin,  les 
modèles à flux d’ordre proposent également des solutions à l’énigme de la déconnexion des 
taux de change (Bachetta et van Wincoop (2006), Evans (2010)). 
 
Les modèles comportementaux de change ou modèles à agents hétérogènes ont été 
créés par Frankel et Froot (1987) puis enrichis par les travaux de De Grauwe et Grimaldi 
(2007). Ces modèles supposent l’interaction de deux agents dans le marché: les chartistes et 
les fondamentalistes. Les chartistes prévoient le change futur à partir d’une interpolation des 
tendances passées du change alors que les fondamentalistes se basent sur l’écart entre le taux 
de change observé et la valeur fondamentale du change pour faire leurs prévisions de change. 
L’interaction entre chartistes et fondamentalistes permet d’expliquer la dynamique des taux de 
change  et  notamment  l’énigme  de  la  déconnexion  du  taux  de  change  de  sa  valeur 
fondamentale.  Les travaux de Vigfusson (1997) puis ceux de Chan et al. (2000) valident 
empiriquement  la  théorie  de  Frankel  et  Froot  (1987).  Les  modèles  à  agents  hétérogènes 
fournissent également une réponse à l’énigme de l’excès de volatilité du change (De Grauwe 
et Grimaldi (2007)). 
 
L’approche IKE a été créée par Frydman et Goldberg (2007)
3 et est indépendante tant 
des modèles basés sur l’HAR HEM que des modèles à agents hétérogènes. Dans la lignée de 
la critique de Lucas (1976), Frydman et Goldberg (2007) reconnaissent que les modèles qui 
prédéterminent les comportements des agents (comme les modèles basés sur l’HAR HEM et 
les modèles à agents hétérogènes) sont inappropriés pour modéliser la dynamique du prix 
d’un actif. En effet, ces modèles assimilent les agents à des robots puisque les agents se 
                                                           
3 Les idées de Frydman et Goldberg (2007) sont également partagées par certains praticiens sur les marchés 
financiers dont Soros (1987).   33
comportent conformément à des règles exogènes établies par le modélisateur. Ces modèles ne 
laissent aucune liberté à l’évolution endogène du comportement des agents ainsi qu’à leur 
environnement.  Frydman  et  Goldberg  proposent  ainsi  de  prédéterminer  partiellement  le 
comportement  des  agents  en  imposant  des  restrictions  qualitatives  au  lieu  d’imposer  des 
contraintes  quantitatives.  L’approche  IKE  fournit  une  nouvelle  réponse  à  l’énigme  de  la 
déconnexion  des  taux  de  change.  Cette  approche  montre  qu’en  situation  d’incertitude,  la 
déconnexion du change des fondamentaux ne dépend pas du degré de flexibilité des prix 
comme l’ont précédemment énoncés les modèles basés sur l’HAR HEM. Ces déconnexions 
sont  plutôt  justifiées  par  la  connaissance  imparfaite  des  agents  de  leur  environnement 
économique. 
 
Au total, les théories s’éloignant du concept de l’HAR HEM offrent une meilleure 
compréhension de la dynamique des taux de change. Nous tiendrons ainsi compte dans nos 
recherches, des enseignements apportés par ces nouvelles théories et plus globalement des 
enseignements apportés par la finance comportementale. 
 
3.  L’amélioration de la structure empirique des modèles traditionnels de change 
 
  L’échec empirique des modèles traditionnels de change nous amène à reconsidérer la 
structure économétrique de ces modèles. Les modèles traditionnels supposent l’existence d’un 
monde  symétrique  et  s’appuient  sur  une  relation  linéaire  entre  le  taux  de  change  et  ses 
fondamentaux. L’hypothèse d’un monde symétrique signifie qu’un choc sur un fondamental 
dans un pays domestique ou dans un pays étranger aura le même effet sur la dynamique du 
taux de change. Une structure linéaire signifie qu’il existe une relation stable entre le taux de 
change et un stock donné de fondamentaux au cours du temps. Ces deux hypothèses ne sont 
pas vérifiées empiriquement. 
  En  premier  lieu,  de  nombreuses  études  montrent  que  les  investisseurs  réagissent 
asymétriquement à un choc de nouvelle sur un fondamental entre deux économies (Prast et De 
Vor (2000), Galati et Ho (2001) et Andersen et al. (2003)). Ainsi, pour le taux de change 
euro/dollar,  les  agents  semblent  surpondérer  les  nouvelles  en  provenance  des  Etats Unis 
relativement aux nouvelles en provenance de la zone euro. Ce fait supporte plutôt l’hypothèse 
d’un monde asymétrique où le taux de change ne réagit pas de la même manière à un même 
choc sur les fondamentaux domestiques et étrangers.   34
  En  second  lieu,  De  Grauwe  (2000)  et  Cheung  et  Chinn  (2001)  montrent  que 
l’importance des fondamentaux dans la détermination du taux de change varie dans le temps. 
De Grauwe et Vansteenkiiste (2002) montrent que la dynamique des taux de change et de 
leurs fondamentaux est caractérisée par des ruptures structurelles. Cheung, Chinn et Garcia 
Pascual  (2005)  montrent  qu’empiriquement  les  modèles  linéaires  basés  sur  un  stock 
particulier de fondamentaux alternent entre des périodes de faibles et fortes performances 
explicatives.  Egalement,  les  modèles  tenant  compte  d’une  structure  non linéaire  dans  la 
dynamique des taux de change (Gandolfo, Padoan et Paladino (1990), Kilian et Taylor (2003), 
Cheung  et  Erlandsson  (2005))  offrent  des  performances  explicatives  et  prédictives  plus 
satisfaisantes que celles des modèles linéaires. Ces observations apportent plus de crédibilité 
aux modèles non linéaires. L’hypothèse de non linéarité signifie que le taux de change n’est 
pas expliqué par le même stock de fondamentaux à travers le temps. 
Jusqu’à  maintenant,  l’économétrie  offre  deux  types  d’outils  pour  modéliser  la 
dynamique des taux de change à l’aide de modèles non linéaires. D’un côté, nous avons les 
modèles non linéaires où les transitions entre états sont fonctions de variables observables 
(modèles  à  seuils  et  modèles  à  changement  de  régime  markovien  avec  probabilités  de 
transition variables dans le temps). D’un autre côté, nous avons des modèles non linéaires où 
les transitions entre états sont fonctions de variables inobservables (modèles à changement de 
régimes markoviens avec probabilités de transition fixes dans le temps). 
  Dans les modèles à seuils, les paramètres des équations dans les différents états varient 
en  fonction  de  la position  d’une  variable  observable par  rapport  à  un  seuil  estimé par  le 
modèle. Les modèles à seuils se scindent en deux catégories. En premier lieu, les modèles 
TAR (Threshold AutoRegressive), établis par Tong (1978) et Tong et Lim (1980),  impliquent 
que la transition entre états est soudaine et dépend d’une fonction indicative qui prend les 
valeurs  0  ou  1.  En  second  lieu,  les  modèles  STAR  (Smooth  Transition  Autoregressive) 
développés par Luukkonen, Saikkonen et Teräsvirta (1988), Luukkonen et Teräsvirta (1991) 
et Teräsvirta et Anderson (1992). Les modèles STAR supposent que la transition entre états 
est progressive. Cette transition est modélisée à travers une fonction continue bordée entre 0 
et 1. Généralement, ces modèles considèrent des fonctions de transition logistiques (LSTAR) 
ou exponentielles (ESTAR). 
  Les  modèles  à  changement  de  régime  markovien  avec  probabilités  de  transition 
variables dans le temps ont été développés par Diebold et al. (1994), Engel et Hakkio (1994) 
et Filardo (1994). Dans ces modèles, les transitions entre régimes dépendent d’une variable   35
d’état  observable.  Les  probabilités  de  transition  entre  régimes  varient  dans  le  temps  en 
fonction de cette variable d’état observable. 
  Les modèles à changement de régimes markoviens avec probabilités de transition fixes 
dans  le  temps  ont  été  développés  par  Goldfeld  et  Quandt  (1973)  et  appliqués  aux  séries 
temporelles par Hamilton (1989). Ces modèles diffèrent des modèles à seuils ainsi que des 
modèles à changement de régime markovien avec probabilités de transition variables dans le 
temps dans le sens où les probabilités de transition entre états sont ici constantes dans le 
temps et sont fonctions d’une variable d’état inobservable qui suit généralement une chaîne de 
Markov d’ordre 1. 
 
Bien que minée par une construction plus ardue relativement aux modèles linéaires, 
les  modèles  non linéaires  offrent  une  structure  plus  adaptée  pour  la  modélisation  de  la 
dynamique des taux de change. En conséquence, notre quête d’un modèle robuste de change 
s’appuiera sur ce type de modélisation. 
 
4. Problématiques et principaux défis de la thèse 
 
  L’objectif de la thèse est de trouver un modèle robuste qui détermine la dynamique des 
taux de change à court, moyen et long termes. La contrainte imposée est que ce modèle doit 
fournir des pouvoirs explicatif et prédictif supérieurs à ceux des modèles traditionnels de 
change. 
  D’après les arguments mentionnés précédemment, un modèle robuste de détermination 
des  taux  de  change  doit  s’écarter  du  paradigme  de  l’HAR HEM.  Par  conséquent,  la 
construction  de  nos  modèles  se  base  plutôt  sur  les  enseignements  de  la  finance 
comportementale.  Nos  modèles  tiennent  compte  non  seulement  des  fondamentaux 
macroéconomiques  mais  également  des  composantes  psychologiques  et  comportementales 
des agents sur les marchés financiers. Cette voie de recherche est justifiée par l’importance de 
la prise en compte du comportement des agents pour comprendre la dynamique des taux de 
change. En effet, les enquêtes menées sur le marché des changes (Cheung et Wong (2000), 
Cheung et Chinn (2001), Cheung, Chinn et Marsh (2004)) montrent que les comportements 
des agents tiennent une place majeure dans la détermination des taux de change notamment à 
court terme (c’est à dire pour des horizons inférieurs à 6 mois).  La construction de notre 
modèle  tient  également  compte  des  enseignements  de  l’économétrie  non linéaire.  Nous 
utilisons  principalement  des  modèles  à  changement  de  régime  markovien  ainsi  que  des   36
modèles à seuils. La difficulté de ce défi réside dans le contournement de ce que Frisch (1970) 
  le fondateur de l’Econometric Society   nommait la playométrie (playometrics). En d’autres 
termes,  tout  modèle  mathématique  non  fondé  sur  des  concepts  théoriques  pertinents  est 
irrecevable.  Par  conséquent,  notre  objectif  sera  de  construire  un  modèle  parcimonieux  et 
robuste de détermination des taux de change, basé sur une théorie économique pertinente. 
 
5. Principaux résultats mis en évidence dans la thèse 
 
  Le premier article analyse l’environnement de recherche c’est à dire le marché des 
changes. Le deuxième article fournit des éléments pour comprendre le succès des modèles à 
flux d’ordre  concernant la détermination des taux de change.  Le troisième article met en 
évidence les déterminants des comportements hétérogènes dans le marché des changes. Le 
quatrième article propose un modèle non conventionnel de détermination du taux de change 
basé sur les conventions prévalant entre agents sur le marché des changes.  
 
  5.1 Les marchés financiers sont ils efficients ? L’exemple du marché des changes 
 
  Le papier montre que l’efficience du marché des changes peut être décomposée en des 
formes  multiples  et  indépendantes.  Nous  fournissons  trois  définitions  de  l’efficience  d’un 
marché: l’efficience fondamentale, l’efficience spéculative et l’efficience macroéconomique.  
  L’efficience fondamentale (ou l’efficience au sens de Fama) est vérifiée si d’une part, 
la  dynamique  du  change  reflète  celle  des  fondamentaux  et  si  d’autre  part,  le  ratio 
rendement/risque associé à une stratégie spéculative ne dépasse pas celui d’une autre stratégie 
spéculative  pour  un  montant  donné  de  risque.  L’efficience  spéculative  est  validée  si  la 
spéculation n’est pas profitable c’est à dire si le ratio rendement/risque associé à une stratégie 
spéculative ne dépasse pas celui d’une autre stratégie spéculative pour un montant donné de 
risque;  et  si  le  taux  de  change  est  déconnecté  de  sa  valeur  fondamentale.  L’efficience 
macroéconomique  décrit  la  capacité  des  taux  de  change  à  évoluer  en  accord  avec  leurs 
fondamentaux. Cette  condition implique non seulement l’existence d’une relation de long 
terme entre la dynamique du change et celle des fondamentaux mais également la présence de 
forces de rappel contribuant à réduire les déséquilibres liés aux mouvements du change tels 
que les déséquilibres de balance commerciale. Un corollaire de la première condition et de la 
seconde condition est la possibilité de prévoir les taux de change à partir des fondamentaux.   37
  Nous définissons des tests empiriques pour chaque forme d’efficience. L’efficience 
fondamentale est ainsi vérifiée si la PTINC et l’hypothèse de rationalité des anticipations sont 
validées dans le marché. Pour évaluer l’efficience spéculative, nous analysons la profitabilité 
de  deux  stratégies  spéculatives  couramment  utilisées  dans  le  marché  des  changes:  une 
stratégie  momentum  et  un  carry  trade.  Concernant  l’efficience  macroéconomique,  nous 
analysons  les  pouvoirs  explicatifs  et  prédictifs  d’un  modèle  de  change  basé  sur  des 
fondamentaux macroéconomiques. 
  Les résultats montrent qu’à court terme (entre 1 mois et 1 an), le marché des changes 
est purement inefficient. Ce résultat est justifié par le rejet de la PTINC, la possibilité de faire 
des profits à  partir de stratégies momentum et de carry trade ; et également par l’existence de 
déconnexions entre le taux de change et ses fondamentaux à court terme. A moyen terme 
(entre 1 an et 2 ans), le marché des changes est spéculativement efficient. En effet, la PTINC 
est validée, ce qui limite les profits issus du carry trade ; la qualité des prévisions de change 
basées sur des règles momentum se détériore ce qui limite les profits issus de l’utilisation de 
règles momentum. A long terme (à partir de 5 ans), l’efficience macroéconomique est vérifiée 
dans  le  marché  des  changes.  Les  modèles  basés  sur  des  fondamentaux  ont  des  pouvoirs 
explicatif  et  prédictif  très  satisfaisants  concernant  la  dynamique  des  taux  de  change. 
L’efficience fondamentale   l’efficience au sens de Fama   est rejetée quelque soit l’horizon 
considéré. Ce dernier résultat est justifié par l’échec de la PTINC à court terme (entre 3 mois 
et 1 an), les piètres performances explicatives et prédictives des modèles fondamentaux à 
court/moyen  termes  (entre  1  mois  et  2  ans)  et  le  rejet  de  l’hypothèse  de  rationalité  des 
anticipations (pour tous les horizons). 
 
  L’article  montre  donc  que  les  modèles  traditionnels  de  change  ont  de  bonnes 
performances  explicatives  et  prédictives  à  long  terme  (à  partir  de  5  ans)  mais  pas  à 
court/moyen  termes.  Par  conséquent,  à  court/moyen  termes,  des  forces  autres  que  celles 
fondamentales doivent expliquer la dynamique des taux de change. L’article suggère que la 
psychologie et le comportement des individus (surréaction, effets mimétiques, rumeurs, etc.) 
peuvent caractériser ces autres forces. Il s’ensuit qu’un modèle robuste de détermination des 
taux de change devrait tenir compte non seulement des fondamentaux macroéconomiques 
mais également de variables comportementales et psychologiques. La littérature économique 
propose t elle  déjà  un  modèle  tenant  compte  de  cette  composante  psychologique  (ou 
comportementale) ? 
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  5.2 Pourquoi les modèles à flux d’ordre sont plus compétitifs que les modèles 
traditionnels de changes ? 
 
  Cet article analyse le succès des modèles à flux d’ordre développés par Lyons (2001) 
et Evans et Lyons (2002). Les modèles à flux d’ordre fournissent des pouvoirs explicatif et 
prédictif supérieurs à ceux des modèles traditionnels de change non seulement à long terme 
mais également à court terme (Berger et al. (2008)). 
  Cette différence de performance entre modèles à flux d’ordre et modèles traditionnels 
de change tient à la prise en compte de deux stocks d’information différents de la part des 
deux  modèles.  L’article  s’intéresse  en  conséquence à  l’information  contenue  dans  le  flux 
d’ordre. 
  Nous  construisons  un  modèle  théorique  qui  regroupe  l’ensemble  des  différentes 
classes  d’information  disponibles  dans  le  marché  des  changes  et  qui  sont  susceptibles 
d’affecter  le  taux  de  change.  L’objectif  du  modèle  est  d’observer  comment  l’information 
initiale est introduite dans le prix final d’une devise. La structure du modèle se compose d’un 
modèle à agents hétérogènes et d’un modèle de microstructure. 
  Trois résultats sont mis en avant. Premièrement, les simulations du modèle répliquent 
d’importants faits stylisés observés empiriquement sur le marché des changes. A court terme, 
le taux de change est déconnecté des fondamentaux alors qu’à long terme, il retourne vers sa 
valeur fondamentale. Les flux d’ordre sont très corrélés à la dynamique du change à court 
terme comme à long terme. Egalement, l’existence du hot potato effect amplifie le montant 
des  flux  d’ordre  entre  dealers  relativement  aux  flux  d’ordre  en  provenance  des  clients. 
Deuxièmement, l’article suggère que le marché des changes est intrinsèquement inefficient. 
En  effet,  l’information  est  déformée  à  deux  niveaux  dans  le  marché.  L’information  est 
déformée tant par le bruit lié au comportement des agents que par le bruit de microstructure 
généré  par  le  mécanisme  d’échange  intrinsèque  au  marché  des  changes.  Troisièmement, 
l’article  justifie  les  meilleures  performances  empiriques  des  modèles  à  flux  d’ordre 
relativement  aux  modèles  traditionnels  de  change  par  la  considération  d’un  stock 
d’information différent entre les deux modèles. Les flux d’ordre contiennent de l’information 
qui  a  déjà  été  traitée  par  les  individus  sur  le  marché.  Cette  information  traitée  inclut 
l’information fondamentale (publique et privée), l’information (publique et privée) liée aux 
comportements des agents et l’information propre à la microstructure du marché. Inversement, 
les modèles traditionnels considèrent une information brute, non traitée par les agents ; soit 
l’information publique sur les fondamentaux du change.    39
 
Cet article suggère que les performances des modèles traditionnels de change ne seront 
jamais supérieures à celles des modèles à flux d’ordre même si des spécifications alternatives 
sont considérées dans le cadre des modèles traditionnels de change (comme la considération 
d’une structure non linéaire entre taux de change et fondamentaux). L’avantage principal des 
flux d’ordre est de tenir compte intrinsèquement du comportement des agents. Cet article 
confirme  ainsi  l’idée  sous jacente  au premier  article ;  soit  l’importance  de  la  composante 
psychologique ou comportementale dans la détermination du taux de change. Les théoriciens 
des modèles à flux d’ordre sont conscients de la prise en compte des comportements des 
agents dans les flux d’ordre. Ils affirment que les flux d’ordre approximent les anticipations 
hétérogènes  des  agents  sur  le  marché.  Cependant,  les  théoriciens  ne  modélisent  pas 
l’information  contenue  dans  le  flux  d’ordre.  En  conséquence,  les  modèles  à  flux  d’ordre 
restent une boîte noire. Ce constat implique qu’en dépit de leur pouvoir explicatif élevé des 
mouvements du change, les modèles à flux d’ordre ne permettent pas de résoudre l’énigme de 
la détermination du taux de change puisque les chercheurs ne connaissent pas l’information 
que  recouvre  le  flux  d’ordre.  Une  voie  de  recherche permettant  de  clarifier  l’information 
contenue dans le flux d’ordre consisterait à modéliser les anticipations hétérogènes des agents. 
Les modèles à agents hétérogènes (Frankel et Froot (1986) et De Grauwe et Grimaldi (2007)) 
accomplissent cette tâche. 
 
  5.3  Une  analyse  des  déterminants  des  comportements  hétérogènes  sur  les 
marchés financiers à l’aide de modèles non linéaires 
 
  Dans la lignée de Frankel et Froot (1986) et De Grauwe et Grimaldi (2007), cet article 
modélise l’hétérogénéité des agents en se basant sur deux types d’agents: les chartistes et les 
fondamentalistes. 
  L’article montre que les modèles à agents hétérogènes expliquent significativement la 
dynamique des taux de change. Cependant, la littérature n’identifie pas les déterminants des 
comportements  hétérogènes.  Ce  papier  analyse  tout  d’abord  le  lien  entre  comportements 
hétérogènes dans le marché des changes (pour le taux de change  euro/dollar) et dans les 
marchés boursiers en zone euro et aux Etats Unis. Ensuite, le papier analyse les déterminants 
des comportements hétérogènes sur les marchés financiers. La période d’analyse se situe entre 
janvier 1990 et décembre 2009.   40
  Premièrement,  les  résultats  montrent  que  l’homogénéité  des  comportements 
hétérogènes croît sur la période d’analyse. Ainsi, en début de période, les chocs affectant 
uniquement le marché des changes ou uniquement les marchés boursiers n’ont pas généré des 
comportements  similaires  sur  les  trois  marchés,  contrairement  aux  chocs  situés  en  fin  de 
période. Cette observation suggère une intégration financière croissante entre le marché des 
changes et les marchés boursiers. Cette intégration augmente le risque d’instabilité financière 
en période de crise. Par ailleurs, la causalité des comportements est fortement significative 
entre marchés échangeant un même actif (i.e. entre les marchés boursiers en zone euro et aux 
Etats Unis). Inversement, la causalité des comportements est faiblement significative voire 
non  significative  entre  marchés  échangeant  deux  actifs  différents  (i.e.  entre  les  marchés 
boursiers en zone euro ou aux Etats Unis; et le marché des changes). 
  Deuxièmement, l’article montre que l’aversion au risque (approximée par la volatilité 
implicite  sur  les  prix  d’option)  explique  les  comportements  hétérogènes  dans  le  marché, 
contrairement aux fondamentaux macroéconomiques. Ainsi, lorsque l’aversion au risque est 
élevée (faible), les fondamentalistes (chartistes) dominent dans le marché. En conséquence, 
les fondamentalistes dominent en temps de crise (quand l’aversion au risque augmente) tandis 
que les chartistes dominent en temps d’expansion économique (lorsque l’aversion au risque 
est faible). D’un point de vue comportemental, cela signifie que les agents sont plus rationnels 
en  temps  de  crise  (puisqu’ils  tiennent  compte  des  fondamentaux  pour  former  leurs 
anticipations)  qu’en  temps  d’expansion  économique  (où  les  agents  s’appuient  sur  des 
techniques chartistes et ignorent l’information sur les fondamentaux macroéconomiques).  
Sur la base de ce fait stylisé, nous construisons une règle de prévision basée sur les 
comportements  des  agents.  Cette  règle  fournit  de  meilleures  prévisions  en  dehors  de 
l’échantillon que le modèle de marche aléatoire. Ce fait est observé à long terme et à court 
terme. Ce résultat suggère que la prise en compte de faits stylisés sur les comportements des 
agents est nécessaire à la compréhension et à la prévision de la dynamique des prix d’actifs. 
Cet article confirme ainsi l’idée défendue dans cette thèse selon laquelle la considération des 
comportements  des  agents  est  importante  si  l’on  désire  construire  un  modèle  robuste  de 
détermination des taux de change. 
 
Au delà de leurs avantages, les modèles à agents hétérogènes présentent deux limites 
majeures. En premier lieu, ces modèles spécifient arbitrairement une valeur fondamentale du 
prix de l’actif pour définir la règle fondamentaliste. La spécification d’une valeur unique pour 
le taux de change fondamental est une limite puisqu’au niveau empirique de multiples valeurs   41
sont associées à la définition du taux de change fondamental. En second lieu, les modèles à 
agents hétérogènes prédéterminent entièrement le comportement des agents en associant une 
règle de comportement exogène à chaque agent. Cette prédétermination des comportements 
constitue une limite puisqu’au niveau empirique, les agents ont tendance à modifier leurs 
modèles au cours du temps. La question qui vient naturellement est la suivante: est il possible 
de  trouver  un  modèle  permettant  de  tenir  compte  des  changements  endogènes  dans  le 
comportement des agents ? 
 
5.4  Les  conventions  dans  le  marché  des  changes  peuvent elles  expliquer  la 
dynamique des taux de change ? 
 
  L’article propose une nouvelle structure de modélisation de la dynamique des taux de 
change à travers les conventions prévalant entre agents sur le marché. Le modèle à convention 
est basé sur un fait stylisé mis en évidence par De Grauwe (2000). De Grauwe montre que les 
agents on tendance à mettre l’accent sur les fondamentaux qui confirment les mouvements 
observés du change. Les économistes ont ainsi justifié la dépréciation de l’euro vis à vis du 
dollar entre janvier 1999 et décembre 2002 par les perspectives de croissance plus favorables 
aux Etats Unis qu’en zone euro. Inversement, l’appréciation de l’euro vis à vis du dollar entre 
décembre 2002 et décembre 2004 a été justifiée par l’importance des déficits courants des 
Etats Unis relativement à la zone euro. Bachetta et van Wincoop (2005) ont théorisé cette idée 
dans  leur  modèle  à  variable  bouc émissaire  (scapegoat  model).  Un  fondamental  est  ici 
considéré comme bouc émissaire par les agents pour justifier les mouvements du change. 
Notre approche diffère de celle de Bachetta et van Wincoop (2005). Notre modèle emprunte 
plus  d’éléments  à  l’approche  IKE  (Imperfect  Knowledge  Economics)  développée  par  
Frydman et Goldberg (2007). 
Dans un premier temps, nous construisons un modèle théorique qui décrit la formation 
des  conventions  dans  le  marché  des  changes.  Le  taux  de  change  simulé  par  le  modèle 
théorique réplique d’importants faits stylisés observés sur la dynamique du change au niveau 
empirique. 
Dans un deuxième temps, nous testons empiriquement le modèle à convention sur le 
taux  de  change  euro/dollar  entre janvier  1995  et  décembre  2008. Nous  considérons  deux 
approches. En premier lieu, nous utilisons une approche macroéconomique pour mettre en 
évidence les conventions présentes sur le taux de change euro/dollar. Nous utilisons pour cela 
les justifications des mouvements de change apportées par le consensus du marché. Dans un   42
second temps, nous construisons une approche  économétrique basée sur l’estimation d’un 
modèle à coefficients variables dans le temps. 
L’analyse macroéconomique et l’approche économétrique débouchent sur les mêmes 
résultats.  Le  marché  tend  à  alterner  entre  des  périodes  d’optimisme  et  des  périodes  de 
pessimisme. Plus précisément, la dynamique du taux de change euro/dollar est expliquée par 
l’alternance entre les fondamentaux considérés dans les conventions optimiste et pessimiste. 
Ce  résultat  montre  l’existence  d’une  relation  non linéaire  entre  le  taux  de  change  et  les 
fondamentaux macroéconomiques. En d’autres termes, certains fondamentaux sont importants 
dans la détermination du change pour certaines périodes alors que d’autres fondamentaux sont 
importants pour d’autres périodes. 
Les deux méthodes identifient trois principales conventions pour le taux de change 
euro/dollar. La première convention est la convention de la nouvelle économie qui prévaut 
entre janvier 1995 et décembre 2000. Les investisseurs étaient à cette époque optimistes dans 
les perspectives de croissance des économies américaine et européenne. Le dollar s’apprécie 
fortement durant cette période. Entre janvier 2001 et juin 2003, le marché s’appuie sur une 
convention pessimiste basée sur la soutenabilité des déficits courants américains. Le dollar se 
déprécie durant cette période. De juillet 2003 à décembre 2005, deux conventions sont en 
compétition dans le marché. Une convention pessimiste basée sur l’importance des déficits 
courants américains et une convention optimiste basée sur la forte reprise économique aux 
Etats Unis. Durant cette période, le dollar alterne entre des périodes courtes d’appréciation et 
de  dépréciation  selon  que  la  convention  optimiste  domine  celle pessimiste.  Après janvier 
2006, des chocs négatifs affectent les fondamentaux de l’économie américaine. Le marché 
commence  à  attribuer  plus  de  crédibilité  à  la  convention  pessimiste  relativement  à  la 
convention optimiste. Le déclenchement de la crise des subprimes en juin 2007 conduit à 
l’adoption par le marché de la convention pessimiste. 
Dans un troisième temps, nous comparons les performances prédictives du modèle à 
convention par rapport à des modélisations alternatives. Les résultats montrent que pour des 
horizons  supérieurs  à  1  mois  le  modèle  à  convention  fournit  de  meilleures  prévisions  en 
dehors de l’échantillon que les modèles traditionnels de change et que la marche aléatoire. Par 
conséquent, le modèle à convention offre une voie prometteuse pour expliquer et prévoir la 
dynamique des taux de change.  
 
 





Through the Looking Glass:  






This paper argues that market efficiency can be split into multiple and independent 
forms. We provide three alternative definitions of market efficiency: fundamental efficiency, 
speculative  efficiency  and  macroeconomic  efficiency.  We  run  empirical  tests  on  the 
euro/dollar, the pound/dollar and the  yen/dollar exchange rates. Results show that foreign 
exchange market efficiency is characterized by pure inefficiency in the short run (between 1 
month and 1 year), speculative efficiency in the medium run (between 1 and 2 years) and 
macroeconomic efficiency in the long run (from 5 years on). Fundamental efficiency   Fama’s 
definition of efficiency   is rejected at every horizon. 
 

























Ce papier montre que l’efficience des marchés peut être décomposée en des formes 
multiples et indépendantes. Nous proposons trois définitions de l’efficience informationnelle 
des  marchés:  l’efficience  fondamentale,  l’efficience  spéculative  et  l’efficience 
macroéconomique. Nous testons ces trois formes d’efficience pour différentes devises et sur 
différents horizons. Les résultats montrent que le marché des changes est purement inefficient 
à court terme (entre 1 mois et 1 an), spéculativement efficient à moyen terme (entre 1 an et 2 
ans)  et  macroéconomiquement  efficient  à  long  terme  (à  partir  de  5  ans).  L’efficience 
fondamentale   l’efficience au sens de Fama   est rejetée pour tous les horizons. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  The analysis of foreign exchange market efficiency has been a long standing subject 
for academics and practitioners. Empirical studies have used various strategies to test foreign 
exchange market efficiency. A lot of tests are based on Fama’s regression (Frankel and Froot 
(1987), Meredith and Chinn (1998), Ron et al. (2008)); others on the profitability of trading 
rules (Neely et al. (1997), Burnside et al. (2006, 2008), Park and Irwin (2007), Wagner (2008), 
Jordà  and  Taylor  (2009));  others  on  the  estimation  of  equilibrium  exchange  rate  models 
(Giannellis and Papadopoulos (2009)). After decades of research, the literature has not yet 
reached  a  clear cut  conclusion  concerning  the  efficiency  of  the  foreign  exchange  market. 
Besides, the concept of efficiency that has been tested across articles may not be identical. 
The innovations brought by this paper are twofold. First, we claim that there is not a 
unique  definition  of  market  efficiency  but  that  markets  can  actually  be  characterised  by 
multiple and independent forms of efficiency. We come up with three distinct definitions of 
efficiency  (fundamental  efficiency,  speculative  efficiency  and  macroeconomic  efficiency). 
Secondly, we test which form of efficiency best characterises the foreign exchange market at 
different time horizons
4. 
We apply empirical tests on three nominal exchange rates: the euro, the pound and the 
yen against the dollar between January 1998 and December 2008. Results show that several 
forms of efficiency prevail in the foreign exchange market according to time horizon. The 
foreign exchange market is thus characterised by pure inefficiency in the short run (between 1 
month and 1 year), speculative efficiency in the medium term (between 1 and 2 years) and 
macroeconomic  efficiency  in  the  long  run  (from  5  years  on).  Fundamental  efficiency  is 
rejected at every horizon. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Starting from the contradiction of 
Fama (1965)’s efficiency, section 2 defines the different forms of efficiency. Section 3 tests 
fundamental efficiency by analysing the forecasting abilities of UIP as well as the validation 
of its underlying hypotheses (risk neutrality and the rational expectations hypothesis). Section 
4 tests speculative efficiency by assessing the profitability of two speculative strategies: a 
momentum  rule  and  a  carry  trade  strategy.  Section  5  tests  macroeconomic  efficiency  by 
estimating a Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate (BEER) model in order to appraise the 
                                                           
4 The closest work to this paper is a book chapter by Bourghelle et al. (2005). They discuss several concepts of 
efficiency  but  their  perspectives  remain  mostly  theoretical.  They  do  not  provide  any  empirically  tractable 
definitions of market efficiency.   46
explanatory  and  forecasting  powers  of  macroeconomic  fundamentals  for  exchange  rates. 
Section 6 discusses the results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Reconsidering Fama’s efficient market hypothesis 
 
2.1 The original definition of market efficiency 
 
According to Fama (1965), a market is considered as informationally efficient if the 
price  of  an  asset  is  equal  to  its  fundamental  value,  given  all  available  information.  The 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) implies that agents are endowed with rational expectations. 
In other words, agents know the true model of exchange rate determination and are able to 
compute the fundamental value of the exchange rate. 
Assuming  risk neutral  agents,  Fama’s  definition  can  be  formalised  in  the  foreign 
exchange market by the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). UIP states that if the interest rate 
differential between a foreign country and a domestic country is equal to 2 %, then agents will 









t+1, the (log of the) expected exchange rate; st, the (log of the) current exchange 
rate; (rt*   rt), the interest rate differential between the domestic and foreign countries. 
 
UIP ensures that expected returns between an investment in a foreign country and an 
investment in a domestic country are equal. UIP thus stands in line with Jensen’s (1978) 
definition of efficiency who claimed that a market is efficient if no profit can be made by 





+ + ∞ − + =
0 k
*
k t k t t r r s s                                           (2a) 
 
Exchange rate dynamics are thus explained and predicted by the long run exchange 
rate s∞  and the sum of the expected interest rate differentials. We therefore provide a more   47
precise definition of Fama’s efficiency. We will refer to this type of efficiency as fundamental 
efficiency. 
 
Definition 1: Fundamental efficiency (or Fama’s efficiency) holds in the foreign exchange 
market if, on the one hand, exchange rate dynamics reflect the evolution of fundamentals as 
stated by UIP and on the other hand, if speculation is not profitable in the market; i.e. if the 
return/risk ratio associated to a speculative strategy is not higher than the one associated to 
another investment strategy for a given amount of risk. 
 
  2.2 The contradictions in Fama (1965)’s efficiency 
 
Three contradictions undermine Fama’s efficiency. First, the theory of rational bubble 
(Blanchard and Watson (1984)) shows that bubbles   disconnections of exchange rates from 
their fundamental values   can occur even if agents behave rationally. Indeed, by iterating 
forward the UIP, we get the general form of equation (2a): 
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The value of the exchange rate is split into a fundamental component and a bubble 
component. Thus in periods of bubble, self fulfilling expectations by rational agents induce a 
departure  of  the  exchange  rate  from  its  fundamental  value  although  agents  are  assumed 
rational. This result goes against the definition of Fama
5. 
  A second contradiction is illustrated by the paradox of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). 
If markets are efficient and information is costly, then rational agents will have no incentive 
to get any information on the asset. Indeed, in an efficient market, the price of an asset fully 
reflects all available information. Therefore, if agents behave rationally, they will not pay to 
get the information since they can freely observe information in quoted prices. Thus if no 
agent is willing to pay for information concerning an asset, then the price of this asset will not 
reflect  anymore  all  the  available  information.  The  market  will  not  be  efficient  anymore. 
                                                           
5 To rule out the occurrence of rational bubble and insure the convergence towards a particular equilibrium under 
the EMH, macroeconomic models usually assume that the transversality condition holds:  0 t k k limb + →∞ = .   48
Consequently,  markets  have  to  be  at  least  temporarily  inefficient  to  make  the  search  for 
information profitable. 
Thirdly,  testing  empirically  Fama  (1965)’s  efficiency  (equation  (2b))  implies  the 
definition of two models: a model of exchange rate determination to quantify s∞  and a model 






k t k t r r . Neither Fama nor 
his  disciples  provide  any  definition  of  such  models.  They  further  take  advantage  of  this 
loophole to criticize the results confirming market inefficiency. According to Fama (1991) 
and his followers, if a model does not validate market efficiency, then this model must be a 
bad model; i.e. it is not the model considered in the definition of Fama’s efficiency. This “bad 
model  argument”  (Fama  (1991))  seems  however  not  relevant  as  it  is  a  general  assertion 
concerning the empirical implementation of economic models. 
 
2.3 Towards new definitions of market efficiency 
 
    2.3.1 The speculative efficiency hypothesis 
 
Fundamental efficiency states that no profit can be made from speculation and that 
exchange rates are always equal to their fundamental value. 
If there are many agents with heterogeneous beliefs, the price of an asset may not be 
equal  to  its  fundamental  value,  because  of  noise  trading  and/or  incomplete  information 
(Frankel and Froot (1986), De Long et al. (1990a, 1990b)). In this context, the market can be 
characterized by inefficiency   the price is not equal to its fundamental value   but may also be 
efficient in the sense that there may be no profit opportunities.  
For  example,  at  short  horizons,  currency  prices  are  disconnected  from  their 
fundamental value (Meese and Rogoff (1983), Chinn et al. (2005)). Speculators can make 
profits  or  losses  by  betting  on  the  chaotic  adjustment  of  the  exchange  rate  towards  its 
fundamental  value.  Indeed  at  short  horizons,  the  major  part  of  speculators  in  the  foreign 
exchange market alternate between periods of profits and periods of losses. Hence Fama’s 
definition no longer applies since we could have a market were no speculative profits can be 
made  although  the  exchange  rate  is  not  equal  to  its  fundamental  value.  To  address  this 
contradiction,  we  put  forward  a  new  definition  of  efficiency  which  we  will  refer  as 
speculative efficiency:  
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Definition 2: Speculative efficiency prevails in a market if speculation is not profitable; that 
is  if  the  return/risk  ratio  associated  to  a  speculative  strategy  is  not  higher  than  the  one 
associated to another investment strategy for a given amount of risk; and if the exchange rate 
is disconnected from its fundamental value 
6. 
 
2.3.2 The macroeconomic efficiency hypothesis 
 
Fundamental efficiency assumes risk neutral agents. A lot of studies claim that agents 
are actually characterised by time varying risk aversion (Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Kim 
(2009)). We argue that the time varying risk aversion of market agents affects the relationship 
between exchange rates and their fundamentals in the long run. Indeed, time varying risk 
aversion affects countries’ risk premia and in turn triggers incentives for countries to reduce 
their  external  disequilibria.  This  process  takes  time  and  thus  occurs  at  medium/long  run 
horizons. To take account of the effect of risk aversion on the relationship between exchange 
rates and fundamentals, we propose an alternative definition of efficiency, which we label 
macroeconomic efficiency. 
 
Definition  3:  Macroeconomic efficiency describes the ability of exchange rates to evolve 
according to their fundamentals. Besides exchange rate dynamics contribute to the reduction 
of macroeconomic imbalances. Therefore macroeconomic efficiency implies the validation of 
two conditions in the foreign exchange market: first, the existence of a long run relationship 
between the exchange rate and its fundamentals; secondly, the existence of correction forces 
that  reduce  macroeconomic  disequilibria  related  to  exchange  rate  movements     such  as 
current account deficits. A corollary of the first and second conditions is the possibility to 
forecast the future dynamics of exchange rates by using macroeconomic fundamentals. 
 
The first and second conditions of macroeconomic efficiency are necessary to ensure 
markets  are  able  to  correct  disequilibria  appearing  after  economic  shocks.  This  condition 
stands in line with the view of Friedman (1953) who advocated that free float regimes induce 
an automatic correction of external disequilibria at medium/long run horizons. For instance, if 
an  economy  in  free  float  is  experiencing  a  current  account  deficit  then  its  currency  will 
depreciate. This depreciation will increase the competitiveness of the economy and reduce the 
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initial  deficit.  Therefore,  exchange  rate  variations  may  drive  the  current  account  balance 
towards equilibrium at medium/long run horizons.  
The forecasting ability of the model is a correlate of the first and second conditions. 
Indeed, if exchange rates reflect the information contained in fundamentals in the long run, 
then such information should improve exchange rate forecasts at least in the long run. 
 
2.4 Towards multiple and distinct forms of market efficiency 
 
  The above definitions of market efficiency are distinct from each other. 
 
Speculative efficiency is different from fundamental efficiency. Indeed a market where 
the value of the exchange rate is fixed by tossing a coin would be efficient in a speculative 
sense (since expected profits are on average equal to zero) but not efficient in the sense of 
Fama (since the dynamics of currency prices will not match the evolution of fundamentals; 
the  exchange  rate  being  fixed  randomly).  The  literature  always  confuses  speculative 
efficiency and fundamental efficiency. For example, Roll (in Roll and Shiller (1992)) argues 
that “If there’s nothing investors can exploit in a systematic way, […] then it’s very hard to 
say  that  information  is  not  being  properly  incorporated  into  stock  prices”.  Roll  actually 
confuses the two types of efficiency. As explained above, if the value of exchange rates is 
fixed by tossing a coin, then it is on average not possible to make systematic profits in the 
market although currency prices do not fully reflect all the available information in the market. 
Thus  speculative  efficiency  is  distinct  from  fundamental  efficiency  in  the  sense  that 
speculative efficiency does not necessarily mean that the observed exchange rate is equal to 
its fundamental value. 
Macroeconomic  efficiency  and  fundamental  efficiency  are  also  different  concepts. 
Macroeconomic  efficiency  assumes  time varying  risk  averse  agents  while  fundamental 
efficiency assumes risk neutral agents. Besides fundamental efficiency must be verified at 
each  period  of  time  while  macroeconomic  efficiency  is  a  long  run  concept.  Formally, 
macroeconomic efficiency implies that exchange rate misalignments   spreads between the 
current exchange rate and the long run exchange rate   exist in the short run but vanish in the 
medium/long run. 
  Macroeconomic  efficiency  is  also  distinct  from  speculative  efficiency  since 
speculative efficiency assumes the existence of a disconnection of the exchange rate from its 
fundamental value.   51
  These  three  distinct  definitions  of  efficiency  (fundamental,  speculative  and 
macroeconomic)  lead  to  different  forms  of  market  efficiency:  fundamental  efficiency, 
speculative  efficiency,  macroeconomic  efficiency  and  pure  inefficiency.  The  literature  on 
market efficiency does not distinguish between these different forms of efficiency. Previous 
articles only test fundamental efficiency or part of the definition of fundamental efficiency. 
As  a  result,  we  argue  that  the  concept  of  efficiency  that  has been  tested  across previous 
articles may not be identical. 
 
Having clarified the various forms of efficiency that one can found in a market, we 
now test which form of efficiency best characterises the foreign exchange market at different 
time horizons. 
 
3. Testing fundamental efficiency 
 
  Tests for fundamental efficiency follow two steps. First we test UIP ex post. If UIP 
and its underlying hypotheses (REH and risk neutrality) hold then fundamental efficiency is 
validated. On the contrary, if UIP is rejected we then look for the possible reasons behind the 
rejection  of  fundamental  efficiency.  We  will  focus  on  the  validation  of  the  hypotheses 
underlying the UIP: risk neutrality and the rational expectations hypothesis (REH). 
Tests  for  fundamental  efficiency  are  based  on  the  euro/dollar,  pound/dollar  and 
yen/dollar exchange rates. The period of analysis spans January 1999 to December 2008. Due 
to data availability and in accordance with previous studies in the related literature, tests are 
based on a monthly frequency. The spot and forward rates come from Datastream and the 
expected  exchange  rates  from Consensus  Forecast.  Stationarity  tests  show  that  the  series 
considered in the models are not stationary and integrated of order 1 over the sample period. 
Besides cointegration tests show the existence of a significant long run relationship between 
the endogenous variable and the exogenous variables
7. We therefore implement our tests by 
relying on a VECM structure. VECM models are estimated following the method of Johansen 
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  3.1 Testing uncovered interest rate parity ex post 
 
Following Frankel and Froot (1987), tests for UIP are based on the analysis of the 
bias between the forward exchange rate and the future exchange rate
8. If UIP holds, then the 
constraints α = 0 and β = 1 (and t k ε + → iidN( ,σ²)) should be significant in equation (3): 
 
, ( ) t k t t k t t k s s f s α β ε + + − = + − +                                              (3) 
 
We proceed to the estimation of equation (3) by estimating the following VECM: 
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UIP holds if the Likelihood Ratio test verifies the following constraints:  0 α =  and 
1 β =  in the long run relationship. 
 
Table 1: Results for UIP tests at 3 months, 1 year and 2 years 
st  Horizon  λ  α  β  R2adj  White  LM  J&B  β = 1  α = 0,  
 β = 1 
Euro 
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NB: Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets; p values are mentioned in brackets; critical values for 
the test of Student amount to 1,96 at a 5 % confidence level and to 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level; 5 lags are 
considered for the LM test. 
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Diagnostic  tests  in  table  1  show  no  sign  of  heteroskedasticity  (White  test)  and 
autocorrelation  in  the  residuals  (LM  test).  However,  residuals  do  not  follow  a  normal 
distribution (Jarque and Bera test). 
Table  1  shows  that  at  short  horizons  (3  and  12  months)  UIP  is  rejected.  The 
coefficients β are significant and negative; the constraints  0 α = and  1 β =  are not accepted in 
the long run relationship. On the contrary for medium/long run horizons (2 years), UIP holds 
significantly.  The  coefficients β  are  significant  and positive  and  the  constraints  0 α = and 
1 β =  are not rejected in the long run relationship.  
Previously,  Meredith  and  Chinn  (1998)  tested  UIP  based  on  the  interest  rate 
differential (relation (1)) at different horizons (3, 6 and 12 months, 5 years and 10 years). 
They show that UIP holds for long run horizons (for 5 and 10 years). Results show here that 
UIP holds also for medium horizons (2 years). 
  The failure of UIP in the short run can be attributed to two factors: a possible bias in 
equation (3) due to the assumption of risk neutral agents (i.e. the exclusion of a risk premium) 
instead of risk averse agents; and/or the rejection of REH   we assume in equation (3) that 
agents behave rationally
9. In order to find the factors justifying the failure of UIP at short 
horizons, we test whether the hypotheses of risk neutrality and rational expectations hold in 
the market. 
 
3.2 Tests for time varying risk aversion 
 
The failure of UIP in the short run (also known as the forward bias) can be caused by 
the assumption of risk neutral agents (Frankel and Froot (1987), Sarno and Taylor (2002)). 
We thus test whether the failure of UIP is due to the omission of a time varying risk premium. 
We regress the variation of the expected exchange rate (s
a
t + k   st) on the forward premium (ft,k 
  st) 
10: 
 
      s
a
t + k   st = α + β( ft,k   st) + εt+k        (4) 
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In a VECM form, equation (4) becomes: 
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Following Frankel and Froot (1987), three tests are applied on the model. First, if the 
constraints  α  =  0  and  β  =  1  hold  then  the  forward  bias  is  explained  only  by  systematic 
expectation errors and not by a time varying risk premium. Secondly, if the constraint β = 1 is 
verified then a risk premium explains part of the forward bias. Thirdly, if β = 0,5 then the 
forward  bias  is  equally  explained  by  the  presence  of  a  time varying  risk  premium  and 
systematic expectation errors
11. Table 2 presents the results. 
 
Table 2: Results for a time varying risk premium at 3 months, 1 year and 2 years 
st  Ho 
rizon  λ  α  β  R2a
dj  White  LM  J&B  β  = 
0,5  β = 1  α = 0,  
β = 1 
Euro 






























































































































































NB: Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets; p values are mentioned in brackets; critical values for 
the test of Student amount to 1,96 at a 5 % confidence level and to 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level; 5 lags are 
considered in the LM test. 
 
Diagnostic tests show no sign of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals; 
and residuals are normally distributed. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
10 See appendix C. Expected exchange rates come from Consensus Forecast. Consensus Forecast asks a panel of 
economists  (mostly  fundamentalist  economists)  to  provide  their  expectations  on  the  future  realisations  of 
currency prices at 3 months, 1 year and 2 years. 
11 Appendix C provides elements to understand the theoretical relevance of such constraints.   55
The first hypothesis (α = 0 and β = 1) is rejected for every currency. Thus the forward 
bias is not entirely explained by systematic expectation errors. The second hypothesis (β = 1) 
is accepted for every currency at short horizons (shorter than 2 years) but rejected at horizons 
equal to 2 years. Thus a risk premium explains part of the forward bias at horizons shorter 
than 2 years where p values are very high (table 2, column 11). This result casts doubts on the 
specification of the test for UIP (equation (3)) and also about the robustness of the rejection of 
UIP at short run horizons (less than 2 years). The third hypothesis (β = 0,5) is accepted for 
every currency at short run horizons (from 3 to 12 months) and rejected for horizons equal to 
2 years. Thus, the forward bias is equally explained by a time varying risk premium and 
systematic errors at short horizons. Conversely, for long run horizons (longer than 2 years), 
the  forward  bias  is  explained  more  by  systematic  expectation  errors  and  less  by  a  time 
varying risk premium. Indeed p values are very low at such horizons for the euro and the 
pound (table 2, column 10). 
Thus, the rejection of UIP in the short run (from 3 to 12 months) can be attributed to 
the omission of a time varying risk premium in equation (3). The possible misspecification of 
equation (3) casts doubts on the failure of UIP in the short run and hence on the possible 
rejection of fundamental efficiency. To counter the uncertainty concerning the validation of 
fundamental  efficiency,  we  test  the  second  underlying  hypothesis  of  UIP:  the  rational 
expectations hypothesis (REH). 
 
  3.3 Tests for the rational expectations hypothesis  
 
  Following Frankel and Froot (1987), the test for the rational expectations hypothesis is 
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In a VECM form, equation (5) becomes: 
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REH holds if expectation errors are not systematic i.e. if the constraints  0 α = and 
1 β =  (and t k ε + → iidN( ,σ²)) are significant in the model. 
 
Table 3: Results for the test of the REH at 3 months, 1 year and 2 years 
st  Horizon  λ  α  β  R2adj  White  LM  J&B  β = 1  α = 0,  
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NB: Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets; p values are mentioned in brackets; critical values for 
the test of Student amount to 1,96 at a 5 % confidence level and to 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level. 
 
Diagnostic tests show no heteroskedasticity in the residuals for the pound and the yen 
contrary to the euro. Autocorrelation in the residuals is not significant for every currency at 12 
months and 24 months; but significant for the pound and the yen at 3 months. Residuals 
follow a normal distribution except for the pound and the yen at 24 months. 
Table 3 shows that the REH is significantly rejected for all currencies at all horizons. 
Indeed, for short run horizons (3 months and 1 year) as well as for medium/long run horizons 
(2 years), coefficients are strongly negative and significant (see also appendix A). Such results 
imply that when agents expect an appreciation of the exchange rate at time t+k (with k = 3, 12 
and 24), the price of the currency actually depreciates in t+k! Therefore, the rejection of the 
REH  clears  the  ambiguity  on  the  robustness  of  the  failure  of  UIP  in  the  short  run,  and 
furthermore on the rejection of fundamental efficiency.   57
  3.4 Discussion of the results 
 
Tests show that UIP holds in the long run but not in the short run. Besides, REH is 
rejected at all horizons. As fundamental efficiency implies the verification of UIP and REH, 
fundamental efficiency does not hold in the foreign exchange market for every horizon.  
Several reasons explain the rejection of UIP in the short run and the rejection of REH 
for every horizon. Systematic errors by agents can be attributed to the heterogeneity of agents’ 
expectations.  Indeed,  the  sample  of  agents’  expectations  considered  here     Consensus 
Forecast   may not finely represent the expectations of the whole market. Consensus Forecast 
regroups mostly fundamentalist economists. However in the short run, market agents are in 
majority  chartist  (Allen  and  Taylor  (1992),  Cheung  and  Chinn  (2001)).  Fundamentalists 
dominate  the  market  only  in  the  long  run.  The  strong  heterogeneity  in  exchange  rate 
expectations in the short run between Consensus Forecast and the whole market could explain 
the failure of UIP in the short run. In the long run, as agents become more fundamentalist, 
agents’  expectations  from  Consensus  Forecast  reflect  more  properly  market  expectations. 
This fact may explain the validation of UIP in the long run. Causality can however run the 
other way round. Because it is difficult to predict exchange rates at long run horizons, the 
farther  the  horizon,  the  more  economists  from  Consensus  Forecast  will  rely  on  forward 
exchange rates to predict future exchange rates. Thus this fact may also explain the validation 
of UIP in the long run. Besides, given the fact that economists from Consensus Forecast do 
not trade directly in the market, they may face a different stock of information compared to 
agents who trade directly in the foreign exchange market. This difference in the stock of 
information  could  also  explain  the  failure  of  UIP  in  the  short  run.  In  spite  of  the  limits 
concerning the sample of Consensus Forecast, our results seem rather robust. Indeed, the 
analysis of market agents’ expectations by Bizimana (2008) based on a Reuters survey leads 
to the same conclusion. 
 
4. Testing speculative efficiency 
 
  To  test  speculative  efficiency  we  analyse  whether  speculation  is  profitable  in  the 
foreign exchange market. We rely on two speculative strategies commonly used by agents 
who speculate in the foreign exchange market: a momentum rule and a carry trade. 
We first test the profitability of a momentum rule on the euro/dollar, pound/dollar and 
yen/dollar  exchange  rates.  In  accordance  with  previous  studies  in  the  related  literature   58
(Schulmeister (2008)), we rely on a daily frequency. We then test the profitability of carry 
trades on the dollar/yen, euro/yen and pound/yen. Following Burnside et al. (2006, 2008) we 
rely  on  a  quarterly  frequency  for  the  carry  trade.  We  however  test  whether  results  are 
sensitive to the chosen frequencies
13. For both tests the period of analysis spans January 1998 
to December 2008. 
 
4.1 Are momentum rules profitable in the foreign exchange market? 
 
We analyse the profitability of a momentum rule in the foreign exchange market. A 
momentum rule is a chartist strategy that aims at forecasting exchange rates based on the 
































 where  st lt N N <  andN stands for the number of days.          
 
The momentum rule works as follows: if the price of the currency has appreciated in 
the past (ma
st
t 1 > ma
lt
t 1) then agents will expect an appreciation of the price of the currency 
(and conversely if ma
st
t 1 < ma
lt
t 1). We thus invest in euros in t + 1 if ma
st
t 1 > ma
lt
t 1. We then 
hold the position until ma
st
t 1 < ma
lt
t 1 where the position is closed at t + k + 1. 
Tests  are  carried  out  for  different  N  (with  Nst  <  Nlt).  Rules’  profitability  changes 
among years but results remain globally the same over the sample period. We here mention 
the  results  for  14 st N = days  and  200 lt N = days.  Returns  of  momentum  strategies
14 are 
compared to those offered by a buy and hold strategy on the S&P500 and risk free strategies 
(on  3 months  bills  and  10 years  bonds)  in  the  United  States.  Table  4  reports  the  returns 
associated to each strategy. 
 
                                                           
13 Changes in data frequency do not alter the final result concerning the tests for speculative efficiency. Results 
are available upon author request. 







 , with Ri, the daily returns associated to an open 
position based on a momentum rule; N, the number of open positions taken in the foreign exchange market.   59
Table 4: Annual average returns of a momentum strategy, a buy and hold strategy 
(B&H) and a risk free strategy 
                             Strategies 
Periods  MM  €/$  MM £/$  MM Y/$  B&H  US T Bill 
3 months 
US T Bonds 
10 years 
1998  9,37  1,90  5,43  26,31  5,20  5,26 
1999   16,65   4,30  10,87  24,00  4,73  5,64 
2000   10,67   20,12   9,76  8,76  5,46  6,03 
2001   4,60   3,93   10,94   15,32  5,15  5,02 
2002  18,74  17,03  6,09   15,43  2,29  4,59 
2003  25,48  19,51  10,06   1,23  1,32  3,99 
2004  10,55  14,29  4,39  19,24  1,06  4,26 
2005   15,72   16,49   11,94  8,68  2,30  4,29 
2006  15,65  27,28   0,80  10,59  4,15  4,79 
2007  15,90  2,78  5,88  14,79  4,95  4,63 
2008   11,51   15,54  25,69   15,69  2,95  3,64 
Annual Average Return  3,31  2,04  3,18  5,88  3,60  4,74 
Maximal Return  25,48  27,28  25,69  26,31  5,46  6,34 
Minimum Return   16,65   20,12   11,94   15,69  1,06  3,64 
Standard Deviation  14,66  15,19  10,65  14,96  1,58  0,68 
Sharpe Ratio   0,02   0,10   0,04   0,02 
NB: Sharpe ratio are defined as the ratio of the return difference between a speculative strategy and a risk free 
strategy (US Treasury bill) at 3 months over the risk associated with the speculative strategy ; all returns are 
expressed in US dollars. 
 
  Returns generated by the momentum rule vary across currencies and across periods. 
The momentum rule offers high returns for particular periods (between  January 2002 and 
December 2004 for the euro and the pound) and low returns at other periods (between January 
1999  and  December  2001  for  the  euro  and  the  pound).  Globally,  the  return/risk  ratios 
associated to the chartist rule are lower than those offered by alternative investment strategies 
(such  as  an  investment  in  US  Treasury  bills).  The  same  results  are  obtained  with  other 
momentum rules with different number of days
15. Hence table 4 shows that momentum rules 
can be profitable in the short run, while in the long run, profits opportunities converge on 
average to zero. These results imply that speculative efficiency is verified in the short run but 
not in the long run. 
 
4.2 Do carry trade strategies generate profits? 
 
The carry trade is a speculative strategy where investors borrow from low yielding 
currencies to invest in high yielding currencies. According to UIP, carry trades should not 
yield any profits. Indeed, UIP states that expected returns between a foreign and a domestic 
investment are equal since the variations in the expected exchange rate should compensate 
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any return differentials between two countries. However, the failure of UIP highlighted in 
section 3.1 implies that carry trade strategies may be profitable. 
  Assuming a carry trade between the United States and Japan, the speculative strategy 
works as follows: given that Japanese interest rates are lower than US interest rates ( 1 − t R  < 
*
t R 1 − ) over the sample period, a carry trade strategy involves borrowing in Japan at the rate Rt 1 
and investing in the United States at the rate R*t 1. Profits induced by this operation are given 
by: 










1 1 − −
−
+ − + = π         (7) 
 
With St, the dollar/yen exchange rate (listed as S yen per one dollar); R*t 1 and Rt 1, 
respectively, the interbank interest rate at 3 months in the United States and in Japan. 
 
Table 5: Cumulated annual average returns
16 of a carry trade strategy, a buy and hold 
strategy (B&H) and a risk free strategy 
                           Strategies 
Periods  CT  €/Y  CT £/Y  CT $/Y  B&H  US T Bill 
3 months 
US T Bonds 
10 years 
1998  3,02  11,78  4,33  26,31  5,20  5,26 
1999   12,52  5,76  8,44  24,00  4,73  5,64 
2000  16,72  27,29  39,67  8,76  5,46  6,03 
2001  20,45  26,04  24,99   15,32  5,15  5,02 
2002  15,41  13,44   2,11   15,43  2,29  4,59 
2003  16,67  13,70   4,61   1,23  1,32  3,99 
2004  11,37  23,81  4,89  19,24  1,06  4,26 
2005  8,75  19,49  24,22  8,68  2,30  4,29 
2006  20,57  30,58  18,29  10,59  4,15  4,79 
2007  14,71  14,56  12,39  14,79  4,95  4,63 
2008   11,26   32,54   15,24   15,69  2,95  3,64 
Annual Average Return  9,45  13,99  10,48  5,88  3,60  4,74 
Maximal Return  20,57  30,58  39,67  26,31  5,46  6,34 
Minimum Return   11,26   32,54   15,24   15,69  1,06  3,64 
Standard Deviation  12,41  17,09  16,42  14,96  1,58  0,68 
Sharpe Ratio  0,68  0,83  0,58   0,02 
NB : Sharpe ratio are defined as the ratio of the return difference between a speculative strategy and a risk free 
strategy (US Treasury bill) at 3 months over the risk associated with the speculative strategy ; all returns are 
expressed in US dollars. 
 
For each currency, returns offered by carry trades are relatively high between January 
1998 and December 2007. Returns become negative at the end of the period (between January 
2008 and December 2008). This fact is due to the appreciation of the yen and the fall of 
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interest rates in the United States, the United Kingdom and the Euro zone during the subprime 
crisis. However, carry trades offer globally higher return/risk ratios than passive investment 
on the S&P500 or risk free investments. Therefore, carry trades appear globally profitable 
over the sample period. These results corroborate the failure of UIP in the short run (table 1). 
As  observed  with  the  momentum  rule,  there  are  some  periods  in  which  carry  trades  are 
profitable while at other periods they generate losses. Hence table 5 suggests that in the short 
run, profits from carry trades are likely while in the long run, profits converge on average to 
zero. These results imply that speculative efficiency is verified in the short run but not in the 
long  run.  There  is  however  an  important  difference  between  the  carry  trade  and  the 
momentum strategy. The definition of the long term associated to both strategies cannot be the 
same.  The  long  run  of  an  investment  strategy  depends  on  the  adjustment  delay  of  its 
underlying variables (macroeconomic variables for carry trades and the exchange rate for 
momentum rules). In the case of a momentum strategy, the adjustment is defined as the mean 
reversion of the observed exchange rate towards its moving average. Conversely, in the carry 
trade, the adjustment is illustrated not solely by interest rate variations but also by the return 
of the observed exchange rate towards its fundamental value. The delay of adjustment   the 
mean reversion   lasts longer for macroeconomic fundamentals than for the exchange rate 
itself.  As  a  result,  considering  a  short period     short  enough  to  avoid  adjustments  in  the 
underlying  variables  of  an  investment  strategy     may  produce  higher  Sharpe  ratios.  As 
adjustments of the variables related to the  carry trade  (i.e. interest rates) last longer than 
adjustments of the underlying variables for the momentum strategy (i.e. exchange rate), we 
end up with higher Sharpe ratios for the carry trade than for the momentum strategy. Had we 
considered longer periods   long enough to allow for adjustments in macroeconomic variables 
  we would have found lower Sharpe ratios for the carry trade. To justify this point, we cite 
Burnside et al. (2006) and Jordà and Taylor (2009) who analysed the profitability of carry 
trade strategies on longer periods and found lower Sharpe ratios. Also and in line with our 
previous statements, Jordà and Taylor (2009) and Nozaki (2010) justify that low Sharpe ratios 
related to carry trades are due to the occurrence of exchange rates adjustments towards their 
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  4.3 Discussion of the results 
 
Empirical results show that momentum and carry trade strategies are profitable in the 
short run but not in the long run. Therefore, speculative efficiency does not hold in the short 
run but is verified in the long run. 
A possible  factor justifying  speculation  gains  in  the  short  run  lies  in  the  fact  that 
winning speculators use information more efficiently than losing speculators or that winning 
speculators  have  an  informational  advantage  over  losing  speculators.  Nowadays,  every 
investor  in  the  market  has  access  to  a  wide  range  of  information  about  macroeconomic 
fundamentals through software such as Bloomberg, Reuters, etc. As a result, it is less likely 
that  profits  from  speculative  strategies  are  determined  by  informational  advantages  on 
macroeconomic fundamentals. We argue that winning strategies may take account of a key 
component  of  exchange  rate  beyond  macroeconomic  fundamentals.  In  the  short  run,  this 
component could be market agents’ behaviours. Indeed, according to surveys among financial 
practitioners  (Cheung  and  Wong  (2000),  Cheung  and  Chinn  (2001),  Cheung,  Chinn  and 
Marsh (2004)), agents’ behaviours play a major role in the determination of exchange rates at 
short run horizons (from intraday frequencies to 6 months). Thus a fine appraisal of agents’ 
behaviours could explain the profits of speculators in the short run. Studies from Osler (2003) 
and Gehrig and Menkhoff (2003) show evidence of significant links between chartism and 
market agents’ behaviours. Further the high volatility of profits with the momentum rule (table 
4) relative to profits obtained with the carry trade strategy (table 5) could thus be explained by 
two  factors:  the  fact  that  market  agents’  behaviours  is  a  highly  volatile  component  of 
exchange  rates;  and  the  fact  that  chartism  (momentum  rules)  provides  information  about 
market agents’ behaviours contrary to models based on macroeconomic fundamentals (carry 
trades). 
 
5. Empirical tests for macroeconomic efficiency 
 
  5.1 Testing the first and second conditions of macroeconomic efficiency 
 
Testing the first condition of macroeconomic efficiency requires testing the existence 
of a long run relationship between the exchange rate and its fundamentals and also taking 
account of the time varying risk aversion of agents in the market. We thus estimate a portfolio 
model of exchange rate based on a BEER model (Clark and MacDonald (1998)). The flexible   63
framework  of  BEER  models  enables  us  to  estimate  a  dynamic  relationship  between  the 
exchange  rate  and  its  fundamentals
17.  The  estimation  of  BEER  models  is  based  on  a 
cointegrated  relationship  between  the  exchange  rate  and  its  fundamentals.  We  define  the 




0 1 2 3 ( ) ( ) ( ) t t t t t t t t q b b r r b a a b niip niip ε = + − + − + − +                       (8) 
 
With qt, the (log of the) real euro/dollar exchange rate (s dollars for 1 euro); (rt   rt*), 
the long term real interest rate differential; (at   at*), the productivity differential; (niipt   
niipt*), the differential of the ratio of the net international investment positions over GDP; εt, 
an error term. 
 
The error correction model takes the following form: 
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In accordance with the related literature and due to data availability, the estimation of 
model (9) is based on a monthly frequency. The considered currencies are the euro, the pound 
and the yen against the dollar. Because macroeconomic adjustments happen over long periods, 
we consider a longer period for the tests of macroeconomic efficiency. The estimation period 
runs from January 1975 to December 2008 
19. The method used is dynamic OLS (Banerjee et 
al.  (1998))
20.  This  method  is  more  satisfying  than  relying  on  a  VECM  model  given  the 
validation of weak exogeneity for exchange rate fundamentals 
21; and the willingness to build 
                                                           
17 We however keep in mind that BEER models have several flaws. BEER models are mainly ad hoc models 
where almost any economic variable can be included (see Wadhwani (1999), Koen et al. (2001), Camarero et al. 
(2005), Bénassy Quéré et al. (2008)); the dynamics are based on an econometric relationship and not on an 
economic model; the use of an error correction model implies that on average, over the estimation period, the 
exchange rate is assumed to be equal to its equilibrium value. 
18 Appendix E provides a detailed description of the variables used in model (8). 
19 A long time span is best suited for the estimation of equilibrium exchange rates. Yet one limit of the approach 
for the euro exchange rate is that we assume that the euro area had been in place since 1975 and in particular that 
there was a single monetary policy since then. Prior to 1999, the euro/dollar exchange rate is calculated using the 
synthetic euro provided by Datastream (see appendix J). 
20 We follow Banerjee et al. (1998) by considering 4 lags (k = 4) and 2 leads (m = 2). Leads and lags selection is 
based on a recursive method: starting from the highest lag/lead, we then drop variables whose coefficients are 
not significant at a 5 % level. 
21 See appendix F, table F.4.   64
a parsimonious model. We take account of the eventual presence of heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation in the residuals by applying the HAC correction of Newey West (1987). Table 
6 shows the estimation output. 
 
Table 6: Estimation output of the error correction models 
Currencies  λ  b0  b1  b2  b3  R2adj  R2adj 
LT 













Pound   0,041 


















NB: Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets; p values are mentioned in brackets; critical values for 
the test of Student amount to 1,96 at a 5 % confidence level and to 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level; 5 lags are 
considered for ARCH and LM tests. 
 
Diagnostic  tests  show  that  although  there  is  some  heteroskedasticity  and 
autocorrelation in the residuals for the pound and yen models (in spite of the HAC correction), 
RESET tests do not reject the specification of the model used here for every currency. 
Adjusted R2 associated to the error correction models are rather weak (lower than 
15 %). This result, often found in the literature, is related to the difficulty to explain exchange 
rate returns based on macroeconomic fundamentals. Conversely, adjusted R2 associated to the 
long run relationship are more satisfying since for each currency, the model explains at least 
70 % of the variance of the real exchange rates. The difference between the short run adjusted 
R2 and the long run adjusted R2 is related to the characteristics of the endogenous variables 
and the set of exogenous variables considered in the model. Equation (8) explains a financial 
variable     the  exchange  rate     by  relying  on  a  set  of  macroeconomic  fundamentals. 
Macroeconomic  fundamentals  are  low  volatile  variables  that  follow  long  run  trends. 
Conversely,  financial  variables     exchange  rates     experience  higher  volatility  than 
macroeconomic  fundamentals  and  follow  short/medium  run  trends.  This  difference  in  the 
characteristics between  financial variables  (the  endogenous variables)  and macroeconomic 
fundamentals (the exogenous variables) explain the difference between the short run adjusted 
R2 and the long run adjusted R2.  
The coefficients λ   the speed of adjustment of the exchange rate towards its long run 
value   are significant and negative. The model hence validates the existence of significant 
return  forces  that  lead  the  exchange  rate  towards  its  equilibrium  value  in  the  long  run. 
Moreover, all the coefficients in the long run relationship are significant and correctly signed. 
These  results  imply  the  acceptance  of  the  first  condition  of  macroeconomic  efficiency.   65
However, return forces appear rather weak. Indeed, half lives
22 amount to almost 38 months 
for the euro, 17 months for the pound and 18 months for the yen. 
The second condition of macroeconomic efficiency is also validated since for every 
currency, the coefficients related to the net external positions differentials are significant and 
positive. Therefore  a worsening of the external position ((niipt i   niipt i*)  < 0) induces  a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate. This depreciation will increase the competitiveness of 
the economy; leading the external position towards a more sustainable path in the long run. 
 
5.2 Testing the corollary of macroeconomic efficiency 
 
  The  validation  of  the  corollary  of  macroeconomic  efficiency  requires  testing  the 
quality of exchange rate forecasts based on fundamentals. In line with Meese and Rogoff 
(1983) and Cheung et al. (2005), we analyse the performances of out of sample recursive 
forecasts
23 of a BEER model compared to two alternative models. The models are defined 
below: 
 
    a BEER model:      
* BEER
t k t k t k t k s q p p + + + +   =   −  +                         (10) 
 
    With 
* * *
0, 1, 2, 3, ( ) ( ) ( ) t k k k t t k t t k t t t k q b b r r b a a b niip niip ε + +   = + − + − + − +  
 
    a momentum rule :      
MOM st lt
t k k k t t t k s ma ma   ν ε + +     = + − +               (11) 
 
    With 50 st N = days (2 months) and  200 lt N = days (6 months) 
 
  a random walk without drift :      
RW
t k t t k s s ε + + = +                          (12) 
 
Where  t k ε + → iidN(0, σε
2)    
 
                                                           
22 Half lives, expressed in months, are computed as follows: half life = ln(0,5)/ln(1 λ). 
23 Recursive forecasts aim at estimating the model in sample for a given period of time and forecasting the 
endogenous variable out of sample. We then estimate the model by adding one observation to the previous in 
sample period (the initial date of the in sample period remains the same). We iterate this procedure until the end 
of the sample period.    66
  Models  are  estimated  in sample  from  January  1975  to  December  1995  based  on 
monthly data. The out of sample period runs from January 1996 to December 2008. Forecast 
horizons span from 1 month to 10 years. Forecast errors of the different models are shown in 
table 7. 
 
Table 7: Forecast errors from a BEER model, a momentum rule (MM)  
and a random walk (RW) 
Currencies  Model  Stat  1 month  3 months  6 months  1 year  2 years  5 years  10 years 
Euro 
BEER 
RMSE  0,1531  0,1557  0,1604  0,1696  0,1831  0,1912  0,1140 
U Theil  5,08  2,50  1,88  1,42  0,98  0,67  0,42 















RMSE  0,0407  0,0593  0,0820  0,1108  0,1715  0,3193  0,3558 
U Theil  1,35  0,95  0,96  0,92  0,91  1,12  1,33 














RW  RMSE  0,0301  0,0621  0,0851  0,1193  0,1865  0,2828  0,2664 
Pound 
BEER 
RMSE  0,2273  0,2281  0,2273  0,2330  0,2040  0,2501  0,1628 
U Theil  4,84  2,53  2,04  1,55  1,14  1,01  0,66 















RMSE  0,0494  0,0677  0,0958  0,1267  0,1688  0,3082  0,4160 
U Theil  1,05  0,75  0,86  0,84  0,94  1,24  1,70 














RW  RMSE  0,0469  0,0901  0,1109  0,1494  0,1777  0,2467  0,2435 
Yen 
BEER 
RMSE  0,1518  0,1572  0,1546  0,1700  0,1479  0,2061  0,1691 
U Theil  5,46  3,10  2,22  1,72  1,10  1,70  0,78 















RMSE  0,0315  0,0469  0,0609  0,0793  0,1128  0,1428  0,3168 
U Theil  1,13  0,92  0,87  0,80  0,84  1,18  1,47 














RW  RMSE  0,0278  0,0507  0,0695  0,0985  0,1340  0,1209  0,2144 
NB: RMSE = ((1/T)Σ(yt+s – ft,s)
2)
1/2 ; U Theil = RMSEm/RMSErw ; The Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistics 
(see appendix I) are computed relative to the random walk ; p values are mentioned in brackets. 
 
  At very short run horizons (1 month) and for every currency, the random walk offers 
the best predictions, followed by momentum rules and BEER models. For short/medium term 
horizons (from 3 months to 2 years), the momentum model beats the random walk and offers 
the best forecasts. Indeed, for every currency, U Theils associated to the momentum rule are 
less than one. BEER models provide the worst predictions between 3 months and 12 months. 
This  observation  underlines  the  high  potential  of  chartist  rules  to  forecast  exchange  rate 
dynamics  at  short/medium  run  horizons.  However,  as  long  as  the  horizon  increases,  the 
predictive performances of chartist rules decrease significantly. Indeed, for long run horizons 
(between  5  years  and  10  years),  momentum  rules  provide  the  worst  forecasts  for  every 
currency. From 5 years on, U Theils associated to the momentum rule become higher than one.   67
Conversely, at long run horizons the predictive performance of BEER models is higher than 
the random walk. This fact is verified for the yen and the pound at 10 years as well as for the 
euro from 2 years on. Table 7 shows that for the majority of currencies, U Theils associated to 
a BEER model decreases at 5 years and become less than one at 10 years. 
  As a result, in the very short run (1 month), the best forecasts are provided by the 
random walk; the momentum rule in the short/medium term (from 3 months to 2 years) and 
the BEER model for long run horizons (for 5 and 10 years). Hence, the third condition of 
macroeconomic  efficiency  is  verified  for  every  currency:  in  the  long  run,  fundamentals 
provide the best forecasts concerning exchange rate dynamics. 
 
  5.3 Discussion of the results 
 
Empirical results show  the existence of significant return  forces of  exchange rates 
towards their fundamental value in the long run (from 2 years on). Hence exchange rates can 
wander away from their fundamental value in the short run, but they converge towards their 
fundamental value in the long run. The adjustment speed of exchange rates towards their 
long run value is different across exchange rates (table 6) but strongly significant. Moreover, 
exchange  rate  models  based  on  fundamentals  (BEER  models)  offer  better  forecasts  than 
momentum rules or random walks only in the long run (for 5 and 10 years). As a result, 
macroeconomic  efficiency  holds  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  in  the  long  run,  i.e.  for 
horizons longer than 5 years. Macroeconomic efficiency does not hold for short run horizons 
(from 1 month to 2 years). 
It follows that macroeconomic fundamentals play a major role in the determination of 
exchange rates especially in the long run. However, in the short run, several factors alter the 
relationship between exchange rates and their fundamentals. The literature often mentions 
nominal rigidities (Dornbush (1976)), transaction costs (De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007)), 
expectations’  heterogeneity  (De  Grauwe  and  Grimaldi  (2007)),  etc.  We  argue  that  the 
disconnection  of  exchange  rates  from  fundamentals  in  the  short  run  could  be  caused  by 
factors related to agents’ behaviours. This point is justified by surveys in the foreign exchange 
market. According to Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung and Chinn (2001), Cheung et al. 
(2004), in the short run (from intraday frequencies to 6 months) foreign exchange market 
operators consider that exchange rates are exclusively driven by non fundamental components:   68
speculative  forces,  over reaction  and  bandwagon  effects
24.  Only  in  the  long  run  (over  6 
months) do foreign exchange market operators consider that exchange rates are determined in 
majority by macroeconomic fundamentals. Such results justify the empirical output obtained 
in  table  7.  In  the  long  run,  as  exchange  rates  are  mainly  determined  by  macroeconomic 
fundamentals,  BEER  models  offer  the  best  forecasts  concerning  exchange  rate  dynamics 
relative to momentum rules and random walks. Conversely, in the short run, momentum rules 
offer the best forecasts of future exchange rates. As suggested by previous studies (Gehrig and 
Menkhoff (2003), Osler (2003)), chartism seems to take account of the psychological (i.e. 
agents’ behaviours) components affecting exchange  rates. This result explains why in the 
short run (from 3 months to 2 years) momentum rules perform well in predicting exchange 
rate  dynamics
25.  On  the  contrary,  BEER  models  which  assume  agents  bereft  of  any 
psychological dimension, offer the worst forecasts at such horizon. It follows that a robust 
model  of  asset  pricing  should  consider  not  solely  fundamentals  but  also  market  agents’ 
behaviours to determine the dynamics of asset prices. 
 
6.  Different forms of efficiency for different time horizons 
 
  For every exchange rate (euro/dollar, pound/dollar and yen/dollar), results show that 
different forms of efficiency prevail in the foreign exchange market at different time horizons. 












                                                           
24 See appendix H. 
25 Another interpretation of the success of chartist rules to predict exchange rates at short/medium term horizons 
could be related to the fact that a majority of agents use chartist techniques at short/medium term horizons to 
forecast exchange rates.   69
Table 8: Results associated to the different forms of efficiency 
Type of 
Efficiency  Results  Conclusion 
Fundamental 
Efficiency 
 Rejection of UIP in the short run  (from 1 month to 1 year) 
 Validation of UIP in the medium term (2 years) 
 Rejection of the REH at all horizons 
Fundamental Efficiency 
rejected at short, medium and 
long run horizons 
Macroeconomic 
Efficiency 
 Existence of a long run relationship between exchange rates 
and fundamentals ; significant return forces to the long run 
equilibrium exchange rate 
 Slow return to the equilibrium exchange rate value 
 Bad forecasting performances of BEER models in the 
short/medium term (from 1 month to 2 years) ; Better 
forecasting performances than random walk and momentum 
rules in the long run (from 5 years on) 
 Rejection of macroeconomic 
efficiency in the short run  
 Validation of 
macroeconomic efficiency in 
the long run 
Speculative 
Efficiency 
 No systematic profits related to the use of chartist rules in 
the long run  
 Good forecasting performances of chartist rules in the 
medium term but not in the long run (from 5 years on) 
 Rejection of speculative 
efficiency in the short run 
 Validation in the medium run 
 Rejection in the long run 
 
 
In  the  short  run  (between  1  month  and  1  year)  pure  inefficiency  characterises  the 
foreign  exchange  market.  The  foreign  exchange  market  is  neither  fundamentally  efficient 
(failure of UIP between 3 months and 1 year), nor speculatively efficient (possibility to make 
punctual profits based on momentum or carry trade strategies; good forecasting performances 
of  momentum  rules  between  3  months  and  2  years),  nor  macroeconomically  efficient 
(existence of long lasting misalignments of the exchange rate from its equilibrium value in 
the short run and unsatisfying forecasting results with BEER models from 1 month to 2 years). 
In the medium term (between 1 year and 2 years), speculative efficiency is verified in 
the foreign exchange market. Indeed, UIP holds for medium/long run horizons (from 2 years 
on) thus limiting profits related to carry trade strategies at medium/long run horizons. Profits 
from momentum rules or carry trades converge towards zero in the long run. Forecasts based 
on  a  momentum  rule  worsen  at  longer  horizons  (from  5  years  on)  thus  limiting  the 
profitability of such rules at long horizons. Conversely, speculative efficiency is not verified 
in the short run. Indeed, UIP is not validated in the short run (between 3 months and 1 year) 
and profits from momentum rules or carry trade strategies can be generated punctually. Also, 
forecasts based on a momentum rule are rather satisfying for short run horizons (between 3 
months and 1 year). 
In the long run (from 5 years on), the foreign exchange market is efficient from a 
macroeconomic perspective. Indeed, BEER models offer better forecasts between 5 years and 
10 years and show the existence of significant return forces towards the long run equilibrium   70
exchange rate (even if the adjustment of exchange rates towards the equilibrium value appears 
rather slow). 
Finally, the failure of UIP in the short run (between 3 months and 1 year), the poor 
performances of BEER models in the short/medium term (from 1 month to 2 years) and the 
rejection of REH (at all horizons) lead to the rejection of fundamental efficiency   i.e. Fama’s 
efficiency   in the foreign exchange market whatever horizon considered. 
As shown in figure 1, the foreign exchange market is characterised by different forms 
of efficiency for different time horizons. 
 






  Starting from the internal contradictions of Fama (1965)’s definition of efficiency, the 
paper  provides  three  definitions  of  foreign  exchange  market  efficiency:  fundamental 
efficiency,  macroeconomic  efficiency  and  speculative  efficiency.  These  three  distinct 
definitions  lead  to  four  different  forms  of  market  efficiency:  fundamental  efficiency, 
speculative efficiency, macroeconomic efficiency and pure inefficiency. 
  Empirical tests show that foreign exchange market efficiency is characterised by pure 
inefficiency in the short run  (between 1 month and 1  year), speculative efficiency in the 
medium run (between 1 and 2 years) and macroeconomic efficiency in the long run (from 
5 years on). Fundamental efficiency does not hold in the foreign exchange market. These 
results  have  important  implications  regarding  exchange  rate  dynamics.  The  validation  of 
macroeconomic efficiency in the long run implies that large misalignments of exchange rates 
can occur and persist in the short run and as such, can contribute to global imbalances.   71
  There are several possible extensions of this work. First, the tests of foreign market 
efficiency can be extended to other types of exchange rates (for instance, effective exchange 
rates)  or  other  bilateral  exchange  rates  (for  example,  exchange  rates  from  emerging 
economies).  Secondly,  one  can  improve  the  empirical  tests  associated  to  each  form  of 
efficiency by taking account of new econometric techniques or new data. Testing UIP and 
REH at higher frequencies by relying on tick by tick data could be an interesting way of 
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Appendices 
 
A. Current, forward and expected exchange rates at 3 months, 1 year and 2 years 
 
Figures A.1 to A.6 represent the evolution of the current exchange rates, the forward 
exchange rates and the expected exchange rates at 3 months, 1 year and 2 years for the euro, 
the pound and the yen against the dollar. 
 
Figures A.1 to A.6: Current, forward and expected exchange rates  
at 3 months, 1 year and 2 years 
Figure A.1: Euro/dollar current and 
forward exchange rates 
 
Figure A.2: Euro/dollar current and 
expected exchange rates 
 
Figure A.3: Pound/dollar current and 
forward exchange rates 
 
Figure A.4: Pound/dollar current and 
expected exchange rates 
 
Figure A.5: Yen/dollar current and 
forward exchange rates 
 
Figure A.6: Yen/dollar current and 
expected exchange rates 
 
Sources: Thomson Datastream and Consensus Forecast ; the euro is listed as one euro for s dollars ; the pound is 
listed as one pound for s dollars and the yen is listed as one dollar for s yens. 
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For every exchange rate, the forward exchange rate appears as a bad predictor of the 
future  exchange  rate.  Besides,  agents  seem  to  make  systematic  errors  concerning  their 
exchange rate expectations. 
For instance, in January 2000, 1 euro is equal to 1,02 dollars. The one year interest rate 
is equal to 5,4 % in the United States and 3,3 % in Europe. According to UIP, the market 
expects at one year an appreciation of 2,1 % for the euro (hence one euro for 1,04 dollars). 
According to Consensus Forecast, the expected value of the euro at one year is equal to 1,12 
(hence an appreciation of 9,8 %). Actually, in January 2001, 1 euro is equal to 0,94 dollars 
(the euro has depreciated by 8,5 %). 
At the beginning of 2007, 1 euro is worth 1,30 dollars. Consensus Forecast predicts 1 
euro  for  1,31  dollars  at  the  beginning  of  2008  (hence  an  appreciation  of  0,8  %).  Such 
dynamics match the interest rates differential between the US and the euro zone. Actually, in 
January 2008, the exchange rate is equal to 1,49 (hence an appreciation of the euro by 14,6 %). 
Eventually, between January 2002 and January 2008, the dollar depreciated from 0,88 
in January 2002 to 1,50 euros in January 2008. During this period, the annual returns for a US 
investor  of  a  risk free  investment  labelled  in  dollars  has  been  on  average  2,8  %  a  year. 
Conversely, over the same period, the annual returns of a risk free investment labelled in 
euros amounted to 12,4 % (given the evolution of the euro/dollar exchange rate). The dollar 
dynamics do not match the one assumed by UIP. Had UIP held, the dollar should have had 
appreciated  during  this  period.  As  mentioned  above,  the  dollar  has  actually  depreciated 
between January 2002 and January 2008. 
The same observations can be made for the pound/dollar and the yen/dollar exchange 
rates. 
 
B. Tests for uncovered interest rate parity and the rational expectations hypothesis 
 
Fundamental efficiency assumes the validation of UIP:  
 
* a
t k t t t s s r r + − = −                                  
 
  Empirical tests of UIP often include the forward exchange rate in the above equation. 
The forward rate is introduced through the covered interest rate parity (CIP). According to 
CIP, the spread between the forward exchange rate ( , t k f ) and the actual exchange rate at time   80
t  (
t s )  is  equal  to  the  interest  rate  differential  between  a  foreign  country  and  a  domestic 
country: 
*
, t k t t t f s r r − = −                                  
 
  From  the  above  equations,  the  forward  rate  must  be  equal  to  the  future  expected 
exchange rate: 
         ,
a
t k t k f s + =                                             
 
Under REH, expectation errors made by  agents (
t ε ) are on average equal to zero 
( [ ] 0 t E ε = ). In other words, agents’ expectations on the future exchange rate are on average 
equal to the realised values of the exchange rate in the future. Therefore, the future exchange 
rate is equal to the expected exchange rate plus an error term: 
 
a
t k t k t k s s ε + + + = +                    with      [ ] 0 t k E ε + =           
 
Given the above equations, one can write UIP as:  
 
        , t k t t k t t k s s f s ε + + − = − +                       
 
  Under an econometric form, the above relationship becomes: 
 
        , ( ) t k t t k t t k s s f s α β ε + + − = + − +            
 
  Therefore, UIP will be verified if the following constraints are significantly accepted 
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C. Tests for a time varying risk premium 
 
According to Frankel and Froot (1987), the omission of a time varying risk premium 
can explain the failure of UIP in the short run. Indeed, equation (3) in the core text assumes 
risk neutral agents. The hypothesis of risk aversion implies the introduction of a time varying 
risk premium (ρt) in relation (1) in the core text: 
 
rt = rt*   (s
a
t+k   st) + εt                                                   (C.1) 
 
  The  presence  of  a  risk  premium  means  that  domestic  and  foreign  assets  are  not 
perfectly substitutable anymore. Investors consider that one asset is riskier than the other one. 
Consequently, investors require a higher return to hold the riskier asset. Supposing that CIP 
holds, the risk premium can be defined as: 
   
ρt = ft,k    s
a
t+k/t                                                                (C.2) 
 
Based on this definition, we now define the influence of the risk premium on the 
coefficient β of equation (3) in the core text and hence on the failure of UIP.  
By definition, the limit probability of the coefficient β is given by: 
 
    plim β = 
) (






t k t k t k t
f VAR
f s COV f COV + +   + ε
                    (C.3) 
 
Introducing the definition of the risk premium (equation (C.2)) and readjusting, we get: 
 
β = 1    






























t k t t
k t




f COV ρ ρ ε
           (C.4)                                   
                          Systematic errors on the             Time varying risk premium                                                  
              future expected exchange rate                                     
 
Hence:                            β = 1   bar   bpr                                                                 (C.5) 
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This decomposition shows that the coefficient β is influenced by two factors. The term 
bar represents systematic expectation errors (or the invalidation of the REH). The term bpr 
represents the influence of a time varying risk premium. If UIP holds, then β =1. In this case, 
agents behave rationally and do not make systematic errors in their forecasts (bar = 0); also, 
the presence of a time varying risk premium is not justified (bpr = 0). 
The failure of UIP can therefore be attributed to two factors: the presence of a time 
varying risk premium (bpr ≠ 0) and the occurrence of systematic forecasting errors by agents 
(bar ≠ 0). To test whether the failure of UIP is due to a time varying risk premium, we regress 
the variation in the expected exchange rate (s
a
t + k   st) on the forward premium (ft,k   st): 
 
      s
a
t + k   st = α + β( ft,k   st) + εt+k                                             (C.6) 
 
The  failure  of  UIP  and  hence  the  forward  bias  will  be  more  influenced  by  the 
existence of a time varying risk premium than systematic expectation errors if β < 0,5. In this 
case, the forward premium (ft,k   st) is more explained by the variance of the time varying risk 
premium ρt than by the variance of systematic expectation errors (s
a
t + k   st). Hence: 
 
      VAR( s
a
t+k/t) < VAR(ρt)                                                       (C.7) 
 
By introducing the risk premium (C.2) in (C.4) and after adjustments, we get: 
 








t k t k t
f VAR
s f COV
                                                    (C.8) 
 
From  (C.3)  and  assuming  that  COV(εt+k,  ft,k)  =  0,  (C.8)  is  equal  to  β  <  0,5.  This 
demonstration allows testing three hypotheses from relation (C.6). First, if the constraints α = 
0 and β = 1 hold then the forward bias is explained only by systematic expectation errors and 
not by a time varying risk premium. Secondly, if the constraint β = 1 is verified then a risk 
premium explains part of the forward bias. Thirdly, if β = 0,5 then the forward bias is equally 
explained  by  the  presence  of  a  time varying  risk  premium  and  by  systematic  expectation 
errors. 
   83
D. Stationarity tests for UIP tests (table 1 in the core text), time varying risk premium 
tests (table 2 in the core text) and REH tests (table 3 in the core text) 
 
Stationarity tests are based on three tests: the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, 
the Phillips Perron (PP) test and the Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin (KPSS) test. Results 
are presented in tables D.1, D.2 and D.3. 
 
Table D.1: Stationarity tests for the endogenous variable (st+k   st) for UIP and REH tests 
(st+k   st)  k = 3  k = 12  k = 24 
Tests  ADF  PP  KPSS  ADF  PP  KPSS  ADF  PP  KPSS 
























































NB: p values are mentioned in brackets; one star (*), two stars (**) and three stars (***) denote respectively a 
stationary series at a 10 %, 5 % and 1% confidence level. 
 
Table D.2: Stationarity tests for the exogenous variables (ft,k   st) in UIP tests 
  (ft,k   st)  k = 3  k = 12  k = 24 

























































NB: p values are mentioned in brackets; one star (*), two stars (**) and three stars (***) denote respectively a 
stationary series at a 10 %, 5 % and 1% confidence level. 
 
Table D.3: Stationarity tests for the exogenous variables (s
a
t+k   st) in REH tests 
(s
a
t+k   st)  k = 3  k = 12  k = 24 

























































NB: p values are mentioned in brackets; one star (*), two stars (**) and three stars (***) denote respectively a 
stationary series at a 10 %, 5 % and 1% confidence level. 
 
Results concerning stationarity tests are mixed. A given series can be stationary or not 
stationary depending on the chosen test. As in the sample period (January 1999 December 
2008), the considered exchange rates are highly volatile in level, we consider exchange rate 
series are integrated of order one. 
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  Table D.4 presents the cointegration tests of equations (3), (4) and (5) in the core text. 
 
Table D.4: Cointegration tests associated to equation (3), equation (4) and equation (5) 
Currencies  Horizon  Statistics 
UIP 







Trace  2  1  1 
MaxEig  1  0  1 
12 
Trace  0  1  2 
MaxEig  1  0  1 
24 
Trace  0  1  1 
MaxEig  1  0  0 
Pound 
3 
Trace  2  2  2 
MaxEig  1  0  2 
12 
Trace  0  1  1 
MaxEig  1  0  1 
24 
Trace  1  1  1 
MaxEig  1  0  0 
Yen 
3 
Trace  1  1  1 
MaxEig  1  0  0 
12 
Trace  0  0  2 
MaxEig  1  0  1 
24 
Trace  0  0  0 
MaxEig  1  0  0 
NB: Cointegration tests are based on the following assumptions: Data Trend: Linear; Test Type: Intercept, No 
Trend; UIP stands for the test for uncovered interest rate parity ex post; TVRA stands for the tests for a time 
varying risk aversion; REH stands for the test for the rational expectations hypothesis; Critical values are based 
on the table of MacKinnon Haug Michelis (1999). 
 
  Cointegration  tests  show  the  existence  of  a  significant  cointegrated  relationship 
between the endogenous and the exogenous variables considered in equations (3), (4) and (5) 
for all currencies except for the yen in equations (4) and (5) respectively at 1 and 2 years. 
 
E. Description of the variables used in the BEER model 
 
E.1 Endogenous variable: the real exchange rate 
 
qt = log(Qt) = log( St Pt/Pt*)                           
 
With St, the euro/dollar exchange rate (1 euro for S dollars) ; Pt*, the consumer price 
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E.2 Exogenous variables 
 
  Long term interest rate differential: 
 
(rt   rt*) = (it   πt)   (it*  π t*)                                
 
With πt = [CPIt   CPI t 12/ CPI t 12]x100 and πt* = [CPI t*   CPI t 12*/ CPI t 12*]x100 ; it 
and it*, respectively the nominal interest rates on 10 years bonds for the Euro zone and the 
United  States;  πt  and  πt*,  the  inflation  rates  in  the  Euro  zone  and  in  the  United  States 
computed as the growth rate of the consumer price index in the Euro zone (CPIt) and in the 
United States (CPIt*). 
 
  Productivity differential: 
 
(at   at*)  = log(GDPt/Lt )   log(GDPt*/Lt*)          
 
With GDPt and GDPt*, the gross domestic products in the Euro zone and in the United 
States; Lt and Lt*, the number of employed people in the Euro zone and in the United States. 
 
  Net international investment position differential: 
 
(niipt   niipt*) = NIIPt/GDP    NIIPt*/GDPt*           
 
With NIIPt and NIIPt* respectively, the net international investment position of the 
Euro zone and the United States; GDPt and GDPt*, the gross domestic product in the Euro 
zone and in the United States. The series (niipt   niipt*) have been filtered with a Hodrick 
Prescott filter. This filter is often used in the literature to smooth series available at lower 
frequencies. Indeed, the BEER model is estimated on a monthly frequency while data on net 
international investment positions are only available annually. Besides, without filtering, we 
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F. Test procedure for the BEER model 
 
The  estimation  procedure  of  the  BEER  model  follows  three  steps.  The  first  step 
verifies whether all series have the same order of integration. Table F.1 shows that all series 
are integrated of order one. 
 
Table F.1: Integration order for the series used in the BEER models  
for the euro, the pound and the yen 
Variables  ADF  PP  KPSS 
qt  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
(rt   rt*)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
(at   at*)  I(1)  I(2)  I(1) 
(niipt –niipt*)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
 
  In a second step, we look for the number of cointegrated vectors by applying Trace 
tests and Maximum Eigenvalue tests. Results available in table F.2 (column 4) validate the 
presence of at most one cointegrated vector between the exchange rate and its fundamentals. 
We therefore estimate a univariate error correction model. 
 
Table F.2: Number of cointegrated vectors at a 5 % confidence level 
Euro  
Data Trend  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 







Trend  Intercept Trend 
Trace  1  1  1  1  1 
Max Eigenvalue  1  1  1  1  1 
Pound 
Data Trend  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 







Trend  Intercept Trend 
Trace  1  1  2  2  3 
Max Eigenvalue  1  1  1  2  3 
Yen 
Data Trend  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 







Trend  Intercept Trend 
Trace  1  1  1  2  2 
Max Eigenvalue  2  2  1  2  2 
NB: Critical values are based on the tables of MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999). 
 
  In a third step, we estimate the long run relationship (equation (8) in the core text) by 
ordinary least squares (OLS). We then test for stationary residuals in equation (8). Table F.3 
shows that residuals in the long run relationships are stationary. We therefore estimate the 
error correction model. Results are available in table 6 in the core text.   87
Table F.3: Critical values for Augmented Dickey Fuller cointegration test 












without trend    4,30    3,74    3,44   4,66   3,93   3,80 
with constant, 
without trend    4,73    4,11    3,83   4,65   3,93   3,80 
with constant, 




without trend    4,30    3,74    3,45   4,65   3,93   3,80 
with constant, 
with trend    4,67    4,12    3,84   4,61   3,93   4,70 
 
To justify the estimation of a univariate ECM, we compute weak exogeneity tests on 





Γi ∆Xt i +  ΠZt 1+ εt                
  
Where X is a (nx1) vector, with n representing the number of variables considered in 
the model ; Γi is a (nxn) matrix ; Π is a (nxn) matrix, whose rank determines the number of 
cointegrated vectors; εt is a (nx1) error term vector assumed to follow a white noise process. 
The matrix Π can be split into two vectors a and b such that: 
 
Π = ab’                                         
 
  Where a is a (nxr) matrix that contains the adjustment parameters towards the long run 
relationship (r represents the number of cointegrated relationships); b is a (nxr) matrix that 
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 and  b’ = (1 β0  β1  β2  β3)                     
 






t t t t 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − = Ε β β β β  
 
The normalisation suggests that qt is endogenous and (rt   rt*), (at   at*), (niipt   niipt*) 
are weakly exogenous for the parameters in the vectors a and b. Thus, the test of a parameter 
equal  to  zero  in  the  rows  of  vector  a  is  equivalent  to  testing  whether  a  variable  can  be 
considered as weakly exogenous in the long run parameters of the vector b (Johansen (1995), 
Juselius  (2006)).  For  example  qt  is  weakly  exogenous  for  the  vector  b  (long  run  weakly 
exogenous) if λ1 is significantly equal to zero (λ1 = 0). In the same vein, if (rt   rt*) is weakly 
exogenous then λ2 = 0. If the zero restriction is significant then the variable (rt   rt*) is weakly 
exogenous. In other words, the variable (rt   rt*) does not respond to any deviation from the 
long run equilibrium. 
Tests for weak exogeneity are based on a Likelihood Ratio statistic: 
 
LR =  2[ln(LC) – ln[LNC]] ~> χ
2(ν)                           
 
Where ν is the number of constraints; LC, the likelihood of the constrained model; LNC, 
the likelihood of the unconstrained model. If the LR statistics is higher than the χ
2(ν) at a 
confidence level α then H0 is rejected and the restrictions are not significant.   89
Table F.4: Results for weak exogeneity tests 




























NB: LR test follows a χ
2(ν) ; p values are mentioned in brackets. 
 
The variable qt is not considered as weakly exogenous at a 5 % confidence level. 
Conversely, the variables (rt   rt*), (at   at*), (niipt   niipt*) can be considered as weakly 
exogenous at a 5 % confidence level. Weak exogeneity tests thus justify the estimation of a 
univariate ECM model rather than a multivariate ECM model. 
 
G. Fundamental and actual exchange rates 
 
  Figures  G.1  to  G.3  represent  the  dynamics  of  the  observed  exchange  rate  and  the 
estimated fundamental exchange rate based on a BEER model for the euro, the pound and the 
yen against the dollar. 
 









































































































































































NB:  The  black  line  represents  the  actual  exchange  rate  (left  scale);  the  grey  line  represents  the  estimated 
fundamental exchange rate (left scale); the green (red) area represents periods of overvaluation (undervaluation) 
(right scale).   
 
The  euro  is  undervalued  relative  to  the  dollar  in  the  1980s  and  following  its 
introduction between 1999 and 2003. The former observation is due to the strong appreciation 
of  the  dollar  in  the  1980s  while  the  later  one  can  be  attributed  to  fears  among  market 
participants  concerning  the  introduction  of  a  new  currency  and  a  new  central  bank  (the   90
European Central Bank). The euro seems overvalued against the dollar from 2003 until the 
end of the sample period. 
 













































































































































































NB:  The  black  line  represents  the  actual  exchange  rate  (left  scale);  the  grey  line  represents  the  estimated 
fundamental exchange rate (left scale); the green (red) area represents periods of overvaluation (undervaluation) 
(right scale).   
 
  Periods  of  overvaluation  and  undervaluation  of  the  pound  are  close  to  the  ones 
identified for the euro. The pound is undervalued relative to the dollar during the first half of 
the 1980s and in the 1990s. Periods of overvaluation for the pound are located in the late 
1980s and at the end of the sample period. 
 















































































































































































NB:  The  black  line  represents  the  actual  exchange  rate  (left  scale);  the  grey  line  represents  the  estimated 
fundamental exchange rate (left scale); the green (red) area represents periods of overvaluation (undervaluation) 
(right scale); the estimation period begins in January 1985 for the yen since the Japanese external debt is only 
available from January 1985. 
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The yen is overvalued at the times of the Japanese economic boom in the late 1980s. 
However, after the burst of the Japanese stock price bubble and house price bubble in the 
early 1990s, the overvaluation of the yen progressively disappears. The yen enters in a phase 
of  undervaluation.  This  phase  is  concomitant  with  the  deep  recession  of  the  Japanese 
economy in the 1990s until the end of the sample period. 
 
H. Factors determining exchange rates according to surveys among market practitioners 
 
  Tables  H.1  to  H.3  report  the  results  of  three  surveys  led  on  three  major  foreign 
exchange market places. Market practitioners were asked to provide the main determinants of 
exchange rates according to time horizon. 
 
Table H.1: Factors determining exchange rate movements in Tokyo, Hong Kong and 
Singapore foreign exchange market (Cheung and Wong (2000)) 
Factors  Intraday  Medium Run  Long Run 
Bandwagon Effects  24,40  12,13  0,84 
Over Reaction to news  30,16  1,98  0,20 
Speculative Forces  30,82  14,0  2,30 
Economic Fundamentals  0,70  32,14  79,56 
Technical Trading  13,92  39,75  17,1 
Source: Cheung and Wong (2000); Percentages of respondents in each category are mentioned. 
 
Table H.2: Factors determining exchange rate movements in the US foreign exchange 
rate market (Cheung and Chinn (2001)) 
Factors  Intraday  Medium Run  Long Run 
Bandwagon Effects  28,20  10,52  3,93 
Over Reaction to news  30,45  2,10  0 
Speculative Forces  25,51  23,68  2,36 
Economic Fundamentals  0,82  32,10  87,40 
Technical Trading  14,40  30,52  3,14 
Other  0,62  1,08  3,17 
Source: Cheung and Chin (2001); Percentages of respondents in each category are mentioned. 
 
Table H.3: Factors affecting exchange rate dynamics in the UK foreign exchange rate 
market (Cheung, Chinn and Marsh (2004)) 
Factors  Intraday  Medium Run  Long Run 
Bandwagon Effects  29,3  9,5  1 
Over Reaction to news  32,8  0,7  0 
Speculative Forces  25,3  30,7  3,1 
Economic Fundamentals  0,6  31,4  82,5 
Technical Trading  10,3  26,3  11,3 
Other  1,7  1,5  2,1 
Source: Cheung, Chinn and Marsh (2004); Percentages of respondents in each category are mentioned. 
   92
All three surveys reach the same conclusions. In the short run (intraday to horizons 
shorter than 6 months), market psychology (bandwagon effects, over reaction to news and 
speculative forces) dominates in the determination of the exchange rate while in the long run 
(for  horizons  longer  than  6  months),  macroeconomic  fundamentals  dominate  in  the 
determination of exchange rate dynamics. 
 
I. The Diebold and Mariano (1995) test statistic 
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J. Definition of the synthetic euro/dollar exchange rate 
 
In  this  study,  we  rely  on  the  synthetic  euro/dollar  exchange  rate  delivered  by 
Datastream. The Datastream mnemonic code for the series is USEURSN. Details of how 
Datastream  computes  the  synthetic  euro/dollar  exchange  rate  are  provided  below.  The 
formula of the synthetic euro/dollar exchange rate is based on: 
 
1. The US Dollar/Euro irrevocable fixed conversion rate of 1 euro per 1 dollar; 
2. The cross rates to the US Dollar as published on May 4
th 1998; 
3. The weighting factor is constant and is the 1996 GDP weight of each country in the 
total GDP of the euro zone; 
 
 
USEURSN =   (α1*S1*DMARKER/AUSTSCH+ α2*S2*DMARKER/BELGLUX 
+ α3*S3*DMARKER/FINMARK+ α4*S4*DMARKER/FRENFRA 
+ α5*S5*DMARKER/IPUNTER+ α6*S6*DMARKER/ITALIRE 
+ α7*S7*DMARKER/GUILDER+ α8*S8*DMARKER/PORTESC 
+ α9*S9*DMARKER/SPANPES+0.31315)*1  
 






  With, αi, the 1996 GDP weights of the respective members of the euro zone (e.g. 
0,03139 (3,139 %) is the weight of Austria; 0,22064 (22,064 %) is the weight of France; 
0,31315 (31,315 %) is the weight of Germany) ; Si, the fixed exchange rate of each euro 
members  to  1  US  Dollar  as  published  in  May  4
th  1998  (e.g.  S1  stands  for  the  Austrian 









Inside the Black Box: Why are Order Flows Models of Exchange Rate more competitive 






This article looks inside the black box of order flows to understand why order flows 
models of exchange rate are more competitive than traditional models of exchange rate. We 
set a theoretical model that relies on a behavioural exchange rate model and a microstructure 
model.  The  model  puts  forward  three  results.  First,  simulations  replicate  stylised  facts 
observed  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  Secondly,  the  model  shows  that  the  foreign 
exchange market is intrinsically inefficient. Incoming information is distorted by behavioural 
noise  and  microstructure  noise.  Thirdly,  order  flows  models  of  exchange  rate  provide  an 
answer  to  the  exchange  rate  disconnection  puzzle.  Indeed,  order  flows  contain  processed 
information i.e. a time varying weight of fundamental information, behavioural information 
and microstructure information while traditional models only consider raw information i.e. 
fundamental information. 
 
Keywords: Behavioural Finance, Microstructure, Order Flows Models, Market Efficiency, 





















Cet article analyse la boîte noire des modèles à flux d’ordre pour comprendre le succès 
des  flux  d’ordre  dans  l’explication  et  la  prévision  des  taux  de  change  relativement  aux 
modèles traditionnels de change. Nous construisons un modèle théorique qui se compose d’un 
modèle à agents hétérogènes et d’un modèle de microstructure du marché des changes. Trois 
résultats  sont  mis  en  avant.  Premièrement,  les  simulations  répliquent  d’importants  faits 
stylisés observés sur le marché des changes. Deuxièmement, le modèle montre que le marché 
des changes est intrinsèquement inefficient. En effet, l’information est altérée tant par le bruit 
issu des comportements des agents que par le bruit inhérent à la microstructure du marché des 
changes. Troisièmement, les modèles à flux d’ordre fournissent une réponse à l’énigme de la 
déconnexion des taux de change car les flux d’ordre contiennent de l’information déjà traitée 
par les agents tandis que les modèles traditionnels considèrent uniquement de l’information 
brute i.e. non traitée. 
 
Mots Clés: Finance Comportementale, Microstructure, Modèles à Flux d’Ordre, Efficience 
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1. Introduction 
 
Following  decades  of  empirical  failure  to  explain  and  forecast  exchange  rates 
dynamics based on traditional exchange rate models (Meese and Rogoff, (1983), Cheung et al. 
(2005)), the recent microstructure literature offers promising results. Microstructure models 
based  on  order  flows  provide  better  explanatory  and  predictive  powers  in  forecasting 
exchange  rate  dynamics  than  traditional  models;  especially  at  short  horizons  (Evans  and 
Lyons  (2002a,  2002b),  Danielsson  et  al.  (2002),  Berger  et  al.  (2008),  Chinn  and  Moore 
(2008)).  To  justify  this  performance,  order  flows  theorists  claim  that  order  flow  includes 
private  information  about  exchange  rate  fundamentals  (Lyons  (2001),  Evans  and  Lyons 
(2008), Chinn and Moore (2008), Rime et al. (2010)). However, many studies counter this 
view. Such studies show that order flows only convey information about liquidity effects, 
temporary  preferences  and  other  demand  shocks.  Both  views  raise  a  debate  between 
respectively the proponents of the strong flow centric view and the ones of the weak flow 
centric view. 
This paper defends the idea that order flows contain information from both the strong 
and the weak flow centric views; but not solely. The article investigates inside the black box 
of  order  flows  to  unveil  the  various  types  of  information  contained  in  order  flows.  This 
question  is  becoming  increasingly  important  as  the  black  box  has  been  shifted  from 
understanding exchange rate determination to understanding order flow determination. We set 
a theoretical model of the foreign exchange market that describes how the initial information 
arriving to market agents is embedded into the final price of the currency. 
The most related studies to this paper are Bachetta and van Wincoop (2006) and Evans 
(2010). Bachetta and van Wincoop (2006) provide an analytical framework which regroups 
both  the  strong  and  the  weak  flow  centric  views.  Their  main  finding  is  that  information 
heterogeneity disconnects the exchange rate from observed macroeconomic fundamentals in 
the short run, while there is a close relationship in the long run. At the same time, there is a 
close link between exchange rate dynamics and order flows over all horizons. Evans (2010) 
presents a theoretical model to analyse the links between high frequency spot exchange rates, 
order flows and macroeconomic developments. Evans finds that trades between dealers and 
customers convey information to dealers about the current state of the economy which dealers 
then use to revise their spot exchange rate quotes. 
The model presented here departs from Bachetta and van Wincoop (2006) and Evans 
(2010)  in  several  ways.  Indeed,  both  models  miss  a  major  component  of  exchange  rate   97
determination in the short run: agents’ behaviours (Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung and 
Chinn  (2001),  Cheung,  Chinn  and  Marsh  (2004)).  Our  modelling  approach  integrates  not 
solely the public and private information as in Bachetta and van Wincoop (2006) and Evans 
(2010)  but  also  behavioural  components  affecting  customers  and  dealers’  decisions.  Our 
model therefore merges two strands of the literature: behavioural exchange rate models and 
microstructure  models  of  exchange  rate.  The  model  puts  forward  three  results.  First, 
simulations replicate important stylised facts observed in the foreign exchange market. In the 
short run, the exchange rate is disconnected from its fundamental value but not from order 
flows. In the long run, the exchange rate returns towards its fundamental value and remains 
close  to  order  flows.  Customer  and  interdealer  order  flows  are  highly  correlated  with 
exchange rate dynamics at all horizons. Besides the hot potato effect magnifies the amount of 
interdealer order flows relative to the amount of customer order flows. Secondly, the model 
indicates  that  the  foreign  exchange  market  is  intrinsically  inefficient.  The  introduction  of 
incoming information in the final price of the currency is distorted by agents’ behaviours 
(behavioural noise) and by the trading mechanism peculiar to the foreign exchange market 
(microstructure noise). Thirdly, the model explains why order flows provide an answer to the 
exchange rate disconnection puzzle. Order flows contain information processed by agents 
while traditional models only  consider raw information. Processed information includes  a 
time varying  weight  of  fundamental  information  (both  public  and  private),  behavioural 
information  (both  public  and  private)  and  microstructure  information.  Conversely, 
information considered in traditional models only includes public fundamental information. 
The difference in the types of information considered by order flows models and traditional 
models explains why order flows models provide higher explanatory and predictive powers of 
exchange rate dynamics relative to traditional models. 
The remainder of the paper comprises 5 sections. Section 2 provides evidence of the 
high explanatory and predictive powers of order flows models. Section 3 proposes a literature 
survey concerning the information contained in order flows. Section 4 presents a theoretical 
model of the foreign exchange market and exposes the simulations provided by the theoretical 
model. Section 5 addresses the question of foreign exchange market efficiency and explains 
why order  flows models come as a  resolution to the exchange rate disconnection puzzle. 
Section 6 concludes. 
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2. On the competitive performances of order flows models of exchange rate 
 
In a pioneered work, Evans and Lyons (2001, 2002) came up with an hybrid model 
based on private and public information to explain exchange rate dynamics. The hybrid model 




0 1 2 ( ) t t t t t
Private Information Public Information
s i i X β β β ε   = +   − +   + 1 4 24 3                    (1) 
 
With st, the (log of the) spot exchange rate (an increase in s is equal to an appreciation 
of the domestic currency); (it   it*), the interest rate differential between the domestic country 
and the foreign country; Xt, the net cumulated order flow.   stands for the first difference of 
the series. 
 
Macroeconomic  fundamentals  (here  the  interest  rate differential  (it    it*))  represent 
public  information  known  by  all  agents.  Order  flows 
26 Xt  represent  private  information 
known by a minority of agents. Order flow is defined as the net of buyer  and seller initiated 
currency transactions. Intuitively, order flow represents a willingness to back one's beliefs on 
future exchange rate dynamics, with real money. 
Evans  and  Lyons  tested  their  model  on  the  deutschemark/dollar,  yen/dollar  and 
pound/dollar in daily  frequency  from May 1996 to August 1996.  They  show that private 
information (order flows) explain at best 65 % of the variance of exchange rates. On the 
contrary, public information (the interest rate differential) only explains at best 5 % of the 
variance of exchange rates (a figure close to the ones obtained with traditional exchange rate 
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Table 1: Literature survey of the in sample performances of order flows models 






Fan and Lyons 
(2000) 
January 1993   
June 1999  Monthly  Customer 
order flows 
Euro/Dollar  0,16 
Yen/Dollar  0,15 
Evans and Lyons 
(2002a) 
May 1996   
August 1996  Daily  Interdealer 
order flow 
Deutschemark 
/Dollar  0,67 
Yen/Dollar  0,43 
Evans and Lyons 
(2002b) 
May 1996   
August 1996  Daily  Interdealer 
order flow 
Pound/Dollar  0,29 











Euro/Dollar  0,45 
Yen/Dollar  0,67 
Pound/Dollar  0,01 
Euro/Pound  0,01 
Berger et al. 
(2008) 
January 1999   
December 
2004 
Daily  Interdealer 
order flow 
Euro/Dollar  0,46 
Yen/Dollar  0,54 
Berger et al. 
(2008) 
January 1999   
December 
2004 
Weekly  Interdealer 
order flow 
Euro/Dollar  0,43 
Yen/Dollar  0,48 
Berger et al. 
(2008) 
January 1999   
December 
2004 
Monthly  Interdealer 
order flow 
Euro/Dollar  0,21 
Yen/Dollar  0,34 





Monthly  Interdealer 
order flow 
Euro/Dollar  0,06 
Yen/Dollar  0,24 
NB: The regression method used in the studies mentioned in table 1 is ordinary least squares (OLS) 
 
 
Table 1 shows that the explanatory power of order flows models far exceeds the one of 
traditional models of exchange rate. For daily and weekly frequencies, the coefficients of 
determination (R2) spread between 30 % and 67 % (except for Danielsson et al. (2002)). At 
such frequencies, traditional exchange rate models usually provide R2 close to or less than 
10 %. Beyond the explanatory performance of exchange rates, order flows provide also better 
exchange rate forecasts than traditional models. A lot of studies show that order flows models 
beat the random walk in the short run (Evans and Lyons (2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2005a, 2006), 
Lindahl and Rime (2006), Rime et al. (2010)). 
The results from order flows models have to be put into perspective. The relationship 
between order flows and exchange rate dynamics is strong at intradaily, daily and weekly 
frequencies but becomes weaker at lower frequencies. For example, table 1 shows that in 
Berger et al. (2008), order flows explain about 50 % of the variance of exchange rates at daily 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
26 A detailed description of order flows is available in appendix A.   100
and  weekly  frequencies.  At  lower  frequencies,  for  instance  monthly  frequencies,  the  R2 
declines gradually and falls to 34 % for the yen/dollar exchange rate and to 21 % for the 
euro/dollar  exchange  rate.  The  same  observation  stands  in  Chinn  and  Moore  (2008). 
Therefore the explanatory power of exchange rate variation by order flows models falls at 
monthly frequencies. In somes cases, the explanatory power comes even close to the one 
offered by traditional exchange rate models (see Chinn and Moore (2008)) while in other 
cases the explanatory power is still higher than the explanatory power of traditional exchange 
rate models based on fundamentals (see Berger et al. (2008))
27. Still, despite the relative fall 
in the explanatory power of order flows models at monthly frequencies, the literature review 
in table 1 provides evidence of the high explanatory and predictive performances of order 
flows models at short run horizons (from intradaily to weekly frequencies). As a result, one 
may  wonder  which  types  of  information  do  order  flows  contain  to  justify  such  a  high 
explanatory power of exchange rates at short horizons? 
 
3. The informational content of order flows: a literature review 
 
According  to  Lyons  (2001),  order  flow  contains  private  information.  Private 
information can be split into three components: fundamental information, liquidity effects and 
portfolio balance effects. 
Fundamental  information  includes  private  information  about  exchange  rate 
fundamentals. For example, if a central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market by 
transmitting a positive order flow to a market maker, then this market maker will infer a 
likely appreciation of the currency. Fundamental information is supposed to have a permanent 
effect on currency prices. 
Inventory or liquidity effects refer to information about transfers of unwanted currency 
positions between market makers. For instance, if a market maker A has to absorb a large 
stock of currencies from a market maker B, the market maker A will bear more risks (mainly 
liquidity and valuation risks). As a result, the market maker A will ask a higher risk premium 
(hence a lower price) to buy the currencies of market maker B. This risk premium will only 
have a transitory effect on the price of the currency since it will disappear after the trade 
                                                           
27 Recently, Carlini et al. (2010) show that in the long run (about 5 years), the cointegration relationship between 
order flows and stock prices is not significant. However by using more suitable tools, they show that order flows 
and stock prices are fractionnally cointegrated or even still cointegrated if we correct order flows by the volumes 
of transactions in the market.   101
between  the  two  market makers.  Thus  inventory  effects  only  have  transitory  effects  on 
currency prices. 
Portfolio  balance  effects  relates  to  agents’  decisions  independently  of  fundamental 
movements. For example, an import export firm can operate in the market to convert foreign 
currencies into domestic currencies independently of fundamental movements. The effect of 
portfolio balance is assumed to be permanent on currency prices. 
 
A lot of studies have analysed the informational content of order flows. The literature 
is split between two separate views: the strong flow centric view and the weak flow centric 
view. 
 
The strong flow centric view states that order flows contain in majority fundamental 
information. Order flows are correlated with news about exchange rate fundamentals and have 
thus a permanent effect on currency prices (Ito et al. (1998), Rime (2000), Evans and Lyons 
(2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2005a, 2008), Love and Payne (2004), Marsh and O’Rourke (2005)).  
Love and Payne (2004) base their study on intraday interdealer order flows on the 
euro/dollar, dollar/pound and pound/euro, from the September 28, 1999 to July 24, 2000. 
They show that “even information that is publicly and simultaneously released to all market 
participants  is  largely  impounded  into  prices  via  the  key  micro level  price  determinant    
order  flow”.  Love  and  Payne  find  that  between  a  half  and  two thirds  of  price  relevant 
information is incorporated into prices via order flows. 
Marsh and O’Rourke (2005) use daily customer order flows from August 2002 to June 
2004 on bilateral exchange rates between the dollar, the euro, the pound and the yen. They 
show that inventory effects play a minor role in the informational content of order flows. A 
major role is attributed to fundamental effects. Particularly, when decomposing order flows 
by types of clients, they show that coefficients associated to leveraged firms such as hedge 
funds are very large compared to other flows (such as flows coming from unleveraged firm 
(mutual funds) and non financial corporations (multinationals)). They  conclude that flows 
coming from leveraged funds are more informative about fundamentals than flows coming 
from other customers
28. 
                                                           
28 The view of Marsh and O’Rourke (2005) may be confirmed by Corsetti et al. (2001) who claim that a lot of 
operators believe that hedge funds have an informational advantage relative to the rest of the market concerning 
asset prices. However another interpretation of the high coefficients associated to order flows coming from 
hedge  funds  could  be  related  to  the  fact  that  hedge  funds  speculate  aggressively  and  thus  produce  huge 
movements in the market and hence in currency prices. Therefore order flows from hedge funds would be more   102
  Evans and Lyons (2008) estimate an intraday model using interdealer order flows on 
the deutschemark/dollar market from May 1 to August 31, 1996. They show that roughly two 
thirds  of  the  total  effect  of  macro  news  on  the  deutschemark/dollar  exchange  rate  is 
transmitted via order flows. They claim that order flows contribute significantly to changing 
currency prices at all times, but that they contribute more to changing prices immediately after 
news arrivals about fundamentals. 
Rime, Sarno and Sojli (2010) uses daily interdealer order flows for the euro, the pound 
and the yen against the dollar between February 13, 2004 and February 14, 2005. They argue 
that  news  about  macroeconomic  fundamentals  are  important  determinants  of  order  flows. 
They find that “order flow is intimately linked to both news on fundamentals and to changes 
in expectations about these fundamentals”. 
 
According  to  the  weak  flow  centric  view,  order  flows  do  not  transmit  private 
information about fundamentals in currency prices. Rather, order flows convey information 
about liquidity effects, temporary preferences and other demand shocks. Order flows have 
thus a transitory effect on asset prices. Evidence for the weak flow centric view is based on 
results provided by econometric analyses as well as survey studies. 
Concerning survey studies, Cheung, Chinn and Marsh (2004) base their analysis on a 
sample of UK based foreign exchange dealers in March/April 1998. They found that after 
analysing order flows, “traders do not vary their bid ask spread either very often or for some 
of  the  reasons  thought  important  in  the  microstructure  literature”.  Microstructure  theory 
suggests that three main factors can lead traders to change their spreads: liquidity effects, 
portfolio balance effects and fundamental information. Cheung et al. (2004) add that “traders 
were asked their reasons for changing their quoted spreads from the market convention and 
results suggest that the liquidity effect is dominant. This was confirmed in conversations with 
traders”. 
In the same vein, Gehrig and Menkhoff (2006) sent questionnaires to professional 
market participants in Germany in July 1992. They show that “flows are more informative 
about semifundamental private information. In other words, order flows contain information 
about short term trading objectives or liquidity considerations of other traders that may affect 
short term  price  movements,  but  that  will  not  affect  medium term  asset  prices.  Such 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
related to speculative forces rather than to exchange rate fundamentals (Wei and Kim (1998)). Survey results 
among practitioners reinforce this argument since speculative forces are considered as a major determinant of 
exchange rates at short run horizons (Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung and Chinn (2001) and Cheung, Chin 
and Marsh (2004)).   103
information  may  be  interim  price  relevant  but  irrelevant  in  the  long  run”.  Gehrig  and 
Menkhoff add that “flow analysis does not seem to be used as a tool to learn about the 
fundamental information”. 
Concerning econometric studies, Breedon and Vitale (2004) analyse daily brokered 
interdealer trades in the dollar/euro exchange rate from August 2000 to mid January 2001. 
They show that order flows provide above all, information about portfolio balance effects 
rather than information about macroeconomic fundamentals.  
Froot and Ramadorai  (2005) analyse  a sample  of daily institutional investor flows 
transactions for 18 exchange rates against the US dollar from June 1994 to February 2001. 
They show that order flows have a transitory impact on exchange rates and do not convey 
information  about  macroeconomic  fundamentals  to  market makers.  “Flows  appear  to  be 
bound up with transitory currency under  and overreactions, but unrelated to the permanent 
component of exchange rate surprises. Yet, these exchange rate surprises are strongly related 
to important fundamental variables, as predicted by theory”. 
Berger et al. (2008) analyse monthly interdealer order flows from January 1999 to 
December 2004 on the euro/dollar and the yen/dollar exchange rates. Their analysis points to 
an important role for liquidity effects in the relationship between order flows and exchange 
rates. They provide evidence that the relationship between order flows and exchange rates is 
strong at daily and weekly frequencies but weakens significantly from monthly frequencies. 
Chinn and Moore (2008) analyse monthly interdealer order flows from January 1999 
to January 2007 for the dollar/euro and dollar/yen exchange rates. They build an exchange 
rate model based on a combination of the traditional monetary model of exchange rate and the 
Evans Lyons microstructure approach. They show that “cumulative order flow tracks liquidity 
shocks and provides the ‘missing link’ to augmenting the explanatory power of conventional 
monetary models”. 
 
  The present paper defends the idea that order flows contain information from both the 
strong and the weak flow centric views; but not solely. The article investigates inside the 
black box of order flows to disentangle the types of information contained in order flows. 
This question is becoming increasingly important as the literature has shifted the black box 
from understanding exchange rate determination to understanding order flow determination. 
We build a theoretical model that considers all the information that market agents can 
embed in currency prices. Our modelling approach integrates not solely the public and private 
information as in previous works (Bachetta and van Wincoop (2006) and Evans (2010)) but   104
also  behavioural  components  affecting  customers  and  dealers’  decisions.  Our  model  thus 
merges two strands of the literature on exchange rates: behavioural exchange rate models and 
microstructure models of exchange rate. The global model takes account of heterogeneous 
agents  (Frankel  and  Froot  (1986)),  the  appearance  of  rumours  (Dominguez  and  Panthaki 
(2006)), anchoring effects (Kahneman and Tversky (1974), Osler (2002)), status quo bias 
(Kahneman and Knetsch (1991), De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2008)) and the characteristics of 
the trading mechanism peculiar to the foreign exchange market (Lyons (1997, 2001)). 
 
4. A theoretical model of the foreign exchange market 
 
4.1 Hypotheses of the model 
 
  The model relies on two blocks. The first block is a behavioural model (De Grauwe 
and Grimaldi (2007)) that provides the  characteristics of  customers faced by dealers. We 
assume customers have heterogeneous expectations and are split between two main categories: 
chartists and fundamentalists. The second block is a microstructure model that represents the 
trading  mechanism  of  the  foreign  exchange  market.  The  microstructure  model  is  a 
simultaneous trade  model  that  has  a  decentralised  and  multiple  dealers  structure  as 
empirically observed in the foreign exchange market. Our model is notably based on the work 
of Lyons (1997, 2001) with added elements from Bachetta and van Wincoop (2006). The 
microstructure  model  presents  three  advantages.  It  first  considers  interdealer  trading  that 
accounts  for  two thirds  of  the  trades  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  Secondly,  it  takes 
account of customer order flows as the primary source of private information for dealers. 
Besides, dealers learn about private information from other dealers through the observation of 
order  flows.  Thus  the  model  assumes  dealers  have  access  to  both  public  and  private 
information. Thirdly, we suppose risk averse dealers as empirically observed in the foreign 
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Table 2: Timing of the foreign exchange market model 
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t ε  
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i
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Dealers  Observe  t , V1      
Time t 
Period 2 
Dealers  Quote 
i
t , P2  
Public information:  t , P 1 ,  t , V1  
Private information (permanent effect):
i
t , 2 ξ  
i
t , P2 = 
{ t , P 1 ,  t , V1 , 
i
t , 2 ξ } 
 




t , T2 ; 
Receive 
i '
t , T2  
Public information:  t , V1 ,  t , P2 , st 1 
Private information: 
i
t , 3 ξ , 
i '




t , T1 ,
j
t ε  
i
t , T2 =  
{ t , V1 , st 1, t , P 2 , 
i
t , 3 ξ , 
i '




t , T1 ,
j
t ε } 
Dealers  Observe  t , V2 ; 
Ft Realised 
   
 
 
  The  timing  of  the  model  is  described  as  follows.  First,  customers  form  their 
expectations based on their stock of information and their proper models of exchange rate 
determination.  At  the  same  time,  dealers  set  their  price
29 based  on  public  information. 
Customers then ask dealers about their listed price and choose their optimal dealer according 
to the prices set by dealers. 
                                                           
29 Since in the foreign exchange market, the bid/ask spread is low due to a high degree of liquidity, we assume a 
bid/ask spread equal to zero in our model.   106
Trades in the microstructure model are split into two periods. In the first period the 
chosen  dealers  trade  with  their  customers.  Such  dealers  observe  the  flows  coming  from 
customers and try to infer the private information contained in customer order flows. At the 
end of the first period, dealers trade with other dealers to adjust their stock of risky asset in 
two  ways;  either  to  satisfy  the  net  demand  of  their  customers  or  to  take  positions  on 
currencies. In the second period, dealers trade with other dealers to adjust their stock of risky 
asset in two ways; either to satisfy the net demand by other dealers or to take positions on 
currencies. 
 
In  our  model  the  price  of  the  currency  is  affected  through  two  channels:  a  direct 
channel and an indirect channel. In the direct channel, the price of the currency can change 
with the arrival of public news even if there is no trade in the market. In the indirect channel, 
private information coming from customers affect currency prices through order flows
30. 
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 describe the structure of the model. 
 
4.2 The behavioural model 
 
The behavioural model is based on an heterogeneous agents structure (Frankel and 
Froot (1986), De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007)). The model assumes customers can choose 
between  two  forecasting  rules:  a  chartist  rule  and  a  fundamentalist  rule.  Fundamentalists 
forecast exchange rates based on the spread between the current exchange rate st and the 







t ) s s ( s ε α α + Ψ + − − =   + 2 1 1       With { 2 1,α α  } > 0            (1.1)           
 
Thus  if  the  exchange  rate  is  over appreciated  (under appreciated)  relative  to  its 
fundamental  value,  fundamentalists  expect  the  currency  to  depreciate  (appreciate).  The 
parameter α1 represents the speed at which the exchange rate returns towards its fundamental 
value. The higher α1 the stronger the return force of exchange rates towards their fundamental 
value. 
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The fundamental exchange rate  t s  is defined by the interest rate differential between 
the two countries (it – it*): 
) i i ( s
*
t t t − =             (1.2)  
   
With  t t t i i ε + = −1  where  t i →  ) , ( N i
2 0 σ and  t ε →  ) , ( N






t i i ε α + = −1 where 
85 0,
* = α , 
*
t i →  ) , ( N * i
2 0 σ  and 
*
t ε →  ) , ( N *
2 0 ε σ .
31  
 







t ) s ( s ε β β + Ψ + =   − + 2 2 1 1     With { 2 1,β β  } > 0                     (2) 
 
Thus when the exchange rate has appreciated (depreciated) in the past; chartists expect 
a further appreciation (depreciation) of the currency. Chartists thus magnify exchange rates 
movements. The parameter β1 represents the degree of interpolation. The higher β1, the larger 






t Ψ  represent the effects of collective psychology respectively 
for  fundamentalists  and  chartists.  We  assume  two  definitions  for  this  component.  First 
collective psychology is defined by the appearance of rumours (Dominguez and Panthaki 










i t t , s                             (3.1) 
 
Secondly,  collective  psychology  is  also  materialised  by  the  anchoring  effect 
(Kahneman and Tversky (1974), Osler (2002)). When the exchange rate variation is lower 
than a constant (| st 1| ≤ c), the exchange rate fluctuates around a threshold value following a 
stable random walk (0 < υ < 1). Conversely, when the exchange rate variation is higher than a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
30 The distinguishing feature between the two channels is easily understood with an example taken from Evans 
and Lyons (2008) and Evans (2009) (see appendix G). 
31 The  interest  rate  differential  has  been  filtered  by  a  Hodrick Prescott  filter  because  we  assume  that  the 
dynamics of the fundamental exchange rate are smooth over time.   108





























1                                           (3.2) 
 
With 0 < υ < 1 and Λ, a constant 
 
  The  transition  between  the  two  states  is  driven  by  the  following  function: 




 (with  t ε →  ) , ( N
2 0 ε σ ). 
 
The weight that market agents attribute to a given rule depends on the profitability of a 
particular rule. The more profitable a rule, the higher the weight agents attach to this rule. 
Chartist and fundamentalist weights are defined as: 
 












=    and  












=      (4) 
 
    Where ωf,t + ωc,t = 1 and 0 < γ < 1 
 
The parameter γ represents the intensity at which agents revise their forecasting rules. 
When γ → ∞, agents choose the rule which proves to be the most profitable. Conversely, 
when γ → 0, agents keep the rule they are using and are insensitive to the profitability of this 
rule. Thus γ can be viewed as a representation of the status quo bias in agents’ behaviour. The 
status quo bias highlighted by Kahneman and Knetsch (1991) means that when agents use a 
given rule, they find it difficult to change for a different rule. We assume agents need some 
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The profitability π'i,t of each rule is evaluated according to the profit π i,t and the risk 
σ²i,t  associated to a given rule: 
 
    π'i,t = π i,t    σ²i,t             i = c, f                                        (5) 
 
  The parameter   represents the coefficient of risk aversion (we set   = 5). The risk 
associated to a forecasting rule is defined as the variance of the forecasting error: 
 
        σ²i,t = [E
i
t 1(st)   st]²        i = c, f                                       (6) 
 
  The profit πi,t related to a forecasting strategy is defined as the one period earnings of 
investing one unit of domestic currency in the foreign asset: 
 
  π i,t = [st(1 + it*)   st 1(1 + it)]sgn[E
i
t 1(st)(1 + it*)   st 1(1 + it)]   i = c, f           (7) 
 









0     x   if   1     sgn[x] 
0     x   if   0   sgn[x] 
0     x   if   1   sgn[x] 
 
 
Thus when agents forecast an appreciation of the foreign currency (an increase in st) 
they will invest in the foreign country. If this appreciation is realised then their profit is equal 
to  the  appreciation  of  the  foreign  currency,  adjusted  by  the  interest  rate  differential. 
Conversely, if the foreign currency depreciates (st decreases) agents will face a loss which 
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We assume fundamentals have an influence on exchange rate dynamics in the long run. 
More precisely, we assume that the external debt exerts a return force on currency prices such 
that the exchange rate returns towards its equilibrium value in the long run. The dynamics of 
the domestic (foreign) external debt  t d  (
*
t d ) are defined as: 
 
      1 1 1 1 1 1 − − − − − − + = + + = t t t t t t t t t s d ) i ( ) s ( bc d i d d θ     (8.1) 
 














t s d ) i ( ) s ( bc d i d d θ     (8.2) 
 
With  t d (
*
t d ),  the  domestic  (foreign)  external  debt;  t i (
*
t i ),  the  domestic  (foreign) 
interest rate;  t bc (
*
t bc ) the domestic (foreign) current account;  1 − t s , the final realised price of 
the currency at time t 1; θ = 0,025;  t t t d d ε + = −1  where  t d →  ) , ( N d
2 0 σ and  t ε →  ) , ( N






t d d ε + = −1 , where 
*
t d →  ) , ( N * d
2 0 σ and 
*
t ε →  ) , ( N *
2 0 ε σ  (initially, we assume d0 = 0) 
 
  The stock of debt at time t is therefore equal to the stock of debt at time t 1 ( 1 − t d ), plus 
the interest rate of the debt ( 1 − t td i ) and the current account balance at time t ( t bc ). The current 
account is related to the exchange rate dynamics by an inverse relationship. Thus when the 
domestic currency appreciates, the current account worsens and vice versa. We assume also 
that fundamentalists do not take account of the effect of the external debt on the exchange rate 
in their rule. The external debt has here an external effect on exchange rate dynamics. In other 
words,  the  external  debt  influences  exchange  rate  dynamics  outside  the  expectations  of 
chartists and fundamentalists. 
 
The expected exchange rate at time t+1 is obtained by aggregating agents’ forecasts in 
the market: 








t t , c
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t t , f
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f
t t t t , f
Market
t ) d d ( ) ) s ( ( ) ) s s ( ( s 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 + − − − + + − − Ψ + + Ψ + − − =   ε θ β β ω α α ω
                        (9) 
        With θ = 0,025 and initially, d0 = 0 
 
  The  following  rules  provide  the  link  between  the  behavioural  model  and  the 
microstructure  model.  Order  flows  from  fundamentalists  (
f
t OF )  and  chartists  (
c
t OF )  are 
defined as: 
 




t 1 +   = = n.ωf,t.
f
t s 1 +    where  ∈
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t 1 +   = = n.ωc,t.
c
t s 1 +      where  ∈
c


















































  (11) 
 
  With n, the total number of customers in the market 
 
  Therefore, when customers expect an appreciation of the currency, they will buy the 
currency. Conversely, when customers expect a depreciation of the currency, they will sell the 
currency. We assume customers select an optimal dealer. Customers willing to buy the risky 
asset choose the dealer that quotes the minimum price. Conversely, customers willing to sell 
the  risky  asset  choose  the  dealer  that  quotes  the  maximum  price.  The  total  amount  of 
customer order flows at time t is given by: 
 
     
c
t t , f
f
t t , f
customers
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Table 3 decomposes the various types of information contained in the behavioural 
model. 
 
Table 3: Decomposition of the information contained in the behavioural model  
  Public Fundamental 
Information 
Public Psychological 








t t t t bc , bc , d , d , i , i , s , s  
f
t Ψ  
f
t ε  
Chartist 
Rule  2 − t s  
c
t Ψ  
c
t ε  
  Private Fundamental 
Information 
Private Psychological 
Information  Noise  
Fundamentalist 
Rule  ) s s ( t t − 1 α  
f
t Ψ 2 α  
f
t ε  
Chartist 
Rule  ) s ( t 2 1 − β  
c
t Ψ 2 β  
c
t ε  
 
  The  behavioural  model  contains  four  types  of  information:  public  fundamental 
information, private fundamental information, public psychological information and private 
psychological information. 






t t t t bc , bc , d , d , i , i , s , s )  deals  with  information 
concerning  macroeconomic  fundamentals.  Every  agent  has  access  to  public  fundamental 
information. 
Private fundamental information regroups information about fundamentals that have 
been analysed or processed by agents. The terms  ) s s ( t t − 1 α  and  ) s ( t 2 1 − β  describe the model 
of  exchange  rate  determination  in  which  agents  believe.  They  are  related  to  the  internal 
psychology of agents. 
Public psychological information (
f
t Ψ  and 
c
t Ψ ) relates to information about market 
psychology (or market agents’ behaviours) that can be observed by every agent. This type of 
information  is  associated  to  the  external  psychology  of  agents  and  can  be  illustrated  by 
anchoring effects or incoming rumours. 
Private psychological information (
f
t Ψ 2 α  and 
c
t Ψ 2 β ) defines the weight attributed by 
customers to the psychological component of exchange rate. Intuitively, this weight defines 
the degree of rationality of agents. Agents bereft of any psychological component will be 
considered as more rational than agents who attribute a high weight to this component. 
The parameter εt
f (εt
c) is a white noise that represents unexpected news or unexpected 
behaviours by fundamentalists (chartists). Therefore, the noise parameters can represent either 
public information or private information about fundamentals or customers’ behaviours.   113
4.3 The microstructure model 
 
We follow Lyons (1997) and model the trading mechanism of the foreign exchange 
market with a simultaneous trade model with multiple dealers. We assume the existence of m 
dealers in the market. In this model, dealers are not solely market makers (they match the 
supply  and  demand  of  currencies);  they  are  also  speculators  (they  take  positions  on 
currencies). 
 
4.3.1 Period 1 of the microstructure model 
 
  Given their information set (public and private signal), dealers set their currency price 











t , 0 ξ → iidN( ;σξ
2),
Market
t ε → iidN( ;σε
2) and i = 1,...,m  
 
The first price 
i
t , P 0  set by dealers includes public information about fundamentals st 1, 
private information proper to the dealer 
i
t , 0 ξ  and unexpected news about fundamentals 
Market
t ε . 
The term
i
t , 0 ξ  is interpreted as a private signal that dealers hold concerning the future exchange 
rate dynamics. This private signal induces a difference among prices listed by dealers. 
Equation (13) is the start of the direct channel of news incorporation into currency 
prices. Indeed, the price of the currency can change with the arrival of public news (through 
the terms 1 − t s , 
i
t , 0 ξ ,
Market
t ε ) even if there is no trade between customers and dealers in the 
market (
customers
t OF = 0). 
  Once dealers set their price, customers select their optimal dealer. Customers willing 
to buy the risky asset will choose the dealer that quotes the minimum price. Conversely, 
customers willing to sell the risky asset will choose the dealer that quotes the maximum price. 
 
 












, fundamentalists trade with dealer i such that:  { }
{ } m i P Max P






0 0  
 
 










OF , chartists trade with dealer i such that:                { }
{ } m i P Max P










  Notice that some dealers receive orders flows from customers while other dealers do 
not.  We  thus  face  two  cases.  On  the  one  hand,  dealers  that  receive  orders  flows  from 
customers have access to private information and include this information into their quoted 
price. On the other hand, dealers that do not receive any orders from customers do not have 
access to private information. Such dealers will learn about private information through the 
hot potato effect i.e. through interdealers order flows in period 2. Therefore customer order 
flow is the source of information asymmetry in this model. 
When dealers receive order flows from customers, they will try to infer the private 
information contained in these order flows. If dealers receive positive (negative) customer 
order flows OFt
f + OFt
c > 0 (OFt
f + OFt
c < 0), they will include a positive (negative) private 
signal 
+ i
t , 1 ξ (
− i
t , 1 ξ ) in their quoted price
i
t , P 1 . If dealers receive no customer order flows (OFt
f = 
OFt
c = 0), they receive no private signal from customers. We assume that the signal 
i
t , 1 ξ  
extracted by dealers from customer order flows follows a white noise process. The quoted 
price 
i
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Dealers  quote  their  price  simultaneously  and  independently.  Quoted  price  are 
observable and available to all dealers. Each quote is a single price at which the dealer agrees 
both to buy and sell. Equation (15) is the start of the indirect channel in which dispersed or 
private information coming from customers affect currency prices through order flows, based 
on the term 
i
t , 1 ξ . 
We define the demand for the risky asset by dealer i or the desired stock of currency in 
period 1 for dealer i 
i
t , D1 by: 
 
i


























  The following three paragraphs help understanding the structure of equation (16). 
 
First,  dealers  have  access  to  both  public  and  private  information  sources.  Their 
demand  for  the  risky  asset  depends  on  public  information  st 1 (the  higher  st 1,  the  more 
appreciated the value of the stock of risky asset, the higher the demand for the risky asset); 
private  information  coming  from  customer  order  flows 
i
t , 1 ξ (the  higher 
i
t , 1 ξ ,  the  higher  the 
incentive for dealers to invest in the risky asset); the private signal that dealers hold on the 
future exchange rate dynamics 
i
t , 0 ξ  (the higher 
i
t , 0 ξ , the higher the incentive for dealers to 
invest in the risky asset); and the average price of the risky asset set by dealers in period 1  t , P 1  
(the higher  t , P 1 , the lower the demand for the risky asset). 
 
  Secondly, dealers are also speculators in this model. They benefit from the information 
contained in their received customer order flows to take speculative positions on the risky 
asset. The term γ1
i takes account of the speculative dimension of dealers. This term acts as a 
leverage effect on the demand for currencies by dealers. We assume that the willingness to 
buy or sell currencies for dealers depends on the amount bought or sold by their customers. If 
dealers receive an amount of customer order flows higher than the average amount of order 




t F O OF > ), dealers will buy a higher   116
amount of currencies ( 1 1 >
i γ ). Conversely, if dealers receive an amount of customer order 





t F O OF < ), dealers will buy  a lower amount of currencies ( 1 0 1 < <
i γ ). The 
same reasoning holds when selling currencies. Thus, the willingness to buy/sell currencies by 
dealer i is defined by the term γ1






























      (17) 
 
Thirdly, the parameter  d represents the degree of risk aversion for dealers: if  d < 1, 
dealers are risk lover; if  d > 1, dealers are risk averse; if  d = 1, dealers are risk neutral. 
 
Beyond  their  role  of  speculators,  dealers  are  also  market makers.  They  match  the 
demand and supply of currencies by customers. We define the dealer i trading rule 
i
t , T1  in 










t , / T 1 1   ]         (18) 
 
The  term 
i
t , T1 depends  on 
i
t , D1 , 
i




t , / T 1 1   ].  The  term 
i
t , T1  defines  the 
necessary amount of order flows that dealers have to pass to other dealers to satisfy their own 
demand of risky asset given orders coming from customers and given orders coming from 
other dealers. The term 
i
t , C1  represents customer order flows addressed to dealer i. Customers 
will be net buyers if 
i
t , C1 > 0. Conversely, customers will be net sellers if  
i
t , C1  < 0. Obviously, 
i









t OF OF  and 
i




t , / T 1 1   ] represents the 









t , / T 1 1   ] = 
i '
t , T 1 2 − +
i
t ε . The term 
i '
t , T 1 2 −  represents the net flows received by 
dealer i from other dealers in period 2, at time t 1 
32. The term 
i
t , D1  is the desired stock of 
currencies by dealer i. 
                                                           
32 Initially, we set 
i '




t , / T 1 1   ] = 
i
t ε ; with 
i
t ε → iidN( ;σε
2).   117
The definition of order flows by dealer i 
i




















t , t P a a a s a 1 4 1 3 0 2 1 1 − + + − ξ ξ + (
f
t OF + 
c
t OF ) + 
i '
t , T 1 2 − + 
i
t ε              (20) 
 
  Dealers  then  choose  to  trade  with  their  optimal  dealer.  Buyer  dealers  will  buy 


















, dealer i trades with dealer j such that:  { }
{ } j i , m j P Max P
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33 As in Lyons (1997), we assume that the initial demand of risky asset by dealer i (or equivalently the initial 
desired stock of risky asset for dealer i) 
i
t , D1  is equal to zero.   118
4.3.2 Period 2 of the microstructure model 
 
In  period  2,  dealers  trade  between  each  other.  Their  trades  are  based  on  private 
information contained in order flows. Dealers start to revise their quoted price given their 
updated stock of information. We assume that the price quoted by dealers in period 2 is linked 
to the latest market quote  t , P 1  and to the net interdealer order flows in period 1  t , V1 . This 
assumption gives more stability to the model. We hence define the price quoted by dealer i in 
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t , 2 ξ → iidN( ; σξ




















   
 
  Therefore  if  the  net  cumulated  interdealer  order  flows  in  period  1  t , V1  is  positive 
(negative), then the demand by dealers for the risky asset increases (decreases),  and thus 
dealers will increase (decrease) their quoted price for the currency in period 2. 
 
Once  dealers  have  set  their  price  in  period  2,  they  define  their  net  demand  for 
currencies in period 2 
i
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d
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,  0 < {b1,b2,b3}< 1 and b1 > b3 
 













































t , 3 ξ → iidN( ; σξ






































The following three paragraphs help understanding the structure of equation (24). 
 
First,  the  demand  for  currencies  in  period  2  by  dealer  i
i
t , D2 depends  on  public 
information st 1 (the higher st 1, the more appreciated the value of the stock of risky asset, the 
higher the demand for the risky asset); interdealer order flows  t , V1 observed by dealers at the 
end of period 1 (the higher  t , V1 , the higher the demand for the risky asset by dealers in period 
1, the more appreciated the value of the stock of risky asset, the higher the demand for the 
risky asset by dealers in period 2); the average price set by dealers in period 2  t , P2  (the higher 
t , P2 , the lower the demand for the risky asset); private information 
i
t , 3 ξ coming from dealers 
that received customer order flows in period 1 (the higher 
i
t , 3 ξ , the higher the incentive for 
dealers to invest in the risky asset).  
Thus, in period 2, dealers infer private information 
i
t , 3 ξ  from customer order flows 
through order flows coming from dealers that had traded with customers in period 1. Recall 
that the only way dealers can learn about private information from other dealers is through the 
observation of interdealer order flows coming from other dealers. 
  The term 
i '
t , T1  in equation (25) represents order flows coming from other dealers to 




t , T T 1 1 <  then order flows coming from other dealers to 
dealer i are lower than the average amount of past order flows coming from other dealers to 
dealer i. This case means that the demand of risky asset by other dealers is decreasing. As a 





t , 3 3 ξ ξ ). The demand of currency 




t , T T 1 1 > ). 
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  Secondly, dealers are also speculators. The term 
i
2 γ  takes account of the speculative 
dimension of dealers. This term acts as a leverage effect on the demand for currencies by 
dealers. We assume the willingness to buy or sell the risky asset for dealers depends on the 
amount bought or sold by their dealers’ counterparts. Therefore, if dealer i receives an amount 





t , T T 1 1 > ), dealer i will buy a higher amount of risky asset ( 1 2 >
i γ ). Conversely, if 
dealer i receives an amount of order flows from other dealers lower than the average amount 




t , T T 1 1 < ); dealer i will buy a lower amount of risky asset 
( 1 0 2 < <
i γ ).  The  same  reasoning  holds  when  selling  currencies.  The  term  γ2
i  defines  the 
































        (26) 
 
Thirdly, the parameter  d represents the degree of risk aversion of dealers: if  d < 1, 
dealers are risk lover; if  d > 1, dealers are risk averse; if  d = 1, dealers are risk neutral. 
 
The trading rule for dealer i in period 2 is defined as follows:  
 




















t , T2 depends on
i
t , D1 , 
i
t , D2 , 
i '













t , D D 1 2 − )  represent  a  revision  by  dealer  i  of  the  amount  invested  in  currencies  or 




t , D D 1 2 − ) is interpreted 
as an inventory effect. The inventory effect in turn triggers the hot potato effect. Hence agents 
pass their undesired positions to other dealers in the market through the term 
i
t , T2 . Trades in 
period 2 depend also on the error made by dealer i on the expected flows coming from other   121
dealers in period 1 ( −
i '




t , / T 1 1   ])
34 and on the expected order flows to be received in 




t , / T 2 2   ]). 
The expected flows from other dealers j by dealer i is equal to the flows received by 



















       With 
j
t ε → iidN( ;σε
2)     (28) 
 
Therefore, the definition of order flows by dealer i in period 2 
i
t , T2  is given by: 
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)  (29) 
 
Dealers  then  choose  to  trade  with  their  optimal  dealer.  Buyer  dealers  will  buy 


















, dealer i trades with dealer j such as:  { }
{ } j i , m j P Max P
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2 2 (30) 
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1
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34 The term ( −
i '




t , / T 1 1   ]) represents the effective flows coming to dealer i from other dealers in period 
1.   122
4.4 Stochastic simulations of the model 
 
  We simulate the model over 3000 periods with 50 dealers in the market
35. Figure 1.1 
shows the dynamics of the simulated exchange rate, the fundamental exchange rate and the 
proportion of fundamentalists in the market. Figure 1.2 shows the relative profitability of the 
chartist and the fundamentalist rules and the proportion of fundamentalists. 
 
Figure 1.1: Simulated exchange rate, 
fundamental exchange rate  
























































Figure 1.2: Relative profitability of 
chartist and fundamentalist rules  


















































NB: For figure 1.1, the black line represents the simulated exchange rate F (left scale); the grey line represents 
the  fundamental  exchange  rate  s  (left  scale);  the  blue  margins  represents  periods in  which  fundamentalists 
dominate the market (right scale). For figure 1.2, the black line represents the relative profitability between the 
chartist rule and the fundamentalist rule (π'f,t   π'c,t); the blue margins represents periods in which fundamentalists 
dominate the market (right scale). 
 
From figure 1.1, we observe that in the short run, there is a persistent gap between the 
simulated exchange rate F and its fundamental value s . Over the long run, the simulated 
exchange rate returns towards its fundamental value. The heterogeneity of behaviours in the 
market or equivalently the use of different models by agents explains the disconnection of the 
market exchange rate from its fundamental value. When chartists dominate the market (white 
margins), the exchange rate wanders away from its fundamental value. Conversely, when 
fundamentalists dominate the market (blue margins), the exchange rate returns towards its 
fundamental value. 
As shown in figure 1.2 the domination of a given type of agent in the market depends 
on the profitability of the agent’s rule. If the profitability of the chartist rule is higher than the 
profitability of the fundamentalist rule, chartists dominate the market. Conversely, when the 
fundamentalist rule becomes more profitable than the chartist rule, fundamentalists dominate 
the market. 
                                                           
35 The values for the exogenous parameters are available in appendix F, table F.   123
  Figure 2.1 and 2.2 show the dynamics of the simulated exchange rate with respectively 
the dynamics of customer order flows and the ones of interdealer order flows.  
 
Figure 2.1: Simulated exchange rate and 





















































Figure 2.2: Simulated exchange rate and 























































NB: For figure 2.1, the black line represents the  simulated exchange rate F (left scale); the dark grey line 
represents customer order flows OF
customer (right scale). For figure 2.2, the black line represents the simulated 
exchange rate F (left scale); the light grey line represents interdealer order flows V2 (right scale). 
 
Figures 1.1, 2.1 and 2.2 show that the theoretical model replicates three stylised facts 
observed empirically in the foreign exchange market. 
First, simulations in figures 2.1 and 2.2 confirm the close link between exchange rate 
dynamics  and  cumulative  order  flows  at  short  and  long  run  horizons.  The  coefficient  of 
correlation  between  the  simulated  exchange  rate  and  customer  order  flows  (respectively 
interdealer order flows) amounts to 99,47 % (respectively 98,42 %). This result comes in line 
with the empirical observations of microstructure theorists (Lyons (2001), Evans and Lyons 
(2001, 2002a, 2002b), Rime et al. (2010)). 
Secondly, the amount of interdealer order flows is larger than the amount of customer 
order flows. This fact is due to the hot potato effect. This phenomenon describes the fact that 
with  the  incoming  stock  of  new  information,  dealers  revise  their  demands  of  currencies. 
Revisions in their willing stock of currencies induce inventory imbalances or undesired stock 
of currencies. Dealers get rid of these inventory imbalances by passing them to other dealers. 
As a result, inventory imbalances are passed from dealers to dealers in the market. These 
trades of unwanted positions inflate the amount of order flows between dealers in the market. 
These  trades  further  magnify  the  amount  of  interdealer  order  flows  relative  to  the  initial 
amount of customer order flows. In the model, the hot potato effect appears in period 2 where 
dealers trade between each other. The hot potato effect is defined through the term 
i
t , T2  by the 
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Such inventory effects are an important feature of microstructure models willing to represent 
the trading mechanism of the foreign exchange market. Indeed, empirically, the hot potato 
effect represents 60 % of the trades between agents in the foreign exchange market (Lyons 
(2001)). 
Thirdly, figures 1.1, 2.1 and 2.2 show that in the short run, the simulated exchange rate 
is disconnected from its fundamental value but not from order flows. However, in the long run, 
the  simulated  exchange  rate  returns  towards  its  fundamental  value  and  is  still  highly 
correlated with order flows. This result comes in line with the one from the theoretical work 
by Bachetta and van Wincoop (2006) and the empirical work by Berger et al. (2008). 
 
5. Further results from the theoretical model of the foreign exchange market 
 
5.1 Is the foreign exchange market intrinsically inefficient? 
 
According to Fama (1965), a market is considered as informationally efficient if the 
price of an asset is equal to its fundamental value, given all available information at time t. In 
our theoretical model, we define the fundamental value of the exchange rate s  by the interest 
rate differential between the domestic and the foreign country: 
  
t s  =(it – it*)                   (33) 
 
  Figure  3  shows  the  dynamics  of  the  market  exchange  rate  s
market,  the  fundamental 
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Figure 3: Simulated exchange rate (F), 
market exchange rate (s


























































































































NB: The black line represents the simulated exchange rate or equivalently the final exchange rate quoted by 
dealers (F); the dark grey line represents the fundamental exchange rate (s ); the light grey line represents the 
the market exchange rate expected by customers (s
market). 
 
  The market exchange rate s
market (which we label as the behavioural exchange rate) 
fluctuates around its fundamental value s . In some periods, it wanders away while returning 
to its fundamental value at other periods. The final exchange rate quoted by dealers F (which 
we  label  as  the  microstructure  exchange  rate)  appears  more  disconnected  from  the 
fundamental value than the market exchange rate s
market. 
  Therefore, the final price quoted in the foreign exchange market F does not reflect the 
fundamental  value  s  of  the  asset.  The  behavioural  exchange  rate  and  the  microstructure 
exchange rate are different from the fundamental exchange rate. Thus the foreign exchange 
market can be considered as intrinsically inefficient: the final quoted value of the exchange 
rate by dealers is not equal to the fundamental value of the exchange rate. Indeed, the original 
information  that  determines  the  fundamental  exchange  rate  is  distorted  through  agents’ 
behaviours and through the quotation process of the final currency price F. This information 
distortion appears at two levels in the model. 
 
  On the one hand, information is distorted by the fact that agents have heterogeneous 
expectations in the market. We label this distortion of information as behavioural noise. The 
behavioural noise or the behavioural component of the final exchange rate F can be split in 
two factors: internal factors and external factors. 
Internal factors represent individual psychology (or psychological factors observable 
at  agents’  level).  Such  factors  include  individual  preferences  (risk  aversion,  proper 
interpretation of news, overreaction to news, learning effects, etc.) but also specific rules used 
by individuals (heuristics, heterogeneous expectations, technical models, fundamental models,   126
etc.). For example, in our model, internal factors are represented by agents’ heterogeneous 
expectations or agents’ heterogeneous models (chartist and fundamentalist rules). 
External factors represent global psychology (or psychological factors observable at a 
global level in the market). They include rumours, mimetism and conventions that influence 
the market. In the model, external factors are considered through the appearance of rumours 
(equation (3.1)) and also through the anchoring effect (equation (3.2)). 
Internal and external psychological factors represent the behavioural biases from the 
rational expectations hypothesis (such as anchoring biases, overreaction, etc.). Indeed, REH 
models assume the existence of a representative agent that has homogenous expectations and 
that is bereft of any psychological dimension. 
 
  On the other hand, information is also distorted by the trading mechanism peculiar to 
the foreign exchange market. This point was already highlighted by Lyons (1998). We label 
this  information  distortion  as  microstructure  noise.  The  microstructure  noise  or  the 
microstructure component of the final exchange rate F is induced by two factors: the noise 
brought by the interpretation of private information by dealers and also the noise brought by 
the passing of undesired positions. 
  The noise brought by the interpretation of private information by dealers is illustrated 
as follows. Recall that only a minority of dealers have access to private information. Assume 
that private information from customers comes to a dealer that offers the optimal price for 
customers.  Then  the  chosen  dealer  has  to  infer  the  information  contained  in  order  flows 
coming  from  customers.  The  dealer  provides  a  more  or  less  correct  interpretation  of  the 
original private information contained in customer order flows. The dealer’s interpretation of 
the information is shaped notably by his/her risk aversion and also by his/her desired leverage 
effect
36. The dealer will then transmit his/her interpretation of the original private information 
to another dealer through interdealer order flows. This other dealer will in turn provide a more 
or less correct interpretation of the information contained in the order flows coming from the 
first dealer (and hence a more or less correct interpretation of the original private information 
from the original customer). As a result, if the original private information passes through a 
large amount of dealers   or equivalently if the hot potato effect is large   then the precision of 
the original private information is lowered. The final price will be therefore less revealing of 
                                                           
36 Hence  the  strategic  or  speculative  behaviour  of  the  dealer  contributes  to  the  distorsion  of  the  original 
information.   127
the  original  private  information.  Hence,  the  larger  the  hot  potato  effect,  the  higher  the 
information distortion, the lower the efficiency of the foreign exchange market. 
  The noise brought by the passing of undesired positions works as follows. Recall that 
independently of the private information received from customers, dealers adjust also their 
desired positions in the risky asset given their updated stock of information. Although the 
passing of unwanted positions have a transitory effect on the price of the currency, they act as 
a noise on interdealer order flows. Indeed, dealers do not know whether order flows coming 
from other dealers define simply unwanted positions bereft of any private information from 
customers  or  if  such  order  flows  coming  from  other  dealers  contain  elements  of  private 
information.  Hence  the  passing  of  unwanted  positions  act  as  a  noise  in  the  extraction  of 
private information from customer order flows. As a result, the larger the amount of unwanted 
positions in the market (or equivalently the larger the hot potato effect), the higher the noise in 
interdealer order flows, the larger the difficulty to extract the original private information 
provided by customers. Therefore the hot potato effect   trading mechanism peculiar to the 
foreign exchange market   distorts the original private information provided by customers in 
the final currency price and hence alters the efficiency of the foreign exchange market. 
 
As a consequence, the conjunction of a behavioural noise (internal factors and external 
factors) and a microstructure noise (either the interpretation of private information by dealers 
or the noise brought by the passing of undesired positions) implies that the foreign exchange 
market  is  intrinsically  inefficient.  The  incoming  information  is  distorted  by  agents’ 
behaviours and by the trading mechanism peculiar to the foreign exchange market. 
Note  also  that  the  behavioural  noise  is  often  considered  as  larger  than  the 
microstructure noise; the microstructure noise being often assumed as negligible. In order to 
observe this fact properly in the model, one should isolate the microstructure noise peculiar to 
the trading mechanism of the foreign exchange market from the noise induced by dealers’ 
behaviours and also from the noise implied by customers’ behaviours. This task goes beyond 
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5.2 Towards a resolution of the exchange rate disconnection puzzle? 
 
  The exchange rate disconnection puzzle states that the empirical dynamics of currency 
prices are disconnected from their fundamentals. The disconnection puzzle was highlighted 
by Meese and Rogoff (1983). They found that traditional exchange rate models based on a 
linear  and  symmetric  structure  offer  little  explanatory  and  predictive  powers  concerning 
exchange rate dynamics, especially in the short run. 
We mentioned previously that the explanatory power of exchange rate dynamics by 
order flows models far exceeds the one of traditional exchange rate models, especially at short 
run horizons. As a result, one may wonder whether order flows models of exchange rate 
provide an answer to the exchange rate disconnection puzzle? 
 
We  analyse  the  relative  explanatory  power  of  order  flows  versus  macroeconomic 
fundamentals by relying on the simulated series from our theoretical model of the foreign 
exchange market. The simulated exchange rate F is the endogenous variable. We consider as 
exogenous  variables  the  interest  rate  differential  (it     it*)  that  defines  the  fundamental 
exchange rate (s  in the theoretical model) and interdealer cumulated order flows Xt (V2 in the 
theoretical  model).  All  series  are  non stationary  in  level  but  stationary  in  first  difference 
within the 3000 periods of simulations
37. Regressions are based on OLS (with Newey West 
correction  for  heteroskedasticity  and  autocorrelation).  Table  4  shows  the  output  of  the 
regressions. 
 
Table 4: Empirical tests based on simulated series from  
the theoretical model of the foreign exchange market 
Model 1   st = β0 +  β1   (it   it*) + β2  Xt + εt  Diagnostic Tests 
Coefficients  β0  β1  β2  R2  LM  ARCH  J&B 














Model 2   st = β0 +  β1  Xt + εt  Diagnostic Tests 
Coefficients  β0  β1  R2  LM  ARCH  J&B 











Model 3   st = β0 +  β1  (it   it*) + εt  Diagnostic Tests 
Coefficients  β0  β1  R2  LM  ARCH  J&B 
 F   2,97x10
 1 
 [ 1,00] 
 9,15x10
 1 






NB: Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets ; p values are mentioned in brackets ; critical values for 
the test of Student amount to 1,96 at a 5 % confidence level and to 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level. 
 
                                                           
37 See appendix E for stationarity tests.   129
  As expected, table 4 shows that order flows provide a better explanatory power of 
currency movements than fundamentals. Order flows explain a significant part of the variance 
of  exchange  rate  dynamics  considered  in  first  difference  (R2  amounts  almost  at  60  %) 
contrary to fundamentals (R2 is lower than 1 %). 
We compare this theoretical result to the empirical fit of order flows models versus 
traditional models of exchange rate. We rely on the original dataset provided by Evans and 
Lyons (2002)
38. Tests are based on the deutschemark/dollar, yen/dollar and pound/dollar at a 
daily frequency, from May, 1 1996 to August, 23 1996. Order flows considered here are 
interdealer order flows. Because of non stationarity, series are considered in first difference. 
Equations  are  estimated  by  OLS  (with  Newey West  correction  for  heteroskedasticity  and 
autocorrelation). Table 5 shows the output of the regressions. 
 
Table 5: Empirical tests based on the original model of Evans and Lyons (2001, 2002) 
Model 1   st = β0 +  β1  (it   it*) + β2  Xt + εt  Diagnostic Tests 
Coefficients  β0  β1  β2  R2  LM  ARCH  J&B 










































Model 2   st = β0 +  β1  Xt + εt  Diagnostic Tests 
Coefficients  β0  β1  R2  LM  ARCH  J&B 

































Model 3   st = β0 +  β1  (it   it*) + εt  Diagnostic Tests 
Coefficients  β0  β1  R2  LM  ARCH  J&B 






















Yen   3,99x10
 4 
 [ 0,85] 
 4,16x10
 3 






NB: Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets ; p values are mentioned in brackets ; critical values for 
the test of Student amount to 1,96 at a 5 % confidence level and to 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level. 
 
  The theoretical results from table 4 are confirmed in table 5. At daily frequencies, 
order flows models (model 2 in table 5) provide a better fit of exchange rate dynamics than 
traditional  models  of  exchange  rate  (model  3  in  table  5).  Considering  the  case  of  the 
                                                           
38 We ask every entity likely to collect order flows but we did not manage to have acces to order flows data. The 
main reason provided by our contacts was that order flows are confidential data.   130
deutschemark/dollar exchange rate, order flows models provide a coefficient of determination 
(R2) equal to 65 % while the coefficient of determination for traditional models of exchange 
rate amounts to 5 %. 
  The better fit of order flows models holds not only at short horizons (as shown here for 
daily  frequencies)  but  also  for  long  run  horizons.  Indeed,  Berger  et  al.  (2008)  analyse 
interdealer  order  flows  from  January  1999  to  December  2004  on  the  euro/dollar  and  the 
yen/dollar exchange rates. They show that interdealer order flows have a significant impact on 
exchange rate variations in the short and in the medium run but much less explanatory power 
for long term exchange rate movements. However, although the explanatory power of order 
flows models falls in the long run, Berger et al. (2008) confirm that the explanatory power of 
order flows models is still much higher in the long run than the one of traditional exchange 
rate models. 
Such results suggest that order flows provide an answer to the disconnection puzzle of 
the exchange rate. Indeed, order flows contain information about exchange rate fundamentals 
(Chinn and Moore (2008), Evans and Lyons (2005b, 2008), Rime, Sarno and Sojli (2010)). 
The only difference between order flows models and traditional models is that the information 
about exchange rate fundamentals contained in order flows has been processed by market 
agents. Conversely, traditional models only consider raw (or unprocessed) information about 
exchange rate fundamentals. 
 
  Processed information means information that has been treated by agents. Processed 
information  contains  the  weight  attributed  by  agents  to  the  various  types  of  information 
included  in  order  flows:  fundamental  information  (public  and  private),  behavioural 
information  (public  and  private)  and  information  related  to  the  trading  mechanism  of  the 
foreign exchange market (the microstructure noise). Therefore order flow can be defined as a 
time varying weight of fundamental information (public and private), behavioural information 
(public and private) and microstructure information. In comparison, traditional models only 
consider public fundamental information. Order flows Xt can thus be defined as: 
 
Xt = Ft( t, Bt, Mt)                           
 
The term  t represents the stock of information about macroeconomic fundamental 
considered  by  an  agent  at  time  t.  This  variable  includes  public  information  about 
macroeconomic fundamentals. The term Bt stands for the behavioural noise affecting agents’   131
decisions. It includes the internal and external factors of market psychology. The term Mt is 
the microstructure noise. It includes the noise relative to the trading mechanism peculiar to the 
foreign exchange market. 
 
  Therefore,  the  higher  explanatory  and  predictive  powers  of  order  flows  models 
compared to traditional models of exchange rate are justified by the fact that order flows 
contain  processed  or  treated  information  while  traditional  models  only  consider  raw 
information. In other words, beyond exchange rate fundamentals, order flows models consider 
the  behavioural  and  microstructure  components  of  exchange  rates.  Conversely,  traditional 
models  ignore  such  components  and  take  only  account  of  the  fundamental  information 
concerning exchange rates. 
Given the importance of the behavioural and the microstructure components at short 
horizons relative to long horizons (Cheung and Wong (2000), Cheung and Chinn (2001), 
Cheung, Chinn and Marsh (2004))
39, the explanatory power of order flows models is far better 
than  the  one  of  traditional  exchange  rate  models  in  the  short  run.  The  difference  in 
explanatory power between both models decreases in the long run (but is still in favour of 
order  flows  models  (Berger  et  al.  (2008)))  because  both  the  behavioural  and  the 
microstructure components play a minor role in the determination of the exchange at long run 






This  article  aims  at  understanding  the  determinants  of  order  flows  in  the  foreign 
exchange rate market. We look inside the black box of order flows models to understand why 
order flows provide better explanatory and predictive powers of exchange rate dynamics than 
traditional models. 
  We set a theoretical model that takes account of all types of information available in 
the  foreign  exchange  market.  The  model  is  based  on  two  blocks.  The  first  block  is  a 
behavioural exchange rate model based on heterogeneous agents (De Grauwe and Grimaldi 
(2007)) that provides the characteristics of customers faced by dealers. The second block is a 
microstructure model that represents the trading mechanism peculiar to the foreign exchange   132
market. The microstructure model is a simultaneous trade model with a decentralised and 
multiple dealer structure. 
  Simulations from the model replicate important stylized facts observed empirically in 
the foreign exchange market. 
First, the exchange rate is disconnected from its fundamentals in the short run but not 
from order flows. However, in the long run, the exchange rate returns towards its fundamental 
value and is close to order flows. Customer and interdealer order flows are highly correlated 
with  exchange  rate  dynamics  at  all  horizons.  Besides  the  hot  potato  effect  magnifies  the 
amount of interdealer order flows relative to the amount of customer order flows. 
Secondly, the model shows that the foreign exchange market is intrinsically inefficient. 
Indeed, information is distorted at two levels in the market. On the one hand, information is 
distorted  by  agents’  behaviours.  This  behavioural  noise  is  split  into  two  factors:  internal 
factors  and  external  factors.  Internal  factors  include  notably  individual  preferences,  risk 
aversion, overreaction to news, specific models used by individuals. External factors cover 
rumours,  mimetism  and  conventions.  On  the  other  hand,  information  is  distorted  by  the 
trading  mechanism  peculiar  to  the  foreign  exchange  market.  This  microstructure  noise  is 
caused by two factors brought by the hot potato effect: the noise relative to the interpretation 
of  private  information  by  dealers  and  the  noise  generated  by  the  passing  of  undesired 
positions between dealers. 
Thirdly, we argue that order flows models of exchange rate provide an answer to the 
exchange rate disconnection puzzle. Indeed, order flows models contain information that has 
been processed by market agents while traditional models only consider raw (or unprocessed) 
information. Thus, the information in order flows is a time varying weight of fundamental 
information (both public and private), behavioural information (both public and private) and 
microstructure  information.  In  comparison,  traditional  models  only  consider  public 
fundamental information. The difference in the types of information considered by the two 
models explains why order flows models provide higher explanatory and predictive powers of 
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A. Definition of the different types of order flows 
 
Three types of order flows can be found in the foreign exchange market. All three are 
related to the three main agents that operate in the foreign exchange market: brokers, market 
makers and customers. 
Brokers  play  the  role  of  intermediaries  in  the  foreign  exchange  market.  Given  a 
commission, their task is to match buyers and sellers among market makers. Brokers are not 
allowed to take positions in the foreign exchange. Orders between market makers and brokers 
are called brokered interdealer order flows. They are registered in electronic systems such as 
Reuters 3000 Spot Matching or EBS (Electronic Broking Service).  
Market makers negotiate the purchases and sells of currencies with their customers or 
with  other  market makers  directly  or  indirectly  through  brokers.  Orders  between  market 
makers are called direct interdealer order flows. They are registered in Reuters 3000 Dealing 
System. Usually big banks (such as Deutsche Bank, UBS, Barclays Capital, Citigroup, Royal 
Bank of Scotland, JP Morgan and HSBC) play the role of market makers. Contrary to brokers, 
market makers are allowed to take positions and thus speculate in the market. These positions 
are  however  limited.  These  limits  are  often  set  by  risk  managers  given  the  degree  of 
experience of traders and the degree of risk in the market. Market makers must however close 
their  positions  by  the  end  of  the  day.  Market makers  often  transfer  their  positions  to 
customers or market makers located in other time zones. 
Eventually, customers operate in the foreign exchange market to convert currencies 
with  a  commercial  or  with  a  speculative  objective.  Customers  are  represented  by  non 
financial  companies  (import export  firms,  multinationals),  institutional  investors  (pension 
funds, hedge funds) and sometimes central banks. Customers transmit their orders to market 
makers. Such orders are called customer order flows and are registered in electronic systems 
of private banks. 
An important characteristic of order flows is that order flow is private information. 
They are not released publicly and are only known by a minority of agents (usually market 
makers). The most confidential orders are customer order flows followed by direct interdealer 
order flows and brokered interdealer order flows. 
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B. Description of the trading mechanism in the foreign exchange market  
 
  Order flow is a variable that provides a sign and an amount to a given transaction in 
the market. Buyers initiated order flows (i.e. buy orders) are positively signed while sellers 
initiated order flows (i.e. sell orders) are negatively signed. Net order flows is the difference 
between buy orders and sell orders on a given period of time. It is usual to consider net 
cumulated  order  flows  to  analyse  the  pressure  on  currency  prices.  Hence  a  positive  net 
cumulated order flow is associated to an  appreciation of a currency while a negative net 
cumulated order flow is associated to a depreciation of a currency. 
According to Lyons (2001), order flow can be viewed as a mechanism that conveys 
private  information  into  currency  prices.  Private  information  is  information  that  is  only 
known  by  a  minority  of  agents  in  the  market.  We  provide  an  example  to  illustrate  the 
transmission of information in currency prices through order flows. 
For sake of simplicity, we assume that every order has an aggressive part (Kyle (1985), 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985)) and ignore the existence of a limit order book. This assumption 
is relevant theoretically but not relevant empirically since empirically not all orders have an 
aggressive part and dealers do possess a limit order book. 
 
Figure B: The transmission of information in currency prices through order flows 
 
  Source: Marsh and O’Rourke (2005) 
 
Suppose  that  the  market  is  initially  in  equilibrium.  Customer  1  analyses  the 
fundamentals of the US dollar and finds that the dollar is over appreciated against the euro. 
Customer 1 thus expects a depreciation of the dollar and decides to sell her stock of dollars   140
against euro for 5 millions. Customer 1 hence gives a sell order of  5 to market maker A. 
Market maker  A  is  observing  the  order  flows  transmitted  by  customer  1  and  infers  the 
information contained in the order flows. If the market maker thinks that the customer sells 
her currency because of a worsening of macroeconomic fundamentals, he will then lower his 
listed price for the US dollar. Therefore, private information contained in customer 1’s order 
flows is thus introduced in the price of the currency. At this stage, cumulated order flows and 
net demand in the market are both equal to  5 (see table B). 
  Customer 2 is willing to buy 1 million dollars to market maker A. The cumulated 
order flows and the net demand are both equal to  4. Market maker A sells his whole stock of 
dollars to market maker B. Market maker B infers the negative information contained in the 
flows provided by market maker A and decreases her price. Cumulated order flows decrease 
to  8 while net demand in the market remains unchanged at  4. 
This mechanism will repeat itself for market makers C, D and E. As market makers 
take knowledge of the negative information contained in order flows, they decrease the price 
of the dollar in the market. Finally, the last transaction is materialised by an order of +2 from 
customer 4. Cumulated order flows amount to  12 while net demand is equal to zero. The 
market reaches a new equilibrium where customer 4 buys dollars at a new equilibrium price 
(i.e. at a lowered price).  
Table B summarises the transactions that took place in the market. 
 
Table B: The transmission of information in currency prices through order flows 










1  Customer 1  MM A    5    5    5    5 
2  Customer 2  MM A  + 1    4    4 (=   5 + 1)    4 (=   5 + 1) 
3  MM A  MM B    4    8    4 (=   4 + 0)    4 
4  MM B  MM C    4    12    4 (=   4 + 0)    4 
5  Client 3  MM C  + 2    10    2 (=   4 + 2)    2 (=   4 + 2) 
6  MM C  MM D    2    12    2 (=   2 + 0)    2 
7  MM D  MM E    2    14    2 (=   2 + 0)    2 
8  Customer 4  MM E  + 2    12     0 (=   2 + 2)  0 (=   2 + 2) 
Source: Marsh et O’Rourke (2005); MM stands for Market Maker 
 
Three observations can be highlighted from the above example.  
First and along the lines of Lyons (2001), order flow is a mechanism that transmits 
private  information  into  currency  prices.  Indeed  private  information  about  dollar’s 
fundamentals from customer 1 is spread in the market and included in currency prices through   141
order  flows  between  market makers.  Once  all  the  market makers  took  knowledge  of  the 
negative information, the price of the currency reaches a new equilibrium. 
  Secondly, table B shows that net demand is strictly equal to cumulated customer order 
flows. This is due to the assumptions that every order has an aggressive part and also to the 
exclusion of a limit order book. Had we assume that all trades are not aggressive and also that 
dealers possess a limit order book, customer order flows would not have been strictly equal to 
the net demand. Customer order flows are the main source of information in the market. 
Information from customer order flows is then redistributed among market makers. These 
redistributions  of  information  take  place  through  the  transfers  of  unwanted  positions  of 
currencies by market makers. Such redistributions explain the high volume of transactions 
between dealers in the foreign exchange market; the so called hot potato effect. However, 
transactions between market makers provide no additional information in the market relative 
to the original private information contained in customer order flows. Transactions between 
market makers provide only transitory information through liquidity effects.  
Thirdly, transactions between market makers inflate the amount of flows in the market 
(as  shown  in  the  fifth  column  of  table  B  related  to  cumulated  order  flows).  Such  flows 
magnify the effect of the initial order flows by customer 1. Hence if the price decreases as it 
was the case in the previous example, cumulated order flows decrease further more. In the 
above example, an initial customer order flow of  5 induces a final cumulated order flow of  
12. Given the fact that the price has decreased between the first equilibrium and the second 
equilibrium, there appears a high correlation between the exchange rate and net cumulated 
order flows. This high correlation justifies the use of order flows as an explanatory variable 
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C. The importance of investors’ behaviours at short run horizons 
 
  Beyond macroeconomic fundamentals, one of the major components of exchange rates 
in the short run is market psychology or equivalently agents’ behaviours (Keynes (1936), 
Hopper (1998)). The importance of this component has been justified by numerous surveys. 
 
Cheung and Wong (2000) survey operators in the foreign exchange market in Tokyo, 
Hong  Kong  and  Singapore  between  October  1995  and  January  1996.  They  found  that  at 
intraday frequencies, exchange rates are exclusively driven by non fundamental components 
(at 99,30 %): speculative forces (30,82 %), over reaction (24,40 %) and bandwagon effects 
(24,40 %). In the medium run (shorter than 6 months) factors driving exchange rates are 
successively  technical  trading  (39,75  %),  economic  fundamentals  (32,14  %),  speculative 
forces (14,0 %) and bandwagon effects (12,13 %). Hence, non fundamental components still 
play a major role in explaining exchange rate dynamics (at 67,86 %). In the long run (longer 
than 6 months), operators consider that economic fundamentals are the main determinants of 
exchange rates (at 79,56 %). 
 
Table C.1: Factors determining exchange rate movements (Cheung and Wong (2000)) 
Factors  Intraday  Medium Run  Long Run 
Bandwagon Effects  24,40  12,13  0,84 
Over Reaction to news  30,16  1,98  0,20 
Speculative Forces  30,82  14,0  2,30 
Economic Fundamentals  0,70  32,14  79,56 
Technical Trading  13,92  39,75  17,1 
Source: Cheung and Wong (2000); Percentages of respondents in each category are mentioned. 
 
Cheung  and  Chinn  (2001)  survey  traders  operating  in  the  United  States  foreign 
exchange market between October 1996 and November 1997. At intraday frequencies, factors 
that best explain exchange rate dynamics are over reaction (30,45 %), bandwagon effects 
(28,20 %) and speculative forces (25,51 %). Hence exchange rates are driven exclusively by 
non fundamental components (at 98,56 %). In the medium run (up to 6 months) although 
economic fundamentals gain some importance (32,10 %), more than 66 % of respondents give 
credit to non fundamental forces to explain exchange rate movements. Such non fundamental 
forces  include  technical  trading  (30,52  %),  speculative  forces  (23,68  %)  and  bandwagon 
effects (10,52 %). In the long run (over 6 months), operators consider that exchange rates are 
determined in majority by economic fundamentals (at 87,40 %). 
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Table C.2: Factors determining exchange rate movements (Cheung and Chinn (2001)) 
Factors  Intraday  Medium Run  Long Run 
Bandwagon Effects  28,20  10,52  3,93 
Over Reaction to news  30,45  2,10  0 
Speculative Forces  25,51  23,68  2,36 
Economic Fundamentals  0,82  32,10  87,40 
Technical Trading  14,40  30,52  3,14 
Other  0,62  1,08  3,17 
Source: Cheung and Chin (2001); Percentages of respondents in each category are mentioned. 
 
The same results can be found in Cheung, Chinn and Marsh (2004) who survey the 
United  Kingdom  foreign  exchange  market  from  March  1998  to  April  1998.  At  intraday 
frequencies,  non fundamental  forces  determine  exchange  rates  (at  97,7  %);  mainly  over 
reaction to news (32,8 %), bandwagon effects (29,3 %) and speculative forces (25,3 %). In the 
medium run (within 6 months), non fundamental forces play a major role in the determination 
of exchange rates (67,2 %) even if economic fundamentals gain importance (31,4 %). In the 
long run (over 6 months), economic fundamentals are the major determinants of exchange 
rates (at 82,5 %). 
 
Table C.3: Factors affecting exchange rate dynamics (Cheung, Chinn and Marsh (2004)) 
Factors  Intraday  Medium Run  Long Run 
Bandwagon Effects  29,3  9,5  1 
Over Reaction to news  32,8  0,7  0 
Speculative Forces  25,3  30,7  3,1 
Economic Fundamentals  0,6  31,4  82,5 
Technical Trading  10,3  26,3  11,3 
Other  1,7  1,5  2,1 
Source: Cheung, Chinn and Marsh (2004); Percentages of respondents in each category are mentioned. 
 
D. Stationarity tests for series considered in the original  model of  Evans and Lyons 
(2001, 2002) (model (1) in the core text) 
 
Stationarity tests are based on three tests: the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, 
the Phillips Perron (PP) test and the Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin (KPSS) test. Results 
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Table D.1: Stationarity tests for endogenous variables  st 
Currencies  ADF  PP  KPSS 
Deutschemark   8,84 
(0,00) 
 8,87 
(0,00)  0,08*** 
Pound   8,95 
(0,00) 
 8,98 





(0,00)  0,09*** 
NB: For the ADF test the Akaike criteria with 2 lags is considered; p values are mentioned in brackets; stars 
denote a stationary series at a 1 % (***), 5 % (**), 10 %(*) confidence level. 
 
Table D.2: Stationarity tests for exogenous variables 
Variables   (it   it*)   Xt 





(0,00)  0,06***   9,51 
(0,00) 
 9,50 





(0,00)  0,10***   6,89 
(0,00) 
 6,92 
(0,00)  0,07*** 
Yen   7,91 
(0,00) 
 7,90 
(0,00)  0,04***   7,57 
(0,00) 
 7,60 
(0,00)  0,18*** 
NB: For the ADF test the Akaike criteria with 2 lags is considered; p values are mentioned in brackets; stars 
denote a stationary series at a 1 % (***), 5 % (**), 10 %(*) confidence level. 
 
E. Stationarity tests for simulated series from the theoretical model 
 
Stationarity tests are based on three tests: the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, 
the Phillips Perron (PP) test and the Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin (KPSS) test. Results 
are presented in table E. 
 
Table E: Stationarity tests for the endogenous variable and exogenous variables 
simulated within the theoretical model of the foreign exchange market 
Variables  ADF  PP  KPSS 




(0,38)  1,27 
s  = (it   it*)   3,69 
(0,02) 
 1,42 
(0,85)  0,34 
V2 = Xt   2,08 
(0,55) 
 2,65 
(0,25)  1,27 




(0,00)  0,04* 




(0,31)  0,18*** 
dV2 = dXt   9,06 
(0,00) 
 20,55 
(0,00)  0,04* 
NB: For the ADF test the Akaike criteria with 2 lags is considered; p values are mentioned in brackets; stars 
denote a stationary series at a 1 % (***), 5 % (**), 10 %(*) confidence level. 
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F. Definition of the exogenous parameters used for simulations in the theoretical model 
of the foreign exchange market 
 
  Table F presents the parameters’ values set to run the simulations of the theoretical 
model of the foreign exchange rate market. The model was calibrated. The main sources for 
parameters’ values were De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007) for the heterogeneous agents model 
and Lyons (1997) for the microstructure model. 
 
Table F: Parameters’ values used in the theoretical model 
Agents  Parameters  Base Scenario 
Customers 
Time t 
n  10 
α1  0,6 
α2  0,2 
β1  0,9 
β2  0,4 
θ   0,025 
υ  0,5 
Λ  5 
γ  0,2 
   5 




m  50 
 d  2 
γ1
i  γ1




t F O OF < ;  
γ1




t F O OF >  
a1 
(0< a1< 1)  0,9 
a2 
(0< a2< 1)  0,3 
a4 











t , T T 1 1 < ;  
γ2




t , T T 1 1 >  
b1 
(0< b1< 1)  0,8 
b2 
(0< b2< 1)  0,3 
b3 
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G. Precisions and remarks concerning the theoretical foreign exchange market model 
 
In  our  model  the  price  of  the  currency  is  affected  through  two  channels:  a  direct 
channel and an indirect channel. The distinguishing feature between the two channels is easily 
understood with an example taken from Evans and Lyons (2008) and Evans (2009). 
Assume a scheduled macroeconomic announcement on US gross domestic product 
(GDP)  growth  (i.e.  common  knowledge  news)  is  greater  than  the  expectations  of  market 
participants (other things being equal). Furthermore, suppose that all market agents agree that 
unexpectedly high US GDP growth represents good news for the dollar value. If all market 
agents agree that GDP growth is x percent higher than expected and, as a result, the dollar is y 
percent more valuable in terms of euro, then dealers will immediately quote a euro/dollar rate 
that is y percent higher. This is the standard mechanism   the direct channel   through which 
news directly impact on currency prices. Information that is common knowledge, i.e. public 
information, impacts currency prices through this direct channel. 
Now assume that all market agents agree that the GDP announcement represents good 
news for the dollar, but that there are diverse opinions as to how large the appreciation should 
be. Under these circumstances, the initial rise in the euro/dollar spot rate could be viewed as 
too large by some market agents and too small by others. Those who view the rise as too 
small will place orders to purchase the dollar, while those who view the rise as too large will 
place  orders  to  sell.  In  aggregate,  the  balance  of these  trades  represents  order  flows  that 
dealers use to further revise their spot rate quotes. In particular, positive (negative) order 
flows signal that the initial euro/dollar spot rate was below (above) the balance of opinion 
among market participants concerning the implications of the GDP announcement for the 
value of the dollar. This process of price adjustment via order flows is the indirect channel.
40 
The indirect channel operates via order flows and conveys private information i.e. dispersed 
information  about  fundamentals  to  dealers.  Dispersed  information  comprises  micro level 
information on economic activity that is correlated with fundamentals. Examples include the 
sales and orders for the products of individual firms, market research on consumer spending, 
and  private  research  on  the  economy  conducted  by  financial  institutions,  etc.  Dispersed 
information first reaches the foreign exchange market via customer order flows received by 
individual dealers. These order flows have no immediate impact on dealers’ quotes because 
                                                           
40 Notice that good news for the dollar need not translate into positive order flows. Good news can be associated 
with either positive or negative order flows depending on how dealers’ initial adjusted quotes relate to the 
balance of opinion concerning the implications of the news.   147
they represent private information to the recipient dealer. The information in each customer 
flow will only impact on quotes once it is known to all dealers. Interdealer order flows are 
central  to  this  process.  Individual  dealers  use  their  private  information  to  trade  in  the 
interdealer market. In so doing, information on their customer order flows is aggregated and 
spread across the market. Dispersed information is incorporated into dealers’ quotes once this 

































On the Determinants of Heterogeneous Behaviours in Financial Markets:  






  This  paper  analyses  empirically  behaviours’  heterogeneity  in  the  foreign  exchange 
market and in stock markets. Results show that heterogeneous behaviours are homogenous 
across markets. However, the contagion of behaviours is significant between markets that 
trade the same asset but not significant between markets that trade different assets. We find 
that  risk  aversion  explains  behaviours’  heterogeneity  contrary  to  macroeconomic 
fundamentals.  When  risk  aversion  is  high  (low),  fundamentalists  (chartists)  dominate  the 
market. Based on this stylised fact we build a behavioural forecasting rule. This rule provides 
better short and long run out of sample forecasts of future asset prices than the simple random 
walk. 
  
Keywords: Exchange Rate, Stock Markets, Heterogeneous Agents, Markov Switching Model, 























Ce papier analyse empiriquement l’hétérogénéité des comportements sur le marché de 
changes  et  sur  les  marchés  boursiers.  Les  résultats  montrent  que  les  comportements 
hétérogènes sont homogènes entre marchés. Cependant, la contagion des comportements est 
significative entre marchés échangeant un même actif mais non significative entre marchés 
échangeant des actifs différents. Les résultats montrent que l’aversion au risque explique les 
comportements  hétérogènes  contrairement  aux  fondamentaux  macroéconomiques.  Ainsi 
lorsque l’aversion au risque est élevée (faible), les fondamentalistes (les chartistes) dominent 
le marché. Sur la base de ce fait stylisé, nous construisons une règle de prévision basée sur les 
comportements hétérogènes des agents. Cette règle fournit de meilleures prévisions en dehors 
de l’échantillon que le modèle de marche aléatoire à court terme comme à long terme. 
 
Mots Clés :  Taux  de  Change,  Marchés  Boursiers,  Agents  Hétérogènes,  Modèle  à 
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1. Introduction 
 
The heterogeneous agents’ theory pioneered by Frankel and Froot (1986) provides an 
interesting mechanism to understand exchange rates dynamics. This mechanism is based on 
the observation that agents have heterogeneous expectations in the foreign exchange market. 
The main principle of these models is that the interactions between two (or more) agents with 
different behaviours (often chartists and fundamentalists) generate chaotic dynamics similar 
to the ones observed empirically for exchange rates. Empirical works pioneered by Vigfusson 
(1997) validate the theory of Frankel and Froot (1986). 
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2007) have recently revisited the work 
of Frankel and Froot (1986). Their innovations deal mainly with the introduction of elements 
from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)) and new criteria to choose a particular 
behavioural  rule.  Followers  of  De  Grauwe  and  Grimaldi  provide  little  extensions:  some 
consider new behavioural rules (De Grauwe and Rovira Kaltwasser (2006, 2007), De Grauwe 
and Vansteenkiiste (2007)) or new criteria for rules selection (De Grauwe and Markewicz 
(2006)); others add new markets (Picillo (2009)). The same observation holds concerning 
empirical models that follow the pioneered work of Vigfusson (1997). The theoretical and 
empirical literature on heterogeneous agents models remains focused under the light of the 
street lamp set respectively by Frankel and Froot (1987) and Vigfusson (1997). This article 
aims at highlighting new elements that might be located in the dark side of the street lamp. 
We focus on the following questions. Which factors trigger empirically the trend reversal in 
exchange rates or equivalently which factors determine heterogeneous behaviours in financial 
markets? Is it risk aversion as put forward by De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007) or is it the 
influence of macroeconomic fundamentals as early mentioned by Frankel and Froot (1986)? 
Besides,  what  can  we  tell  about  behaviours’  heterogeneity  across  different  markets 
empirically? Do behaviours propagate across different markets or is there a common variable 
that triggers the same behaviours across financial markets? 
To our best knowledge, the closest work to this article is Menkhoff, Rebitzky and 
Schröder (2009). Menkhoff et al. (2009) test the determinants of expectations’ heterogeneity 
in the foreign exchange market. They approximate expectations’ heterogeneity by computing 
expectations’ dispersion from a qualitative micro survey data of 300 practitioners with the 
Carlson  and  Parkin’s  method  (1975).  To  analyse  the  determinants  of  expectations’ 
heterogeneity, Menkhoff et al. (2009) rely on univariate and multivariate linear models. Our 
paper  differs  from  the  work  of  Menkhoff  et  al.  (2009)  in  at  least  four  points.  First,  our   151
analysis considers macro data and relies on two markets: the euro/dollar foreign exchange 
market  and  the  European  and  US  stock  markets.  Secondly,  we  compute  expectations 
heterogeneity from the estimation of smoothed probabilities from a Markov switching model. 
This non linear model incorporates explicitly both the fundamentalist and the chartist rules. 
This framework allows us to test behaviours’ causality between various markets. Thirdly, we 
use non linear TVTP Markov switching models and STAR models to test which variables are 
likely  to  determine  heterogeneous  behaviours  in  financial  markets.  Fourthly,  we  derive  a 
forecasting rule based on our analysis of agents’ behaviours in financial markets. 
We put forward three major results. Heterogeneous behaviours are homogenous across 
markets. Besides, the causality of behaviours is significant and strong within markets that 
trade the same asset (here between the European and US stock markets) but weaker or even 
not  significant  between  two  markets  that  trade  different  assets  (here  between  either  the 
European or the US stock markets, and the foreign exchange market). Secondly, we find that 
risk aversion (as proxied by implied volatility on option prices) is more likely to explain 
behaviours in financial markets than macroeconomic fundamentals. When risk aversion is 
higher  than  a  critical  value,  fundamentalists  dominate  the  market.  Conversely,  when  risk 
aversion is lower than a critical value, the market is globally chartist. Thirdly, we build a 
behavioural  forecasting  rule  based  on  this  stylised  fact.  This  rule  provides  better  out of 
sample forecasts of future asset prices than the random walk. This observation stands in the 
long run as well as in the short run. 
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a literature survey 
of theoretical and empirical works on behavioural exchange rate models. Section 3 estimates 
an heterogeneous agents model for the euro/dollar exchange rate and the European and US 
stock markets. We then analyse the interactions of behaviours between these markets. Section 
4 tests which factors influence heterogeneous behaviours in financial markets based on TVTP 
Markov switching models and STAR models. Section 5 puts forward a forecasting rule based 
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2. Literature survey 
 
In a pioneered work, Frankel and Froot (1986) provide an interesting mechanism to 
understand exchange rate dynamics. This mechanism is based on the stylised fact that agents 
have heterogeneous behaviours in the foreign exchange market
41. Frankel and Froot represent 
behaviours’ heterogeneity by considering two agents: chartists and fundamentalists. Chartists 
interpolate  past  trends  of  exchange  rates  to  forecast  future  exchange  rate  dynamics. 
Fundamentalists expect a return of the current exchange rate towards its fundamental value. 
The interactions between these two agents help to explain the dynamics of asset prices. When 
chartists dominate the market, the exchange rate wanders away from its fundamental value. 
Conversely, when fundamentalists dominate the market, the exchange rate returns towards its 
fundamental value. 
Frankel and Froot use their model to explain the over appreciation of the dollar in the 
mid 1980s
42. They show that between January 1980 and December 1982, the appreciation of 
the dollar with regards to major currencies of industrialised economies was justified by a real 
interest rate differential in favour of the United States. However between January 1983 and 
June 1985, Frankel and Froot relate the appreciation of the dollar to an “endogenous takeoff of 
a  speculative  bubble”  since  the  dollar  keeps  appreciating  although  the  real  interest  rate 
differential is no more in favour of the United States. Thus in that period, fundamentalist rules 
generate  losses.  Market  agents  have  thus  an  incentive  to  switch  to  chartist  rules.  As  the 
proportion of chartists increases in the market, the bubble inflates further and the exchange 
rate  wanders  away  from  its  fundamental  value.  After  July  1985,  the  dollar  returns 
progressively towards its fundamental value. Frankel and Froot attribute this trend reversal in 
the dollar to the “ever worsening current account deficit” in the United States. During the 
convergence  of  the  dollar  towards  its  fundamental  value,  the  profitability  of  the 
fundamentalist rule increases leading to a rise in the proportion of fundamentalists in the 
market. The dollar reaches its fundamental value in December 1987 and the bubble disappears. 
 
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2007) have recently revisited the work 
of Frankel and Froot (1986). The innovations brought by De Grauwe and Grimaldi concern 
the  introduction  of  psychological  concepts  such  as the status  quo  bias,  the  long  memory 
effects and elements from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). Innovations have 
                                                           
41 See table A, appendix A. 
42 For more details, see appendix B.   153
also  been  brought  on  the  criteria  to  choose  a  particular  behavioural  rule.  However  the 
underlying mechanisms of the model of De Grauwe and Grimaldi remain the same as in 
Frankel and Froot (1986)
43. 
Theoretical models following De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2007) 
provide  little  extensions
44 :  some  add  new  behavioural  rules  (De  Grauwe  and  Rovira 
Kaltwasser (2006, 2007), De Grauwe and Vansteenkiiste (2007)) or new criteria for rules 
selection (De Grauwe and Markewicz (2006)); others add new markets (Picillo (2009)). 
De Grauwe and Rovira Kaltwasser (2006) consider multiple agents that can choose 
between three forecasting rules: one fundamentalist rule and two chartist rules (a momentum 
rule and a simple extrapolative rule). Simulations of the model provide similar results as in De 
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007). Exchange rate dynamics alternate between two regimes: a non 
fundamental (bubble) regime in which the exchange rate wanders away from its fundamental 
value and a fundamental regime where the exchange rate fluctuates around its fundamental 
value.  The  determination  of  these  regimes  depends  respectively  on  the  increase  and  the 
decrease in the proportion of chartists in the market. Later, De Grauwe and Rovira Kaltwasser 
(2007) consider that agents can choose between three rules in the market: two fundamentalist 
rules (optimistic and pessimistic fundamentalists) and one chartist rule (a simple extrapolative 
rule)
45. They find that the exchange rate alternates between three regimes: it wanders away 
from its fundamental value or fluctuates around it depending on the proportion of chartists 
and fundamentalists in the market and also according to the fundamentalist rule chosen by 
fundamentalists. 
De  Grauwe  and  Markewicz  (2006)  introduce  new  learning  mechanisms  in  the 
selection of the rules (fitness learning and statistical learning). In fitness learning (similar to 
the one used in the model of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007)), weights attributed to a rule 
change according to the profitability of the rules (the parameters of the rules remain the same). 
In statistical learning, agents learn to improve these rules by revising the parameters in the 
behavioural  rules  (the  weights  attributed  to  a  given  rule  remain  the  same).  Under  both 
learning mechanisms, simulations show that the exchange rate alternates between a bubble 
regime  and  a  fundamental  regime.  De  Grauwe  and  Markewicz  (2006)  show  that  fitness 
learning is more likely to reproduce the empirical puzzles of exchange rates (fundamental 
                                                           
43 The theoretical model of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007) is exposed in appendix C. 
44 De Grauwe and Altavilla (2010) present a similar model as in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007). 
45 Prior to this study, De Grauwe and Vansteenkiiste (2007) proposed a model with two fundamentalist rules and 
one chartist rule. Fundamentalists have two divergent opinions about the value of the fundamental exchange rate 
while chartists rely on a momentum rule.   154
disconnection, excess volatility and volatility clustering) than statistical learning. Thus fitness 
learning is more likely to replicate agents’ behaviours in the foreign exchange market than 
statistical learning. 
In a more innovative way, Piccillo (2009) regroups the approaches of De Gauwe and 
Grimaldi (2007) and Brock and Hommes (1998) by applying the heterogeneous agents model 
simultaneously to the stock market and to the foreign exchange market. Piccillo interestingly 
asks  about  the  possible  interactions  of  heterogeneous  behaviours  between  both  markets. 
Piccillo enriches the heterogeneous agents model by defining the fundamental value of the 
fundamentalist  rules  through  a  complete  macroeconomic  model  based  on  a  DSGE 
framework
46. Her model  puts forward two theoretical results. First, when agents consider 
productivity shocks in only one of the markets, the dynamics of asset prices in the stock 
market and in the foreign exchange market is the same as the one described by De Grauwe 
and Grimaldi (2007). Indeed, in both markets, an increase in the chartists’ weight leads to a 
disconnection  of  asset  prices  from  their  fundamental  value  while  an  increase  in  the 
fundamentalists’ weight leads to a return of asset prices towards their fundamental value. 
Secondly, when agents consider productivity shocks coming from both the stock market and 
the foreign exchange market, the existence of a bubble in the stock market may create a 
bubble in the foreign exchange market (similar to the bubble created by chartists in the stock 
market) even if agents in the foreign exchange market are in majority fundamentalists. This 
interesting result is however not tested empirically. Her work remains essentially theoretical. 
 
Concerning empirical models based on heterogeneous agents, the pioneered work is 
realised by Vigfusson (1997). Vigfusson tests the model of Frankel and Froot (1986) on the 
Canadian dollar/US dollar exchange rate from January 1983 to December 1992. His model is 
based on a Markov switching framework with two states: a chartist state and a fundamentalist 
state. Vigfusson’s results validate the theory of Frankel and Froot (1986)
47.  
                                                           
46 Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models attempt to explain aggregate economic phenomena 
such  as  economic  growth,  business  cycles,  and  the  effects  of  monetary  and  fiscal  policies,  on  the  basis  of 
macroeconomic models derived from microeconomic principles. DSGE models aim to describe the behavior of 
the  economy  as  a  whole  by  analyzing  the  interaction  of  many  microeconomic  decisions.  The  decisions 
correspond to the determination of the amounts of consumption, saving, investment, labor supply and labor 
demand. The decision makers may include households, business firms, governments or central banks. DSGE 
models are dynamic and study how the economy evolves over time. They are also stochastic, taking into account 
the fact that the economy is affected by random shocks such as technological change, fluctuations in the price of 
oil or errors in macroeconomic policy making. 
47 A detailed description of the model of Vigfusson (1997) is available in appendix D.   155
Studies  following  the  original  work  of  Vigfusson  (1997)
48  provide  only  minor 
extensions. Chan, Daw, Djoudad and Murray (2000) estimate the original model of Vigfusson 
(1997) for the exchange rates of Australia, Canada and New Zealand against the United States 
between January 1973 and December 1999 in daily frequency. They consider three alternative 
chartist rules in their model (a momentum rule and a relative strength index (RSI) associated 
with a moving average convergence divergence (MACD)). They found the same results as in 
Vigfusson (1997). 
  Ahrenz and Reitz (2003) rely on a similar model as in Vigfusson (1997) but assume 
constant  volatility  in  both  regimes  (σf=σc).  They  estimate  their  model  for  the 
dollar/deutschemark exchange rate over the period January 1982 November 1998 on a daily 
frequency. Their results validate the hypotheses of Vigfusson (1997)’s model. 
  Bessec and Robineau (2003) test the robustness of Vigfusson’s results (1997). They 
consider four alternative models tested on the Canadian dollar, the deutschemark, the yen, 
against the US dollar between January 1983 and March 2000 in daily frequency. Their results 
validate the structure of the model used by Vigfusson (1997). 
  Other  studies  test  the  heterogeneous  agents  model by  relying  on  threshold  models 
rather than on Markov switching models. 
  Reitz and Westerhoff (2003) use a STAR model (Smooth Threshold Autoregressive 
model)  to  analyse  the  variation  in  the  proportion  of  fundamentalists  and  chartists  in  the 
market according to the spread between the exchange rate and its fundamental value. They 
estimate their model for the deutschemark, the pound and the yen against the dollar between 
January  1980  and  December  1996  in  daily  frequency.  Their  results  show  that  when  the 
exchange rate wanders away from its fundamental value, chartists dominate the market. A 
limit of their model is that there is no incentive for agents to become fundamentalist. In such 
circumstances, the inflation of a bubble is infinite. 
  Following Vigfusson (1997)’s results suggesting that chartists dominate in periods of 
low exchange rate volatility rather than in periods of high exchange rate volatility, Manzan 
and Westerhoff (2007) use a TAR model (Threshold Autoregressive model) to distinguish 
between  two  types  of  regimes  for  chartists.  They  consider  respectively  stabilising  and 
destabilising chartists according to whether the exchange rate is more or less volatile. They 
estimate their model on the Canadian dollar, the French franc, the deutschemark, the British 
pound and the yen against the US dollar between January 1974 and December 1994 on a 
monthly frequency. Their results show that when exchange rate volatility is high, chartists 
                                                           
48 Murray, Van Norden and Vigfusson (1996) also expose the results related to the model of Vigfusson (1997).   156
favour  a  stabilising  rule  while  when  exchange  rate  volatility  is  low,  chartists  choose  a 
destabilising  rule.  Their  model  provides  however  unsatisfying  out of sample  forecasts 
compared to the random walk. 
 
  More recently, Menkhoff et al. (2009) try to find the determinants of expectations 
heterogeneity in the foreign exchange market. They rely on a qualitative survey of monthly 
exchange rate expectations from about 300 forecasters that spans December 1991 to August 
2006. Their sample covers three exchange rates: the US dollar, the British pound and the 
Japanese  yen  vis à vis  the  euro.  They  found  that  expectations  dispersion  is  positively 
correlated with the decreasing deviation of the actual exchange rate from its fundamental 
value and also with abrupt changes in the exchange rate. Moreover, a rising exchange rate risk 
premium   as defined by the difference between the expected exchange rate and the accordant 
forward rate   increases expectations’ heterogeneity. Macroeconomic fundamentals (money, 
income, short term and long term interest rates, inflation, trade balance and capital flows) 
considered  whether  in  absolute,  in  change  or  in  variation  do  not  affect  significantly 
expectations’ dispersion. 
 
Except  the  paper  by  Menkhoff  et  al.  (2009),  the  literature  survey  shows  that 
theoretical and empirical papers on heterogeneous agents remain focused on the same corner 
of the research field. Theoretical and empirical studies are mostly under the light of the street 
lamp set respectively by Frankel and Froot (1987) and Vigfusson (1997). Reasearchers do not 
go  further  in  the  lessons  that  can  be  drawn  from  heterogeneous  agents  models.  They 
surprisingly stop at the variation of the proportion of chartists and fundamentalists in the 
market and its induced dynamics on the exchange rate. Perhaps, the studies of Piccillo (2009) 
and  Menkhoff  et  al.  (2009)  open  new  ways  of  research  in  the  literature  concerning 
respectively theoretical and empirical models of heterogeneous agents. 
The present article aims at highlighting new elements that might be located in the dark 
side of the street lamp. We start from the observation that in the Markov switching model of 
Vigfusson (1997), the state transition depends on an unobservable variable. Hence we still do 
not know which factors trigger empirically the trend reversal in exchange rates or equivalently 
which factors determine heterogeneous behaviours in the market? Is it risk aversion as put 
forward  by  De  Grauwe  and  Grimaldi  (2007)  or  is  it  the  influence  of  macroeconomic 
fundamentals as early mentioned by Frankel and Froot (1986)? Besides, along with Picillo 
(2009) what can we tell empirically about behaviours’ heterogeneity across different markets?   157
Do behaviours propagate across different markets or is there a common variable that triggers 
the  same  behaviour  across  financial  markets?  The  present  paper  aims  at  answering  these 
questions. 
To our best knowledge, the closest paper to our analysis is Menkhoff et al. (2009). Our 
paper differs however strongly from Menkhoff et al.. First of all, Menkhoff et al. consider 
qualitative micro data survey transformed into quantitative data by using the Carlson and 
Parkin  (1975)’s  method.  Our  paper  considers  quantitative  macro  data  and  uses  smoothed 
probabilities computed from a quantitative model as a proxy for expectations’ heterogeneity. 
This quantitative model is based on a Markov switching framework and models explicitly the 
behaviours  of  fundamentalists  and  chartists  in  the  market.  The  advantage  of  considering 
macro  data  relative  to  micro  data  is  that  macro  data  take  account  of  the  heterogeneous 
expectations of the market as a whole, contrary to micro survey data that consider only the 
heterogeneous  expectations  of  the  considered  sample  of  surveyed  practitioners.  Secondly, 
Menkhoff et al. (2009) rely on purchasing power parity (PPP) to define the fundamental 
exchange rate. However the concept of PPP holds in the very long run. Besides, foreign 
exchange market surveys show that PPP becomes less popular among market agents as a 
fundamental definition for the exchange rate (Cheung and Chinn (2001)). Our paper uses a 
fundamental  exchange  rate  estimated  from  a  cointegration  relationship  based  on 
macroeconomic  fundamentals.  Thirdly,  Menkhoff  et  al.  (2009)  rely  on  univariate  and 
multivariate  OLS  regressions.  Such  models  are  appropriate  to  find  the  determinants  of 
expectations’ heterogeneity if one relies on micro data and does not specify explicitly the 
equations  for  fundamentalist  and  chartist  behaviours.  In  our  case,  we  rely  on  non linear 
models  (TVTP  Markov  switching  models  and  STAR  models)  to  test  which  variables  are 
likely to determine heterogeneous behaviours in the foreign exchange market. Fourthly, our 
paper enriches the tests by Menkhoff et al. since it does not focus only on expectations’ 
heterogeneity  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  but  considers  also  stock  markets  and  the 
interaction of behaviours between both markets. Finally, we draw lessons from our analysis 
by deriving a forecasting rule from the analysis of agents’ behaviours in the markets. 
Our  research  strategy  is  exposed  as  follows.  In  section  3  we  analyse  empirically 
agents’ heterogeneity in three markets: the foreign exchange market and the European and US 
stock  markets.  In  section  4,  we  analyse  the  variables  that  trigger  behaviours  in  financial 
markets among a set of financial and macroeconomic variables. Then, based on the lessons 
drawn from our analysis, section 5 defines a behavioural rule to forecast stock prices and 
exchange rates.   158
3. Analysis of the dynamics of heterogeneous agents in financial markets  
 
  3.1 Presentation of the models 
 
We follow Vigfusson (1997) and test a traditional heterogeneous agents model based 
on  a  fixed  transition  probabilities  (FTP)  Markov  switching  framework.  FTP  Markov 
switching models   pioneered by Goldfeld and Quandt (1973) and applied to time series by 
Hamilton  (1989)     assume  that  the  transition  between  the  state  equations  depends  on  an 
unobservable state variable that usually follows a Markov chain of order one. Assuming a 
FTP Markov switching model with two states   a chartist state and a fundamentalist state   the 
















= = = =





) f S / f S ( P ) c S / f S ( P
) f S / c S ( P ) c S / c S ( P
t t t t




1 1  
 














t t t t
t ) i i ( ) ma ma (











− + − +
− + − +
=  
− − − −
− − − −
1 1 23 1 200 1 14 22 21







  (1) 
 
With st, the (log of the) exchange rate (the euro/dollar exchange rate is listed as 1 euro 
per S dollars);  t s , the (log of the) fundamental exchange rate; maτ,t 1, the moving average of 
the (log of the) exchange rate in the last τ days 
49; (it 1   it 1*), the 10 years interest  rate 
differential between the euro zone and the United States; εt
c → N(0, σε
c) and  εt
f → N(0, σε
f) ; 
α11 and α21 are constants
50. The fundamental exchange rate  t s  is defined as: 
 
t s =  t q   pt + pt*                                                                 (2) 
 
                                                           
49 The τ values considered here are the ones considered in Vigfusson (1997). The consideration of other figures 
for τ does not alter the final results of the analysis. Results are available upon author request.   
50 We consider macroeconomic fundamentals (i.e. the interest rate differential) in the Markov switching model 
because we assume agents are not purely chartist and fundamentalist. We assume agents take account of other 
information coming from fundamentals.   159
With  t q , the (log of the) estimated real exchange rate; pt*, the (log of the) consumer 
price index in the United States; pt, the (log of the) consumer price index in the Euro zone.  
 
As the fundamental value of the price of an asset is a long term concept, we rely on an 
error correction model (ECM) to determine the fundamental value of the exchange rate 
51. 
Besides, because agents rely empirically on various fundamental models to determine the 
fundamental value of an asset, we consider three relationships: 
 
  a UIP model (Keynes (1936)): 
 
        t q  = β0 + β1(rt   rt*)+ εt                                                                    (3a) 
 
  a BEER model (Clark and MacDonald (1998)):   
 
       t q  = β0 + β1(rt   rt*) + β2(at   at*) + β3(edt    edt*) + εt                     (3b) 
 
    a UIP URP model
52 (Heimonen and Vataja (2008)): 
 
      t q  = β0 + β1(rt   rt*) + β2(spt   spt*)+ β3op t + εt                                 (3c) 
 
With  (at     at*),  the  productivity  differential;  (spt     spt*),  the  stock  price  indices 
differential; (edt   edt*), the external debt differential; opt, the oil price index; (rt   rt*), the 
long term real interest rate differential
53. 
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51 Fundamental models are estimated on a monthly frequency and not on a daily frequency because there is too 
much noise in the data at a daily frequency.  See appendix F. 
52 URP  stands  for  uncovered  equity  return  parity  (Cappiello  and  De  Santis  (2005)).  Appendix  K  provides 
elements to undertand the concept of URP. 
53 See appendix E for a detailed description of the series.   160
 
With spt, the (log of the) stock price index (respectively the Eurostoxx for the euro 
zone and the S&P500 for the United States);  t p s , the (log of the) fundamental stock price 
index;  maτ,t 1,  the  moving  average  of  the  (log  of  the)  stock  price  index  in  the  period  τ; 




t 1 1 − − − , the spread between the long term (10 years) interest rate and the short term (3 
months) interest rate; εt
c → N(0, σε
c) and  εt
f → N(0, σε
f) ; α11 and α21 are constant parameters.  
 




t p s  = β0 + β1spreadt + β2profitat + β3at + β4opt + εt     (5) 
 
With  t p s , the (log of the) real stock price index; spreadt, the spread between the long 
term (10 years) real interest rate and the short term (3 months) real interest rate; profitat, the 
(log  of  the)  expected  profits  on  the  respective  stock  indices;  at,  the  productivity  of  the 
economy; opt, the influence of oil prices on stock prices
55. 
 
As the fundamental value of the price of an asset is seen as a long term concept, we 
rely on an error correction model (ECM) to estimate the fundamental value of stock prices.  
 
3.2 Output of the models 
 
Models are estimated for the euro/dollar exchange rate, the Eurostoxx and the S&P500 
between January 1990 and December 2009 on a daily frequency. The estimation procedure is 
based on the Maximum Likelihood (ML) algorithm and on the Expectation Maximization 
(EM) algorithm (Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977), Hamilton (1990))
56.  
For sake of  robustness, we test various specifications of our models.  We consider 
models with and without the interest rate differential (nintd) and also models with ARCH 
                                                           
54 The fundamental model is estimated on a monthly frequency and not on a daily frequency because there is too 
much noise in the data at a daily frequency. See appendix H. 
55 See appendix G for a detailed description of the series. 
56 Models are run in GAUSS. A description of the EM algorithm is available in appendix I.   161
components in the variance of the residuals
57. Tables 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 show the output of the 
estimations for each model. 
 
Table 1.1: Output for the euro/dollar exchange rate 
Models  MLFTP 
ARCH 
MLFTP 
ARCHnintd  MLFTP  MLFTP 











































[0,45]  X  0,26x10
 3 
[2,91]  X  0,10x10
 3 























































[1,86]  X   0,34x10
 3 
[ 1,31]  X  0,17x10
 3 








































































































NB: FTP stands for fixed transition probabilities; nintd stands for no interest rate differential in the model. 
Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets; critical values for the test of Student amount to 1,96 at a 5 % 
confidence level and to 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level. Autocorrelation tests and heteroskedasticity tests follow 
a χ(1); linearity test follows a χ(4). The critical values for a χ(1) amount to 2,70 and 3,84 respectively at a 10 % 
and 5 % confidence level. The critical values for a χ(4) amount to 7,77 and 9,48 respectively at a 10 % and 5 % 
confidence level; p values are mentioned in brackets. 
 
Table 1.1 shows that fundamentalist rules have a positive and significant coefficient 
(this is not the case for the MLFTP model though). For the chartist rule, the coefficient is 
positive and significant (but not for the MLFTP and the MLFTPARCHnintd models). The 
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interest rate differential is only significant for the MLFTP model for the fundamentalist rule; 
and  for  the  MLFTPARCH  and  EMFTP  models  in  the  chartist  rule.  Surprisingly,  ARCH 
components  (coefficients  β12  and  β22)  appear  not  significant  although  we  expect 
heteroskedasticity in the variance of residuals at such a high (daily) frequency. 
  Diagnostic tests show the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals. Besides, despite 
the ARCH correction, heteroskedasticity is still significant in the residuals. Also, linearity 
tests reject the hypothesis of the use of a non linear Markov structure of order one for almost 
all models. 
 
Table 1.2: Output for the European stock market 
Models  MLFTP 
ARCH 
MLFTP 
ARCHnintd  MLFTP  MLFTP 












































[2,74]  X  0,05x10
 4 
[0,06]  X  1,27x10
 3 























































[0,03]  X  1,66x10
 3 
[3,27]  X  0,06x10
 4 









































































































NB: FTP stands for fixed transition probabilities; nintd stands for no interest rate differential in the model. 
Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets; critical values for the test of Student amount to 1,96 at a 5 % 
confidence level and to 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level. Autocorrelation tests and heteroskedasticity tests follow 
a χ(1); linearity test follows a χ(4). The critical values for a χ(1) amount to 2,70 and 3,84 respectively at a 10 % 
and 5 % confidence level. The critical values for a χ(4) amount to 7,77 and 9,48 respectively at a 10 % and 5 % 
confidence level; p values are mentioned in brackets.   163
For the European stock market, fundamentalist rules have a positive and significant 
coefficient. This coefficient is however not significant in the EMFTP model. The coefficients 
associated to the chartist rules appear unsignificant. The spread between the long run and the 
short run interest rates is only significant for the MLFTP model. Moreover, the coefficients 
associated  to  ARCH  components  (coefficients  β12  and  β22)  are  significant  only  for  the 
MLFTPARCH model. 
Diagnostic tests show the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the 
residuals for the majority of models despite the ARCH correction. Linearity tests reject the 
hypothesis of the use of a non linear Markov structure of order one for almost all models. 
 
Table 1.3: Output for the US stock market 
Models  MLFTP 
ARCH 
MLFTP 
ARCHnintd  MLFTP  MLFTP 












































[0,13]  X  1,20x10
 3 
[0,30]  X   0,95x10
 3 























































[0,43]  X   4,73x10
 3 
[ 0,71]  X   0,16x10
 3 
[ 1,65]  X 
β21 
6,74x10





































































































NB: See NB of table 1.2. 
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Table 1.3 shows that the coefficients associated to the fundamentalist rule are positive 
and significant (unsignificant for the EMFTPnintd model though). The coefficients associated 
to the chartist rule appear unsignificant for every model; as are the coefficients related to the 
spread between the long run and the short run interest rates. Once again, ARCH components 
(coefficients β12 and β22) appear not significant. 
Diagnostic tests show the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals. Besides, despite 
the ARCH correction, heteroskedasticity is significant in the residuals. Linearity tests reject 
the hypothesis of the use of a non linear Markov structure of order one for every model. 
 
 
Globally,  fundamentalist  rules  appear  significant  in  the  majority  of  the  models. 
Therefore,  when  the  price  of  the  asset  wanders  away  from  its  fundamental  value,  agents 
expect  a  return  of  the  price  of  the  asset  towards  its  fundamental  value.  Conversely,  the 
coefficients associated to the chartist rules appear in majority unsignificant. This result is 
difficult  to  justify  given  the  fact  that  we  consider  a  daily  frequency  and  for  such  a  high 
frequency,  momentum  effects  are  highly  important  in  the  dynamics  of  asset  prices. 
Coefficients associated to the interest rate differential and to the spread between the long run 
and the short run interest rates appear in majority unsignificant. This result is again difficult to 
justify because both variables play an important role in the determination of respectively, the 
exchange  rate  and  stock  prices.  Besides,  for  every model,  diagnostic  tests  show  a  strong 
presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Also, linearity tests reject the hypothesis 
of the use of a non linear Markov structure of order one for every model. This result is often 
observed  in  studies  using  a  Markov  switching  structure  of  order  one  (Vigfusson  (1997), 
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Table 2: Conditional probabilities, unconditional probabilities and regime duration 
Models  MLFTP 
ARCH 
MLFTP 
ARCHnintd  MLFTP  MLFTP 





 3  17,80x10
 3  498,70x10
 3  502,20x10
 3  0,82x10
 3  0,08x10
 3 
σc  5,10x10
 3  6,90x10
 3  497,70x10
 3  498,70x10
 3  0,25x10
 3  0,02x10
 3 
p  0,89  0,91  0,86  0,90  0,98  0,98 
q  0,84  0,86  0,91  0,85  0,96  0,96 
πf  0,59  0,61  0,39  0,60  0,66  0,66 
πc  0,41  0,39  0,61  0,40  0,34  0,34 
df  9  11  7  10  50  50 




 3  16,9x10
 3  501,70x10
 3  504,70x10
 3  0,36x10
 3  0,36x10
 3 
σc  7,00x10
 3  6,90x10
 3  504,70x10
 3  501,70x10
 3  0,05x10
 3  0,05x10
 3 
p  0,91  0,91  0,86  0,91  0,98  0,98 
q  0,86  0,86  0,91  0,86  0,96  0,96 
πf  0,61  0,61  0,39  0,61  0,66  0,66 
πc  0,39  0,39  0,61  0,39  0,34  0,34 
df  11  11  7  11  50  50 




 3  17,80x10
 3  501,70 x10
 3  501,70 x10
 3  0,32x10
 3  0,32x10
 3 
σc  6,80x10
 3  6,90x10
 3  504,50 x10
 3  504,50x10
 3  0,04x10
 3  0,04x10
 3 
p  0,90  0,91  0,87  0,87  0,98  0,98 
q  0,88  0,86  0,90  0,90  0,97  0,97 
πf  0,55  0,61  0,43  0,43  0,60  0,60 
πc  0,45  0,39  0,57  0,57  0,40  0,40 
df  10  11  8  8  50  50 
dc  8  7  10  10  34  34 
NB: Conditional probabilities p = P(St=f/St 1=c), q = P(St=c/St 1=f); Unconditional probabilities: πf = (1  q)/(2 p 
q), πc = (1  p)/(2 p q); Regime expected duration (in days): df = 1/(1 p), dc = 1/(1 q). 
 
 
Table  2  shows  that  for  a  majority  of  models,  state  variances  are  higher  in  the 
fundamentalist regime than in the chartist regime. Thus fundamentalists dominate the market 
in periods of high asset price volatility while chartists dominate in periods of low asset price 
volatility. This result is often found in the literature (Murray et al. (1996), Vigfusson (1997) 
and Bessec and Robineau (2003)). 
For a majority of models, conditional probabilities show that when agents are chartist 
in the past, there is a high probability that they will be fundamentalist in the future (p > q). As 
a matter of facts, results based on the EM algorithm show that the probabilities to be in the 
fundamentalist state amount to 0,66 or 0,60 while the probabilities to be in the chartist state 
amount to 0,34 or 0,40 (πf  > πc). 
Also, in the majority of cases, the duration of the fundamentalist regime lasts almost 
twice as much as the duration of the chartist regime (df > dc). Therefore, markets alternate 
between a long lasting regime characterised by high volatility   the fundamentalist regime   
and a short lasting regime characterised by low volatility   the chartist regime. 
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We have estimated here our heterogeneous agents models based on two algorithms: 
the  ML  algorithm  and  the  EM  algorithm.  However,  our  estimations  show  that  the  EM 
algorithm provides more stable and more robust results than the ML algorithm. Particularly, 
with the ML algorithm, the final estimated parameters are highly dependent on the choice of 
the initial parameters contrary to the EM algorithm. As a result, we choose to carry on the 




3.3 Graphical analysis 
 
The  following  graphs  represent  the  smoothed  probabilities  of  being  in  the 
fundamentalist regime. These probabilities are estimated from the EMFTP model. The blue 
margins (P(St=f/IT)>0,5) indicate that the market is in majority fundamentalist while the white 


















                                                           
58 Other reasons lead us to carry on the analysis with the results based on the EM algorithm. First, the time of 
convergence of the algorithm is lower with the EM algorithm than with the ML algorithm. Secondly, a lot of 
studies  rely  on  the  EM  algorithm  to  estimate  the  models  considered  here  (Vigfusson  (1996),  Bessec  and 
Robineau (2003) among others).   167



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NB:  The  black  line  represents  the  current  asset  prices  (right  scale);  the  grey  line  represents  the  estimated 
fundamental  asset  prices  (right  scale);  smoothed  probabilities  are  in  grey  (left  scale).  The  blue  margins 
(P(St=f/IT)>0,5)  indicate  that  the  market  is  in  majority  fundamentalist.  The  white  margins  (P(St=f/IT)<0,5) 
indicate that the market is in majority chartist. 
 
For every market, smoothed probabilities confirm the dynamics exposed earlier in the 
theoretical model of Frankel and Froot (1986) and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007). When 
chartists dominate the market, the exchange rate wanders away from its fundamental value.   168
When  the  spread  between  the  actual  exchange  rate  and  the  fundamental  exchange  rate 
increases and reaches a given level, fundamentalists become dominant in the market. The 
increase in the weight of fundamentalists leads the exchange rate towards its fundamental 
value.  For  the  euro/dollar  exchange  rate,  trend  reversals  appear  for  example  between 
December 2000 and April 2001 and also between August 2008 and June 2009.  
Besides for every market, fundamentalists dominate the market in times of financial 
instability. Conversely, chartists dominate in periods of financial stability. For example in the 
foreign  exchange  market,  fundamentalists  dominate  during  the  EMS  (European  Monetary 
System) crisis in September 1992 1993, during the burst of the internet bubble in January 
2001  and  at  the  start  of  the  subprime  crisis  in  August  2008.  Concerning  stock  markets 
fundamentalists dominate during the stock crashes of September 1990  and October 1997, 
during the burst of the internet bubble in January 2001 and during the subprime crisis starting 
from August 2008. 
Further, the homogeneity of behaviours across markets increases all over the period. 
For  example,  at  the  beginning  of  the  period,  shocks  affecting  only  the  foreign  exchange 
market (the EMS crisis in 1992 1993) or only the stock market (the stock crash of 1990) did 
not generate homogeneous behaviours in the three markets, contrary to shocks at the end of 
the period (the internet bubble and the subprime crisis). We justify this observation by the 
increasing financial integration between the three markets over the considered period. This 
increasing homogeneity in market behaviours increases the instability of financial markets in 
periods of financial turmoil. 
 
We go further into the analysis. We try to understand whether this continuous degree 
of integration between the foreign exchange market and stock markets can be observed by 
homogeneity effects at the level of agents’ behaviours in the foreign exchange market and in 
stock markets. 
Table 3 shows the results of Granger causality tests on heterogeneous behaviours in 
the euro/dollar market, the European stock market and the US stock market between January 
1990  and  December  2009.  We  assume  that  behaviours’  heterogeneity  can  be  proxied  by 
smoothed probabilities computed from the EMFTP model. 
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Table 3: Granger causality tests between behaviours (smoothed probabilities) on the 
euro/dollar exchange rate, the Eurostoxx and the S&P500 
Null Hypothesis  Behaviours 
























NB: Ganger tests were carried out in EViews 6; 2 lags (two days) are considered in the second column; 21 lags 
(1 month) are considered in the third column; p values are mentioned in brackets. 
 
Table 3 shows a significant bi causality between behaviours in the European and the 
US stock markets. The causality is weaker between stock markets and the foreign exchange 
market. We notice however a significant unilateral causality from behaviours on the European 
stock market towards behaviours on the euro/dollar market. The causality is not significant 
between behaviours on the US stock market and behaviours on the euro/dollar market. 
Therefore the contagion of agents’ behaviours is significant and strong within markets 
that trade the same asset (here between the European and US stock markets) but weaker or 
even not significant between two markets that trade different assets (here between either the 
European or the US stock markets, and the foreign exchange market). 
Besides,  agents’  behaviours  in  the  three  markets  are  similar.  Thus,  heterogeneous 
behaviours are homogeneous across markets
59. Given the fact that heterogeneous behaviours 
are homogeneous across financial markets and also that the causality of agents’ behaviours is 
strongly significant between markets that trade the same asset but weaker between markets 
that trade different assets, one may wonder which factor drives the simultaneity in market 




                                                           
59 Our empirical results do not validate the theoretical results of Picillo (2009). Piccillo finds that there could be 
chartist domination in one market and fundamentalist domination in a second market. The existence of a bubble 
triggered by chartists in the first market may create a bubble in the second market (similar to the bubble created 
by chartists in the first market) although agents in the second market are in majority fundamentalists. Here the 
models show on the one hand that behaviours tend to be similar across markets; and on the other hand, that the 
causality between behaviours on the foreign exchange market and behaviours on stock markets is weak or even   170
4. Which variable(s) trigger(s) heterogeneous behaviours in financial markets? 
 
   4.1 Motivation of the analysis 
 
This section aims at analysing which variable(s) drive(s) the intervention of chartists 
and fundamentalists in stock markets and in the foreign exchange market? The theoretical 
literature  about  heterogeneous  agents  considers  that  two  types  of  shocks  can  trigger  a 
particular behaviour in the foreign exchange market. The first types of shocks are exogenous 
shocks such as the intervention of public authorities or unexpected shocks in macroeconomic 
fundamentals (Frankel and Froot (1986)). The second types of shocks are endogenous shocks; 
caused for example by the variation of the spread between the actual value of the exchange 
rate and its fundamental value. Endogenous shocks can also be illustrated by a variation in the 
degree of risk aversion in the market (De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007)). 
The method used to unveil the variables that determine agents’ behaviours in financial 
markets are based on time varying transition probabilitities (TVTP) Markov switching models 
and on smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) models. 
 
4.1.1 Markov switching models with time varying transition probabilities  
 
TVTP Markov Switching models were pioneered by the work of Diebold et al. (1994), 
Engel  and  Hakkio  (1994)  and  Filardo  (1994).  Contrary  to  FTP  models,  TVTP  Markov 
switching models assume that the transitions between state equations depend on an observable 
state variable z. Thus the transition probabilities are allowed to vary over time depending on 
the value of the observable variable z. Assuming a TVTP Markov switching model with two 
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not significant. Thus when chartists dominate in the foreign exchange market, there is a high probability that 
chartists also dominate in stock markets and vice versa.   171
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    (7) 
 
Notice that we do not consider macroeconomic fundamentals anymore (i.e. interest 
rate differentials and spreads between the long run and the short run interest rates) in the 
TVTP  Markov  switching  models.  Indeed,  we  fear  macroeconomic  factors  would  bias  the 
choice  of  the  threshold  variable  (notably,  when  we  test  whether  interest  rates     a 
macroeconomic fundamental   is a significant determinant of heterogeneous behaviours). 
 







                                                           
60 Models are run in GAUSS.   172
4.1.2 Smooth threshold autoregressive models 
 
In order to determine if agents’ behaviour depends on the dynamics of a particular 
variable, we rely also on STAR models (Smooth Transition Autoregressive models). In STAR 
models  the  state  transitions  depend  on  an  observable  variable  often  called  the  threshold 
variable. The advantage of STAR models with regards to TVTP Markov switching models is 
that STAR models allow estimating a threshold value λ for the threshold variable. 
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Thus,  if  the  threshold  variable  zt 1  is  higher  than  the  critical  value  λ,  then  the 
endogenous variable  st is determined in majority by the fundamentalist rule. Conversely, if 
the  threshold  variable  zt 1  is  lower  or  equal  to  the  critical  value  λ,  then  the  endogenous 
variable  st is determined in majority by the chartist rule. 
STAR models assume that the transition between the states is smooth. This smooth 
transition is allowed by introducing a  continuous transition function  ) , ; z ( F t λ γ 1 −  bounded 
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61 Once again, we do not consider macroeconomic fundamentals in behavioural rules of the STAR model for the 
same reasons as the ones mentioned for the TVTP Markov switching model.   173
Where λ is the threshold parameter; γ measures the transition speed between regimes. 
Two types of transition functions will be considered in this analysis: the logistic function 
which defines the logistic STAR (LSTAR) model (equation (11)); and the exponential function 
that defines the exponential STAR (ESTAR) model (equation (12))
62: 
 








1 1 1 ) z ( exp ) , ; z ( F t t λ γ λ γ − − − = − −                             (12) 
 
The  STAR  model  is  estimated  according  to  the  Maximum  Likelihood  estimation 
technique performed through the standard Newton Raphson algorithm
63. 
 
4.2 Estimation of the models and discussion of the results 
 
Both the TVTP Markov switching models and the STAR models are estimated on the 
euro/dollar  exchange  rate,  the  Eurostoxx  and  the  S&P500  between  January  1990  and 
December 2009 on a daily frequency. 
We  consider  two  types  of  indicators  as  determinants  of  agents’  heterogeneous 
behaviours. We first consider macroeconomic indicators: the absolute weekly variation in the 
short run (3 months) interest rate for stock markets and the foreign exchange market, the daily 
absolute variation in the dividend yield for stock markets, the quarterly absolute variation in 
the  current  account/GDP  (Frankel  and  Froot  (1986))  for  the  foreign  exchange  market. 
Secondly,  we  consider  market  sentiment  indicators:  the  risk  aversion  (in  level)  as 
approximated by the implied volatility computed on at the money option prices
64 (De Grauwe 
and Grimaldi (2007)) and the monthly variation in consumer and entrepreneurs confidence 
indices  for  both  the  stock  markets  and  the  foreign exchange  market.  The  choice  of  such 
fundamentals  is  justified  by  the  fact  that  such  variables  are  considered  in  the  theoretical 
                                                           
62 We rely on the logistic and the exponential functions because such functions are often used in the literature 
that aims at modelling exchange rate dynamics (see for example, Kilian and Taylor (2003), Reitz and Westerhoff 
(2003)). 
63 Models are run in SAS. 
64 Implied volatility on option prices is often used by practitioners to assess the degree of risk aversion in the 
market. For example, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) has created in 1993 the implied volatility on 
the S&P500 options; also known as the VIX. The VIX is considered by practitioners as the fear index (or fear 
gauge) of investors in the US stock market. For more details about implied volatility and risk aversion, see 
appendix L.   174
models of heterogeneous agents (Frankel and Froot (1986), De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007)) 
and/or in the recent study by Menkhoff et al. (2009). 
 
Estimation results concerning macroeconomic fundamentals and confidence indices 
used as determinant variables of heterogeneous behaviours appear unrobust
65. These results 
are in line with Menkhoff et al. (2009). We therefore conclude that there is no evidence of a 
robust relationship between macroeconomic fundamentals and the heterogeneity of agents’ 
behaviours. On the contrary, results concerning risk aversion used as a determinant variable of 
heterogeneous behaviours appear more robust. We thus focus on these latest results. Table 4 
shows  the  output  of  the  TVTP  Markov  switching  models  and  STAR  models,  with  risk 




















                                                           
65 Results  based  on  macroeconomic  fundamentals  are  highly  unstable  and  thus  not  robust  either  for  TVTP 
Markov switching models or for STAR models. Such results are rather surprising because at first sight graphical 
analyses  show  that  the  probability  to  be  in  the  fundamentalist  regime  coincides  with  large  movements  in 
macroeconomic  fundamentals.  However  no  significant  influence  by  macroeconomic  fundamentals  in  the   175
Table 4: Output for risk aversion as an explanatory variable of  
heterogeneous behaviours in financial markets 
TVTP Markov switching models 
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Exponential STAR models 















































Logistic STAR models 














































NB: Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets; p values are mentioned in brackets. For the Eurostoxx, 
and the euro/dollar exchange rate, the test for risk aversion is run from January 1999 to December 2009 due to 
data availability. 
 
  Table  4  shows  that  the  coefficients  associated  to  the  transition  variable  z  are 
significant for the TVTP Markov switching models. Also, the threshold value λ is significant 
for the STAR models. Therefore, both the TVTP Markov switching models and the STAR 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
determination of agents’ behaviours is found based on either TVTP Markov switching models or STAR models. 
Results are available upon author request.   176
models show that risk aversion is a significant determinant of agents’ behaviours in financial 
markets. 
  Concerning diagnostic tests, we observe that the hypothesis of a non linear model is 
rejected for  every specification. We also notice that  LSTAR models provide more robust 
results than ESTAR models. Indeed, ESTAR models often provide excessive values for the 
Student statistics. 
Besides, the output of STAR models is more easily interpretable from an economic 
perspective than the one of TVTP Markov switching models. 
As mentioned previously, STAR models show that the threshold value λ is highly 
significant for all markets. There is thus a non linear structure in the dynamics of asset prices 
that can be modelled with the degree of risk aversion as a threshold variable. Results tell us 
that if risk aversion increases in the market above a given threshold, fundamentalists dominate 
the market. Conversely, when risk aversion decreases under a given threshold, the market 
becomes  chartist.  We  end  up  with  the  same  results  as  the  one  mentioned  in  section  3.3: 
fundamentalists  dominate  in  times  of  crisis  (when  risk  aversion  increases)  while  chartists 
dominate in times of boom (when risk aversion decreases). From a behavioural perspective, 
these results mean that agents are more rational in times of crisis (since they rely more on 
fundamentals to forecast asset prices) than in times of boom (where agents rely more on 
chartist analysis and ignore fundamentals). 
One of the main advantages of STAR models compared to TVTP Markov switching 
models is to provide an objective estimation of the threshold value. We thus carry on the 
analysis  by  considering  the  threshold  values  estimated  from  STAR  models  since  these 
threshold values act as a reference point to determine which type of behaviours prevail in the 
market. 
 
  Figures 2.1 to 2.3 show the dynamics of  asset  prices, the probability to be in the 
fundamentalist regime estimated from the Markov switching model (section 3) and the degree 
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Figure 2.1: Implied volatility on S&P500 options (S&P500 VIX) and smoothed 


































































































































































































NB: The black line represents the S&P500 (right scale); the grey line represents the estimated fundamental value 
of the S&P500 (right scale); the grey line represents the implied volatility of at the money option prices on the 
S&P500 (left scale); the blue margins represent the smoothed probabilities to be in the fundamentalist regime 
(no scale). 
 
  In line with the results from STAR models, figure 2.1 shows a strong relationship 
between the implied volatility on the S&P500 and the intervention of fundamentalists in the 
market.  Indeed,  each  time  the  implied  volatility  becomes  higher  than  25,  fundamentalists 
dominate the market. Conversely, below 25, chartists dominate the market. 
The  same  observation  holds  for  the  Eurostoxx  and  the  euro/dollar  exchange  rate 
(figures 2.2 and 2.3). When implied volatility is higher (lower) than 0,35, fundamentalists 
(chartists) dominate in the European stock market. When implied volatility is higher (lower) 
than 0,12 in the euro/dollar foreign exchange market, fundamentalists (chartists) dominate in 
the euro/dollar foreign exchange market. 
It is worth to notice that the threshold values highlighted graphically (in figures 2.1, 
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Figure 2.2: Implied volatility on the 
Eurostoxx options and smoothed 
probabilities of being fundamentalist in the 














































































































Figure 2.3: Implied volatility on the 
Euro/Dollar options and smoothed 





























































































NB: The black line represents the observed values of asset prices (right scale); the grey line represents the 
estimated fundamental value of the respective assets (right scale); the grey line represents the implied volatility 
of at the money option prices on the respective assets (left scale); the blue margins represent the smoothed 
probabilities to be in the fundamentalist regime (no scale). 
 
As  a  result,  the  theoretical  intuition  of  De  Grauwe  and  Grimaldi  (2007)  based  on 
prospect  theory
66 seems  to  be  validated.  De  Grauwe  and  Grimaldi  endogenise  the  trend 
reversal based on a stylised fact observed in agents’ behaviours: the more agents realise losses, 
the more they are willing to take risks. This stylised fact has been highlighted by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) in the prospect theory. De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007) state that when 
exchange rates move away from their fundamental value, fundamentalists realise losses. Such 
losses lower the risk aversion of fundamentalists and lead them to use their rule more often. 
The increase in the use of fundamentalist rules makes in turn the use of fundamentalist rules 
more profitable. The induced increase in the proportion of fundamentalists in the market then 
triggers the return of the exchange rate towards its fundamental value. 
However, our tests do not strictly verify the statements of De Grauwe and Grimaldi 
(2007) since we do not distinguish between fundamentalist risk aversion and chartist risk 






                                                           
66 See appendix B.   179
5. Assessing the forecasting power of a behavioural forecasting rule 
 
The analysis of heterogeneous behaviours in the foreign exchange market and in stock 
markets has highlighted a stylised fact. When risk aversion increases and is high in the market, 
fundamentalists  dominate.  Conversely,  when  risk  aversion  decreases  and  becomes  low, 
chartists dominate the market. This section aims at building a forecasting rule based on this 
stylised fact. Due to the relatively high degree of parameter instability within the Markov 
switching and STAR frameworks, we decided not to rely on these models to compute our 
forecasts. Rather we will use more stable models. We describe our forecasting strategy below. 
 
For each market, we consider three models: a fundamentalist rule, a chartist rule and a 
definition of the fundamental value of the asset. 
 
First of all, we estimate in sample the fundamental value of the asset from January 
1990 to December 2002. The fundamental models ((13a) and (13b)) are estimated by OLS. 
We then forecast the fundamental value out of sample between January 2003 and December 
2009. We use recursive forecasts
67. 
 
k t p s +  = β0 + β1spreadt + β2profitat + β3at + β4opt + εt+k                                      (13a) 
   










                                                           
67Recursive forecasts aim at estimating the model in sample for a given period of time and forecasting the 
endogenous variable out of sample. We then estimate the model by adding one observation to the previous in 
sample period (the initial date of the in sample period remains the same). We iterate this procedure until the end 
of the sample period.    180
Our  forecasting  rule  is  based  on  the  analysis  of  heterogeneous  behaviours  in  the 
markets. We observe risk aversion at time t (as proxied by the implied volatility on option 
prices). If risk aversion α is higher than the critical value λ, then forecasts are based on the 
fundamentalist rule
68. Conversely, if risk aversion α at time t is lower than the critical value λ, 
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t t k t k t p p q s + − = + +               (13c) 
 
 
  Based on our previous analysis, we assume λ = 25 for the S&P500, λ = 0,35 for the 
Eurostoxx  and  λ  =  0,12  for  the  euro/dollar  exchange  rate.  Behavioural  rules  (13c)  are 
estimated in sample from January 1990 to December 2002 on a daily frequency. We rely on a 
GARCH model estimated by  Maximum  Likelihood. We then  forecast  our models out of 
sample from January 2003 to December 2009. Again we use recursive forecasts. 
 
We compare the forecasts from our behavioural forecasting rule to the ones from a 
random walk without drift: 
 
         
RW
t k t t k s s ε + + = +              Where  t k ε + → iidN(0, σε
2)                   (13d) 
 
Tables 5.1 to 5.3 show the forecast errors of the random walk and the behavioural 




                                                           
68 Note  that  we  include  the  forecasted  fundamental  series  ( k t s + )  from  equations  (13a)  and  (13b)  in  the 
fundamental rules of each respective market. 
69 Forecasts series are computed in Eviews and MATLAB.   181
Table 5.1: Out of sample forecasts of the behavioural forecasting rule for the 
euro/dollar exchange rate 
Horizon 
(in days)  RMSE  RMSE 
RW  U Theil  MAE  MAE 
RW  U Theil  %DirCh  %DirCh 
RW  U Theil 
1  0,01  0,01  0,99 
(0,00) 
0,01  0,01  0,99 
(0,23) 
48,28  50,57  0,95 
(0,68) 
5  0,02  0,02  1,00 
(0,00)  0,00  0,01  0,02 
(0,12) 
44,83  45,98  0,97 
(0,82) 
10  0,02  0,02  0,99 
(0,00) 
0,00  0,02  0,11 
(0,95) 
54,02  54,02  1,00 
(1,00) 
21  0,04  0,04  0,99 
(0,00) 
0,00  0,03  0,04 
(0,57) 
51,72  52,87  0,97 
(0,77) 
63  0,07  0,07  0,97 
(0,00) 
0,00  0,05  0,09 
(0,19) 
51,76  52,94  0,97 
(0,77) 
126  0,10  0,10  0,96 
(0,00) 
0,01  0,08  0,11 
(0,01) 
52,44  52,44  1,00 
(1,00) 
252  0,13  0,13  0,94 
(0,00) 
0,02  0,12  0,13 
(0,00) 
50,00  50,00  1,00 
(1,00) 
504  0,12  0,15  0,79 
(0,00) 
0,05  0,11  0,40 
(0,02) 
50,00  51,56  0,96 
(1,00) 
756  0,11  0,17  0,68 
(0,00) 
0,09  0,15  0,58 
(0,04) 
48,08  51,92  0,92 
(0,48) 
1260  0,19  0,27  0,70 
(0,00) 
0,14  0,24  0,59 
(0,33) 
53,57  50,00  1,07 
(0,51) 
NB: RMSE (RMSE RW) stands for Root Mean Square Errors of the behavioural forecasting rule (respectively the 
random  walk);  MAE  (MAE  RW)  stands  for  Mean  Absolute  Errors  of  the  behavioural  forecasting  rule 
(respectively the random walk); %DirCh (%DirCh RW) stands for the average percentage of right direction in 
the forecasts of future prices of the behavioural forecasting rule (respectively the random  walk); U Theil = 
Statinvestmentrule/StatRW;  p values  associated  to  the  Diebold Mariano  (1995)  statistics  are  mentioned  in 
brackets. 
 
Table 5.2: Out of sample forecasts of the behavioural forecasting rule for the Eurostoxx 
Horizon 
(in days)  RMSE  RMSE 
RW  U Theil  MAE  MAE 
RW  U Theil  %DirCh  %DirCh 
RW  U Theil 
1  3,05  3,04  1,00 
(0,00) 
2,23  2,23  0,99 
(0,93) 
56,32  54,02  1,04 
(0,67) 
5  6,99  7,01  0,99 
(0,00) 
0,17  5,39  0,03 
(0,00) 
49,43  50,57  0,97 
(0,81) 
10  9,59  9,76  0,98 
(0,00)  0,46  7,35  0,06 
(0,00)  45,98  44,83  1,02 
(0,82) 
21  15,56  15,44  1,00 
(0,00)  1,87  11,57  0,16 
(0,00) 
60,92  60,92  1,00 
(1,00) 
63  29,86  29,38  1,01 
(0,01)  5,35  22,79  0,23 
(0,00) 
60,00  60,00  1,00 
(1,00) 
126  49,37  47,70  1,03 
(0,02)  10,76  37,31  0,28 
(0,00)  60,98  59,76  1,02 
(0,79) 
252  86,03  79,63  1,08 
(0,01)  26,86  66,77  0,40 
(0,00) 
61,33  59,21  1,17 
(0,04) 
504  134,44  121,76  1,10 
(0,01)  49,79  109,12  0,45 
(0,00) 
56,25  57,81  0,97 
(0,77) 
756  138,90  132,16  1,05 
(0,00)  44,61  124,83  0,35 
(0,00)  55,77  57,69  0,96 
(0,76) 
1260  119,37  105,60  1,13 
(0,00)  68,06  76,13  0,89 
(0,00) 
50,00  46,43  1,07 
(0,60) 
NB: See NB of Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.3: Out of sample forecasts of the behavioural forecasting rule for the S&P500 
Horizon 
(in days)  RMSE  RMSE 
RW  U Theil  MAE  MAE 
RW  U Theil  %DirCh  %DirCh 
RW  U Theil 
1  12,23  12,24  0,99 
(0,00)  7,74  7,76  0,99 
(0,97)  58,62  50,57  1,15 
(0,17) 
5  23,10  23,02  1,00 
(0,00)  1,96  17,07  0,11 
(0,00) 
51,72  50,57  1,02 
(0,65) 
10  30,14  30,45  0,98 
(0,00) 
0,02  22,50  0,00 
(0,00) 
54,02  51,72  1,04 
(0,65) 
21  50,07  48,90  1,02 
(0,00)  9,18  35,52  0,25 
(0,00)  51,72  50,57  1,02 
(0,81) 
63  102,65  96,63  1,06 
(0,02)  28,03  71,06  0,39 
(0,00) 
50,59  49,41  1,02 
(0,81) 
126  175,22  157,51  1,11 
(0,03)  61,51  114,20  0,53 
(0,00) 
48,78  50,00  0,97 
(0,81) 
252  299,29  240,46  1,24 
(0,02)  153,61  188,30  0,81 
(0,00)  52,00  51,32  1,01 
(0,89) 
504  490,13  325,58  1,50 
(0,01)  322,65  279,99  1,15 
(0,00)  53,13  51,56  1,03 
(0,79) 
756  565,40  328,78  1,71 
(0,00)  428,23  310,78  1,37 
(0,00)  55,77  53,85  1,03 
(0,78) 
1260  938,27  331,10  2,83 
(0,00)  836,27  289,76  2,88 
(0,00)  46,43  50,00  0,92 
(0,73) 
NB: See NB of Table 5.1. 
 
  In tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, the bold cells are the ones where forecast errors are lower for 
the behavioural forecasting rule than for the random walk.  
For the euro/dollar market, the behavioural forecasting rule (BFR) provides better out 
of sample asset value forecasts (RMSE and MAE) than the random walk for each horizon. 
However the random walk beats the BFR concerning direction forecasts (%DirCh). 
For the Eurostoxx, the BFR provides better asset value forecasts especially in the short 
run  (from  1  day  to  10  days).  Results  are  mixed  concerning  direction  forecasts:  the 
performances of direction forecasts alternate between the random walk and the BFR across 
horizons. 
For the S&P500, the BFR provides better asset value forecasts than the random walk 
for almost all horizons and especially in the short run. The BFR also beats the random walk in 
the majority of cases concerning direction forecasts. 
Therefore, analysing and drawing lessons from agents’ behaviours in financial markets 
has  allowed  us  to  derive  a  rule  that  provides  better  asset  price  forecasts  than  the  simple 
random walk. Indeed the behavioural forecasting rule improves forecasts not solely for the 
direction  of  the  dynamics  of  asset  prices  but  also  for  future  values  of  asset  prices.  This 
observation stands in the long run as well as in the short run. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we analyse heterogeneous agents’ behaviours and their determinants in 
the  foreign  exchange  market  and  in  stock  markets.  Results  show  that  behaviours’ 
heterogeneity significantly explains asset price dynamics in the foreign exchange market and 
in stock markets. We show that heterogeneous behaviours are homogenous across markets. 
The  homogeneity  of  behaviours  between  the  foreign  exchange  market  and  stock  markets 
becomes more acute through the process of financial integration. However, the contagion of 
behaviours  remains  significant  and  strong  within  markets  that  trade  the  same  asset  (here 
between the European and US stock markets) but weaker or even not significant between two 
markets that trade different assets (here between either the European or the US stock markets, 
and the foreign exchange market). We then analyse which variables determine heterogeneous 
behaviours. We find that risk aversion (as proxied by the implied volatility on option prices) 
is more likely to explain heterogeneous behaviours in financial markets than macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Thus our empirical results support the theoretical model of De Grauwe and 
Grimaldi (2007) rather than the model of Frankel and Froot (1986). We show that when risk 
aversion is higher than a critical value, fundamentalists dominate the market. Conversely, 
when risk aversion is lower than this critical value, the market is globally chartist. Based on 
this stylised fact we build a behavioural forecasting rule. This rule provides better out of 
sample forecasts of future asset prices than the random walk. This observation stands in the 
long run as well as in the short run. Further, this observation proves that taking account of 
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A. Heterogeneous expectations in the foreign exchange market: empirical proofs 
 
  By analysing the behaviour of agents in the foreign exchange market, Frankel and 
Froot (1987, 1990a, 1990b) show that two main techniques are used by agents in the foreign 
exchange market to explain and forecast the dynamics of exchange rates. In the short run, 
agents use chartist techniques while in the long run agents rely on fundamentalist analyses. 
Chartists  build  their  forecasting  rule  by  interpolating  past  dynamics  of  exchange  rates. 
Fundamentalists rely on macroeconomic fundamentals to predict the future path of exchange 
rates.  The  observation  of  Frankel  and  Froot  comes  as  a  stylised  fact  since  later  surveys 
undertaken in every foreign exchange places around the world confirm the observation of 
Frankel and Froot (see table A).  
 
Table A: Survey results about agents’ heterogeneity in the foreign exchange market 
Surveys  Markets  Techniques to Forecast Exchange Rates 
Frankel and Froot 
 (1987, 1990a, 1990b)  United States    Chartist Analysis (1 month ≤ H  ≤ 4 months) 
  Fundamental Analysis (4 months ≤ H  ≤ 12 months) 
Allen and Taylor 
(1990,1992)  London 
  Technical analysis (H  ≤ 1 week) for 90 % of respondents 
(chartist analysis ≥ fundamentals for 60 % of agents) 
  Fundamental analysis (H ≥ 1 year) for 30 % of respondents 
(fundamental analysis > chartist analysis for 85 % of agents) 
Lui and Mole (1998)  Hong Kong    Technical analysis (H  ≤ 3 months) 
  Fundamental analysis (H ≥ 6 months) 




  Technical analysis (H  ≤ 3 months) 
  Fundamental analysis (H ≥ 6 months) 
Cheung and Chinn (2001)  United States 
  Technical analysis (H  ≤ 6 months) 
  Fundamental analysis (H ≥ 6 months) 
  30 % of respondents are systematically chartists 
  25 % of respondents are systematically fundamentalists 
 





  Technical analysis (H  ≤ 6 months) 
  Fundamental analysis (H ≥ 6 months) 
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B. The theoretical explanation of the over appreciation of the US dollar in the 1980s by 
Frankel and Froot (1986)  
 
Frankel and Froot (1986) use their model to explain the appreciation of the US dollar 
in the mid 1980s. Figure B.1 shows that the dollar wanders away from its fundamental value 
from January 1984 until January 1988. To explain the over appreciation of the dollar, Frankel 
and Froot cut the period January 1980 December 1987 into three stages.  
Between January 1980 and December 1982, the dollar appreciation is explained by 
increases  in  the  real  interest  rate  differential  in  favour  of  the  United  States  (figure  B.2). 
Between, January 1983 and June 1985, the dollar keeps appreciating although the real interest 
rate differential increases in favour of Europe (figure B.2). 
Between January 1983 and June 1985, Frankel and Froot relate the appreciation of the 
dollar to an “endogenous takeoff of a speculative bubble”. Indeed, from January 1983 to June 
1985, the appreciation of the dollar is not explained by fundamentals. Thus agents who used 
fundamentalist rules to forecast the future path of the dollar experience losses. Frankel and 
Froot add that “fundamentalists have misforecast for so long that they have lost credibility”. 
Hence because the losses induced by the use of fundamentalist rules, market agents have an 
incentive to switch to chartist rules. As the proportion of chartists increases in the market, the 
bubble inflates further more and the exchange rate wanders away from its fundamental value 
(figure B.1). 
 
Figure B.1: Euro/dollar exchange rate and 





































































Figure B.2: Euro/dollar exchange rate, US 

























































































NB: In figures B.1 and B.2, the black line represents the euro/dollar exchange rate; in figure B.1, the grey line 
represents the fundamental exchange rate as defined by the BEER model (see appendices E and F); in figure B.2, 
the light grey line and the dark grey line represent respectively the short term and the long term real interest rate 
differential between the Euro zone and the Unites States. 
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From  July  1985  until  December  1987,  the  dollar  returns  progressively  towards  its 
fundamental value. Frankel and Froot attribute the trend reversal in the dollar to the “ever 
worsening current account deficit” in the United States (figures B.3 and B.4). During the 
convergence  of  the  dollar  towards  its  fundamental  value,  the  profitability  of  the 
fundamentalist rule increases leading to a rise in the proportion of fundamentalists in the 
market. The dollar reaches its fundamental value in December 1987 and the bubble disappears. 
 
Figure B.3: Euro/dollar exchange rate, US 





























































































Figure B.4: Euro/dollar exchange rate, US 






























































































NB: In figures B.3 and B.4, the black line represents the euro/dollar exchange rate; in figure B.3, the light grey 
and the dark grey lines represent the current account balances respectively in Europe and in the United States; in 
figure B.4, the light grey and the dark grey lines represent the external debt over GDP respectively in Europe and 
in the United States. 
 
Frankel  and  Froot  did  not  test  their  heterogeneous  agents  model  empirically. 
Vigfusson (1997) did it by testing the model of Frankel and Froot (1986) on the Canadian 
dollar/US  dollar  exchange  rate  from  January  1983  to  December  1992  on  a  daily  data 
frequency (see appendix D for a detailed description of the model of Vigfusson). Vigfusson 
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C. Description of the theoretical model of De Gauwe and Grimaldi (2007) 
 
The model of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007) relies on two agents: chartists and 
fundamentalists.  
   
Chartists interpolate past trends of exchange rates to forecast the future dynamics of 
currency prices: 
 
    Ec,t( st+1) = β st                 0 < β < 1                    (C.1) 
   
Thus, when the exchange rate has appreciated (depreciated) in the past, chartists will 
expect  a  further  appreciation  (depreciation)  of  the  currency.  Chartists’  behaviour  thus 
accentuates  the  dynamics  of  exchange  rates.  The  parameter  β  represents  the  degree  of 
interpolation. The higher β, the higher the influence of past dynamics of exchange rates on the 
behaviour of chartist agents. 
 
  Fundamentalists  forecast  future  exchange  rates  based  on  the  spread  between  the 
current exchange rate st and the fundamental exchange rate st*: 
 
      Ef,t( st+1) =  ψ(st   st*)            ψ > 0                     (C.2) 
 
  Thus,  when  the  current  exchange  rate  wanders  away  from  its  fundamental  value, 
fundamentalists expect a return of the exchange rate towards the fundamental exchange rate. 
For  example  if  the  exchange  rate  is  over appreciated  (under appreciated)  relative  to  its 
fundamental  value,  fundamentalists  expect  the  currency  to  depreciate  (appreciate).  The 
parameter ψ represents the speed at which the exchange rate returns towards its fundamental 
value. The higher ψ the stronger the return force of exchange rates towards their fundamental 
value. 
 
  De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007) assume that the fundamental exchange rate follows a 
random walk: 
          st* = st 1* + εt                                 (C.3) 
 
  Where εt is a white noise process          194
  The weight that market agents attribute to a given rule depends on the profitability of a 
particular rule
70. The more profitable a given rule, the higher the weight agents attach to this 
rule. Chartist and fundamentalist weights are defined as: 
 
















=    and  
















=    (C.4) 
 
  Where ωf,t + ωc,t = 1 and 0 < γ < 1 
 
The parameter γ represents the intensity at which agents revise their forecasting rules. 
When γ → ∞, agents choose the rule which proves to be the most profitable. Conversely, 
when γ → 0, agents keep the rule they are using and are insensitive to the profitability of the 
rules. Thus γ can be viewed as representing the status quo bias in agents’ behaviour. The 
status quo bias highlighted by Kahneman and Knetsch (1991) means that when agents use a 
given rule, they find it difficult to change for a different rule. 
 
  The profitability π'i,t of each rule is evaluated according to the profit π i,t and the risk 
σ²i,t related to this rule: 
 
    π'i,t = π i,t    σ²i,t             i = c, f                  (C.5) 
 
  The parameter   represents the coefficient of risk aversion. The risk associated to a 
forecasting rule is defined as the variance of the forecasting error: 
 
        σ²i,t = [E
i
t 1(st)   st]²        i = c, f                  (C.6) 
 




                                                           
70 In Frankel and Froot (1986), market agents compute the weight attributed to a given rule based on the past 
degree of forecasting accuracy of the rules.   195
The profit πi,t related to a forecasting strategy is defined as the one period earnings of 
investing one unit of domestic currency in the foreign asset: 
 
  πi,t = [st(1 + r*)   st 1(1 + r)]sgn[E
i
t 1(st)(1 + r*)   st 1(1 + r)]   i = c, f                   (C.7) 
 
 









0     x   if   1     sgn[x] 
0     x   if   0   sgn[x] 
0     x   if   1   sgn[x] 
 
 
  Thus when agents forecast an appreciation of the foreign currency (an increase in st) 
they will invest in the foreign country. If this appreciation is realised then the profit is equal to 
the appreciation of the foreign currency, corrected by the interest rate differential. Conversely, 
if a depreciation is realised (a decrease in the exchange rate st), then agents will face a loss 
which equals the depreciation of the foreign currency, adjusted by the interest rate differential. 
 
  The expected exchange rate at time t+1 is obtained by aggregating agents’ forecasts in 
the market: 
 
Et( st+1) = ωf,tEf,t( st+1) + ωc,tEc,t( st+1)                                          
 
↔  Et( st+1) =   ωf,tψ(st   st*) + ωc,tβ st 
 
↔   st+1 =   ωf,tψ(st   st*) + ωc,tβ st + εt+1                       (C.8) 
 
  Figures C.1 and C.2 show the stochastic simulations of the above model (equations 
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NB: In figure C.1, the black line represents the exchange rate estimated by heterogeneous agents; the grey line 
represents the fundamental exchange rate; the blue margins represent the probabilities to be in the fundamentalist 
regime; the white margins represent the probabilities to be in the chartist regime. In figure C.2, the black line and 
the  grey  line  represent  respectively  the  cumulated  returns  of  the  fundamentalist  and  the  chartist  rules. 
Simulations were realised with the following parameters: ψ =  0,2; β = 0,9; γ  = 5;   = 5; r = r* =0. 
 
  When the chartist rule becomes more profitable than the fundamentalist rule (π'c,t > 
π'f,t), the chartist weight ωc,t increases while the fundamentalist weight decreases (ωf,t = 1  
ωc,t). The bubble inflates: the exchange rate st wanders away from its fundamental value st*. 
At a given period of time, a shock will reverse the trend in the exchange rate. The exchange 
rate starts to return towards its fundamental level. The fundamentalist rule becomes more 
profitable  than  the  chartist  rule  (π'c,t  <  π'f,t).  The  chartist  weight  ωc,t  decreases  while  the 
fundamentalist weight increases. As the proportion of fundamentalists increases in the market 
the exchange rate st returns progressively towards its fundamental value st*. 
  Therefore, the interaction between chartists and fundamentalists explain the swings of 
the exchange rate relative to its fundamental value across time. They explain why exchange 
rates wander away and then return towards their fundamental value. Thus, such models allow   197
explaining the formation of bubbles in the foreign exchange market i.e. the disconnections of 
exchange rates from their fundamental value. 
 
One of the limits of the above model is that the trend reversals in the exchange rate 
remain exogenous. To overcome this limit and to endogenise the trend reversals in exchange 
rates, two main factors have been put forward by the literature: the dynamics of fundamentals 
(Frankel and Froot (1986), De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007)) and the degree of risk aversion 
(De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007)). 
 
De Grauwe and Grimaldi endogenise the trend reversal of the exchange rate towards 
its fundamental value by using a stylised fact observed in agents’ behaviour: the more agents 
realise losses, the more they are willing to take risks. This stylised fact has been highlighted 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in the prospect theory. Prospect theory is formalised as 
follows: 
 
 i,t =   / [1 + Φ’│π*i,t│]      i = c, f        (C.9) 
 










t i π ρ ρ π      i = c, f          
 
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007) show that when exchange rates move away from 
their fundamental value, fundamentalists realise losses (π*f,t < 0 in (C.9)). Such losses lower 
the risk aversion of fundamentalists ( f,t in (C.9)) and lead them to use their rule more often. 
The increase in the use of the fundamentalist rule in turn triggers the return of the exchange 
rate towards its fundamental value. The use of fundamentalist rules becomes more profitable 
and hence leads to an increase in the proportion of fundamentalists in the market. Although 
the explanation of De Grauwe and Grimaldi rests on a stylised fact, testing their proposition 
remains a difficult task. Indeed, we need a measure of risk aversion for fundamentalists and 
chartists  respectively.  Besides,  as  risk  aversion  tends  to  propagate  between  agents  in  the 
markets (Boschi and Goenka  (2007)), doubts arise on the mechanism  put forward by  De 
Grauwe  and  Grimaldi  (2007).  Hence  when  risk  aversion  increases  for  fundamentalists  it 
should also increase for chartists. 
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  A more relevant factor has been proposed by Frankel and Froot (1986) and later by De 
Grauwe  and  Grimaldi  (2007).  The  trend  reversal  is  here  triggered  by  macroeconomic 
fundamentals  and  especially  the  stock  of  external  debt  (Zt)  through  current  account 
imbalances. The fundamental exchange rate is related to the difference between the stock of 
external debt in the domestic country and in the foreign country (Zt   Zt*) by an elasticity 
coefficient ε: 
(Zt   Zt*) =  ε (st   st 1*)          (C.10)                    
 
When  the  exchange  rate  depreciates  and  is  undervalued  (st  <  st 1*),  the  economy 
becomes more competitive: exports increase and imports decrease leading to an excess in the 
current  account  balance.  In  other  words,  there  is  an  excess  of  foreign  assets  supply  or 
equivalently  an  excess  of  the  demand  for  domestic  assets  (Zt  >  Zt*).  This  excess  in  the 
demand for domestic assets leads to an appreciation of the domestic currency. The exchange 
rate  returns  towards  its  fundamental  value.  The  introduction  of  such  a  mechanism  in  the 
model increases the return force of the exchange rate towards its fundamental value (Frankel 
and Froot (1986), De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007)). The higher ε the stronger the return force 
induced by macroeconomic fundamentals on the exchange rate. 
 
D. Description of the empirical model of Vigfusson (1997) 
 
Vigfusson  (1997)  tested  the  model  of  Frankel  and  Froot  (1986)  on  the  Canadian 
dollar/US dollar exchange rate from January 1983 to December 1992 on a daily frequency. 
Vigfusson (1997) estimated a Markov switching model with two states; a fundamentalist state 
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With st, the (log of the) exchange rate;  t s , the (log of the) fundamental exchange rate; 
maτ,t 1, the moving average of the (log of the) exchange rate in the period τ; (it 1 – it 1*), the 
one month interest rate differential between Canada and the United States; εt
c → N(0, σ
c) and  
εt
f → N(0, σ
f) ; c and f are constants. 
   199
Vigfusson (1997) relied on two estimates for the fundamental exchange:  
 
  a measure of purchasing power parity:  t s  = pt   pt* 
  an error correction model based on the terms of trade taken from Amano and Van 
Norden (1995): 
 
 qt = ν[qt 1 – γ0 – γ1TOTCOMODt 1 + TOTENRGY t 1 ]+ λ1RDIFF t 1 + εt 
 
With qt , the (log of the) Canada US real exchange rate ; TOTCOMODt, the price of 
exported  non energy  commodities  divided  by  the  price  of  imported  manufactured  goods; 
TOTENERGYt, the price of exported energy commodities divided by the price of imported 
manufactured goods ; RDIFFt, the interest rate differential between the Canada and the United 
States (RDIFFt = (it
st     it 
lt)   (it
st*    it 
lt*)). 
 
We estimate the model of Vigfusson for the synthetic euro/dollar exchange rate in 
daily frequency for a period that spans January 1978 to December 1996. The fundamental 
exchange rate is estimated based on a BEER model (see appendices E and F). Table D.1 
summarises the results of the estimation with the EM algorithm. 
 
Table D.1: Results associated to the original model of Vigfusson applied to the 
euro/dollar exchange rate over the period January 1978   December 1996 
States  Coefficients  State Variances 
Fundamentalist 
(St = f) 














(St = c) 













NB: Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets; critical values for the test of Student amount to 1,96 at a 
5 % confidence level and to 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level. 
 
The fundamentalist rule tells us that if the dollar is overvalued ( ) ( 1 1 − − − t t s s > 0), then 
fundamentalists expect a depreciation of the dollar. The chartist rule shows that if the dollar 
has appreciated in the recent past ( ) ( 1 , 200 1 , 14 − − − t t ma ma < 0), then chartists expect a further 
appreciation of the dollar. The long run interest rate differentials appear unsignificant whether 
in the fundamentalist regime or in the chartist regime. We find that the state probabilities are 
higher in the fundamentalist regime than in the chartist one. Thus fundamentalists dominate   200
the market in periods of high exchange rate volatility while chartists dominate in periods of 
low exchange rate volatility. 
 
Table D.2: Conditional probabilities, unconditional probabilities and regime duration 




Fundamentalist  p = 0,76  πf = 0,47  df = 4,16 days 
Chartist  q = 0,79  πc = 0,54  dc = 4,76 days 
NB: p = P(St=f/St 1=c); q = P(St=c/St 1=f); πf = (1  q)/(2 p q); πc = (1  p)/(2 p q); df = 1/(1 p); dc = 1/(1 q). 
 
Conditional probabilities show that when agents are fundamentalist in the past, there is 
a  higher  probability  that  they  will  be  chartist  in the  future  (p  <  q).  Over  the  period,  the 
probability to be in the fundamentalist state amounts to 0,47 while the probability to be in the 
chartist state amounts to 0,54 (πf  < πc). Besides, the duration of the fundamentalist regime is 
slightly shorter than the duration of the chartist regime (df > dc). 
 
Table D.3: Diagnostic tests for the original Vigfusson’s model 
Diagnostic Tests  Statistics 
Maximum Likelihood lnL  23202,69 
Autocorrelation Tests 
(H0: No Autocorrelation) 
Regime 1   5,01 
(0,03) 
Regime 2   1,44 
(0,23) 




Regime 1   2,65 
(0,10) 
Regime 2   33,36 
(0,00) 
Both Regimes   4,90 
(0,03) 
Linearity Test  
(H0: Linear Model) 
50,61 
(0,00) 
NB: Autocorrelation tests and heteroscedasticity tests follow a χ(1); linearity test follows a χ(4). The critical 
values for a χ(1) amount to 2,70 and 3,84 respectively at a 10 % and 5 % confidence level. The critical values for 
a χ(4) amount to 7,77 and 9,48 respectively at a 10 % and 5 % confidence level; p values are mentioned in 
brackets. 
 
Diagnostic  tests  show  no  autocorrelation  in  both  regimes.  However,  ARCH  tests 
validate the presence of heteroskedasticity in the variance of residuals. Besides, we reject the 
hypothesis  of  the  use  of  a  non linear  Markov  structure  of  order  one.  This  result  is  often 
observed  in  studies  using  a  Markov  switching  structure  of  order  one  (Vigfusson  (1997), 
Bessec and Robineau (2003)). Those studies suggest considering more than two states. In the 
case of the heterogeneous agents model, we could consider a transition state between the 
fundamentalist and the chartist regimes.   201
Figure D.1 represents the smoothed probabilities of being in the fundamentalist regime 
between January 1978 and December 1996. We observe that when the probability of being 
fundamentalist  is  close  to  one,  the  exchange  rate  returns  towards  its  fundamental  value. 
Conversely, when the probability of being fundamentalist is close to zero, the exchange rate 
wanders away from its fundamental value. 
 
Figure D.1: Euro/dollar dynamics and smoothed probabilities of being in the 













































































































































































NB: The black line represents the exchange rate (right scale); the grey line represents the Hodrick Prescott (HP) 
filtered fundamental exchange rate estimated with a BEER model (right scale); the grey line represents the 
smoothed  probabilities  (left  scale),  the  black  line  and  the  orange  lines  represent  the  HP  filtered  smoothed 
probabilities with respectively λ = 1500 and  λ = 100000. 
 
E. Description of the variables used in the BEER, UIP and UIP URP models 
 
E.1 Endogenous variable: the real exchange rate 
 
qt = log(Qt) = log( St Pt/Pt*)                           
 
With St, the euro/dollar exchange rate (1 euro for S dollars) ; Pt*, the consumer price 
index in the United States ; Pt, the consumer price index in the Euro zone. 
 
 
   202
E.2 Exogenous variables 
 
  The long term interest rate differential: 
 
(rt   rt*) = (it   πt)   (it*  π t*)                                
 
With πt = [CPIt   CPI t 12/ CPI t 12]x100 and πt* = [CPI t*   CPI t 12*/ CPI t 12*]x100 ; it 
and it*, respectively the nominal interest rates on 10 years bond for the Euro zone and the 
United  States ;  πt  and  π  t*,  the  inflation  rates  in  the  Euro  zone  and  in  the  United  States 
computed as the growth rate of the consumer price index in the Euro zone (CPIt) and in the 
United States (CPIt*). 
 
    The oil price index: 
 
      opt = log(OPt/CPIt*) 
 
With OPt, the price of the North Sea brent (the brent is listed in US dollars); CPIt*, the 
consumer price index in the United States. 
 
  The productivity differential: 
 
(at   at*)  = log(GDPt/Lt )   log(GDPt*/Lt*)          
 
With GDPt and GDPt*, the gross domestic product in the Euro zone and in the United 
States; Lt and Lt*, the number of employed people in the Euro zone and in the United States.
   
  The net international investment position differential: 
 
(niipt   niipt*) = NIIPt/GDP    NIIPt*/GDPt*           
 
With NIIPt and NIIPt* respectively, the net international investment position of the 
Euro zone and the United States; GDPt and GDPt*, the gross domestic product in the Euro 
zone and in the United States. The series (niipt   niipt*) have been filtered with a Hodrick 
Prescott filter (λ = 14400). This filter is often used in the literature to smooth series available   203
at lower frequencies. Indeed, the BEER model is estimated on a monthly frequency while data 
are only available annually. Besides, the use of such a variable without filtering leads to an 
incorrect sign in equation (3b) in the core text. 
 
  The stock price index differential: 
 
(spt   spt*) = log(SPt/CPIt)   log(SPt*/CPIt*)         
 
With SPt and SPt* respectively, the stock price indices in the Eurozone (the Eurostoxx) 
and in the United States (the S&P500); CPIt and CPIt*, the consumer price indices in the 
Eurozone and in the United States. 
 
F. Procedure for the estimation of the fundamental exchange rate with a BEER model, a 
UIP model and a UIP URP model 
 
The  estimation  procedure  of  the  models  follows  three  steps.  The  first  step  checks 
whether all series have  the same order of integration. Table F.1 shows that all series are 
integrated of order one.  
 
Table F.1: Integration order of the series used in the exchange rate models 
Variables  ADF  PP  KPSS 
qt  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
(rt   rt*)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
(at   at*)  I(1)  I(2)  I(1) 
(niipt   niipt*)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
(spt   spt*)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
opt  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
 
  In a second step, we look for the number of cointegrated vectors by applying Trace 
tests and Maximum Eigenvalue tests. Results available in table F.2 (column 4) validate the 
presence of at most one cointegrated vector between the exchange rate and its fundamentals. 
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Table F.2: Number of cointegrated vectors at a 5 % confidence level  
for the exchange rate models 
BEER model 
Data Trend  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 










Trace  0  1  1  0  0 
Max Eigenvalue  0  1  1  0  1 
UIP URP model 
Data Trend  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 










Trace  1  1  1  1  1 
Max Eigenvalue  1  1  1  1  1 
NB: Critical values are based on the tables of MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999). 
 
In a third step, we estimate the long run relationships by ordinary least squares (OLS). 
The long run relationships are defined as follows: 
 
  UIP model:           t q  = β0 + β1(rt   rt*) + εt     
 
  BEER model:       t q  = β0 + β1(rt   rt*) + β2(at   at*) + β3(niipt    niipt*) +  εt 
 
  UIP URP model:  t q  = β0 + β1(rt   rt*) + β2(spt  spt*) + β3opt  + εt 
 
With  t q , the (log of the) real euro/dollar exchange rate (s dollars for 1 euro); (rt   rt*), 
the long term interest rate differential; (at   at*), the productivity differential; (niipt   niipt*), 
the differential of the ratio of the net international investment positions over GDP; (spt   spt*), 
the stock price indices differential; opt, the oil price index; εt, an error term. 
 
We then test for the stationarity of residuals in the long run relationships. Table F.3 to 
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Table F.3: Critical values for Augmented Dickey Fuller cointegration test  
(UIP model (3a) in the core text) 
Tables  Confidence Level  1 %  5 %  10 %  T Stat 
(3a) 
Engle and Yoo (1987)  T = 380, N = 1    4,00    3,37    3,02   3,87 
Phillips and Oulliaris 
(1990) 
without constant, without trend    3,39    2,76    2,45   3,87 
with constant, without trend    3,96    3,37    3,07   3,87 
with constant, with trend    4,36    3,80    3,52   3,94 
McKinnon (1991) 
with constant, without trend   3,93   3,35   3,06   3,87 
with constant, with trend    4,37    3,81    3,51   3,94 
 
Table F.4: Critical values for Augmented Dickey Fuller cointegration test  
(BEER model (3b) in the core text) 
Tables  Confidence Level  1 %  5 %  10 %  T Stat 
(3b) 
Engle and Yoo (1987)  T = 392, N = 3    4,34    3,78    3,51   3,60 
Phillips and Oulliaris 
(1990) 
without constant, without trend    4,30    3,74    3,44   4,60 
with constant, without trend    4,73    4,11    3,83   4,40 
with constant, with trend    5,04    4,49    4,20   4,40 
McKinnon (1991) 
with constant, without trend    4,69    4,13    3,83   4,60 
with constant, with trend    5,03    4,47    4,18   4,40 
 
Table F.5: Critical values for Augmented Dickey Fuller cointegration test  
(UIP URP model (3c) in the core text) 
Tables  Confidence Level  1 %  5 %  10 %  T Stat 
(3c) 
Engle and Yoo (1987)  T = 335, N = 3    4,34    3,78    3,51   4,76 
Phillips and Oulliaris 
(1990) 
without constant, without trend    4,30    3,74    3,44   4,76 
with constant, without trend    4,73    4,11    3,83   4,76 
with constant, with trend    5,04    4,49    4,20   4,52 
McKinnon (1991) 
with constant, without trend    4,70    4,13    3,84   4,76 
with constant, with trend    5,04    4,47    4,18   4,52 
 
We therefore estimate the error correction models, which are defined as: 
 
  UIP model:          ∆qt = b1∆(rt   rt*)+ λ[ 1 − t q    β0    β1(rt 1   rt 1*)] + εt 
 
  BEER model:      ∆qt = b1∆(rt   rt*) + b2∆(at   at*) + b3∆(niipt   niipt*)  
                                       
     + λ[ 1 − t q   β0    β1(rt 1   rt 1*)   β2(at 1   at 1*)   β3(niipt 1    niipt 1*)] + εt 
 
  UIP URP model: ∆qt = b1∆(rt   rt*) + b2∆(spt   spt*) + b3∆opt   
 
     + λ[ 1 − t q   β0    β1(rt 1   rt 1*)   β2(spt 1  spt 1*)   β3opt 1] + εt 
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The  estimation  of  the  error  correction  models  is  based  on  monthly  data  for  the 
euro/dollar exchange rate. The period runs from January 1975 to December 2009. We follow 
the  traditional  estimation  method  of  Engle  and  Granger  (1987).  We  take  account  of  the 
eventual presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals by applying the 
HAC correction of Newey West (1987). Results are available in table F.6. 
 
Table F.6: Estimation output for the error correction models 
Model  λ  β0  β1  β2  β3  R2adj  R2adj 
LT 












UIP   0,025 



















NB: Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets; p values are mentioned in brackets; critical values for 
the test of Student amount to 1,96 at a 5 % confidence level and to 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level; 5 lags are 
considered for ARCH and LM tests. 
 
Concerning  diagnostic  tests,  LM  tests  show  the  presence  of  autocorrelation  in  the 
residuals. ARCH tests show no heteroskedasticity in the variance of residuals. The Jarque and 
Bera test confirms the normality of the residuals. RESET tests accept the specification of the 
models. 
Adjusted  R2  are  relatively  low  in  the  error  correction  models.  This  result  is  not 
surprising  since  it  is  difficult  to  explain  the  variation  of  the  exchange  rate  with 
macroeconomic fundamentals. Adjusted R2 are more satisfying in the long run relationships. 
As a matter of facts, the BEER model explains more than 60 % of the variance of the (log of 
the) euro/dollar exchange rate. 
The coefficients associated to the long run relationship are negative and significant. 
Thus, the exchange rate can wander away from its fundamental value in the short run, but will 
converge towards its fundamental value in the long run.  
  The coefficients of the long run relationship are correctly signed: an increase in the 
interest rate differential leads to an appreciation of the euro as well as an increase in the 
productivity differential. Also, an excess in the net international investment position leads to 
an appreciation of the euro. 
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  To compute the fundamental value of the nominal exchange rate, we  consider the 
estimated  real  exchange  rate  t q from  the  long  run  relationship.  We  then  convert  it into  a 
nominal exchange rate based on the following relationship: 
 
t s =  t q   pt + pt* 
 
We choose to smooth slightly  t s  with a Hodrick Prescott (HP) filter (with λ = 14000) 
in  order  to  isolate  the  permanent  component  of  the  exchange  rate;  i.e.  the  fundamental 
exchange rate. 
 
Table F.7: Estimation characteristics of the fundamental models  
for the euro/dollar exchange rate 
Model  Frequency  Data Transformation  Hodrick Prescott filter 
UIP  Monthly 
CPIs filtered from monthly to daily 
frequency (Quadratic Match 
Average) 
λ = 14000 in monthly frequency and 
then filtered in daily frequency 
(Quadratic Match Average) 
BEER  Monthly 
NIIPs filtered from annually to 
monthly frequency (Quadratic 
Match Average) 
λ = 14000 in monthly frequency and 
then filtered in daily frequency 
(Quadratic Match Average) 
UIP URP  Monthly 
CPIs filtered from monthly to daily 
frequency (Quadratic Match 
Average) 
λ = 14000 in monthly frequency and 
then filtered in daily frequency 
(Quadratic Match Average) 
 
Concerning the BEER model, since macroeconomic data about external debt are not 
available  in  2009,  in  order  to  have  a  fundamental  exchange  rate  in  2009,  we  extend  the 
Hodrick Prescott  (HP)  filtered  fundamental  exchange  rate  by  relying  on  the  last  monthly 
growth rate of the HP filtered fundamental exchange rate. We check whether the direction of 
the fundamental exchange rate in 2009 match the one obtained with UIP (indeed, data on long 
term interest rates are available until December 2009). Besides, as we test the heterogeneous 
agents model in daily frequency, we convert the monthly series  t s  in a daily series with a 
Quadratic Match Average filter. Figure F.1 represents the actual dynamics of the euro/dollar 
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NB: The BEER exchange rate is in black; the UIP exchange rate is in light grey; the UIP URP exchange rate is 
in dark grey. 
 
  We decide to use a weighted average of the estimated fundamental exchange rates. 
Thus, the definite fundamental exchange rate we use in our heterogeneous agents model ( t s ) 
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NB: The weighted fundamental exchange rate is represented in grey; the actual exchange rate is in black. 
 
  The estimated fundamental exchange rate clearly represents the negative bubble on the 
dollar in the 1980s (highlighted by Frankel and Froot (1986)). Also, the estimated value of the 
fundamental euro/dollar exchange rate is close to the value of 1 euro per 1 dollar i.e. its 
official  rate  at  the  introduction  of  the  quotation  of  the  euro  in  January  1999.  Finally, 
estimations show that the depreciation of the euro at the beginning of the 2000s has been too 
excessive with regards to its fundamental value. This observation was also noticed by the 
literature on the euro/dollar exchange rate dynamics at that period (Meredith (2001)). 
 
G. Description of the variables used in the long term level of stock price indices 
 




r)     With    SPt
r = SPt/CPIt 
 
With SPt, the stock price index of the respective economies; CPIt, the consumer price 
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G.2 Exogenous variables 
 
  The real expected profits on stock prices: 
 
πt 
a,r = log(Πt 
a /CPIt)      
 
With Πt 
a, the expected profits on stock prices computed as the inverse of the price 
earning ratio over the stock price index; CPIt, the consumer price index in the respective 
economic zones. 
 
  The real interest rate spread: 
 
(rt 
lt   rt 
st) = (it
 lt   πt)   (it
 st   π t)                                
 
With  it
  st,  the  short  term  nominal  interest  rate  (3 months  Treasury  bill)  for  the 
respective economic zones; it
 lt, the long term nominal interest rate (10 years Government 
bond) for the respective economic zones; πt, the inflation rates in the respective economic 
zones computed as the growth rate of the consumer price index in the respective economic 
zones (πt = [CPIt   CPI t 12/ CPI t 12]x100). 
 
    The productivity: 
 
at   = log(GDPt/Lt )  
 
With  GDPt,  the  gross  domestic  product  in  the  respective  economic  zones;  Lt,  the 
number of employed people in the respective economic zones. 
 
  The oil price index: 
 
      opt = log(OPt/CPIt*) 
 
With OPt, the price of the North Sea brent (the brent is listed in US dollars); CPIt*, the 
consumer price index in the United States. 
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H. Procedure for the estimation of the fundamental stock price indices 
 
The estimation procedure of the fundamental stock price index follows three steps. 
The first step checks whether all series have the same order of integration. Table H.1 shows 
that all series are integrated of order one.  
 
Table H.1: Integration order of the series in the stock price indices models 
Variables  ADF  PP  KPSS 
spt
r  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
(rt 
lt   rt
st)  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
at  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
opt   I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
 
  In a second step, we look for the number of cointegrated vectors by applying Trace 
tests and Maximum Eigenvalue tests. Results available in table H.2 (column 4) validate the 
presence  of  at  most  one  cointegrated  vector  between  the  stock  price  indices  and  their 
fundamentals. We therefore estimate a univariate error correction model. 
 
Table H.2: Number of cointegrated vectors at a 5 % confidence level  
for the stock price indices models 
Eurostoxx 
Data Trend  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 










Trace  2  1  1  1  1 
Max Eigenvalue  1  2  1  1  2 
S&P500 
Data Trend  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 










Trace  5  3  1  1  0 
Max Eigenvalue  2  2  1  1  1 
NB: Critical values are based on the tables of MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999). 
 
In a third step, we estimate the long run relationships by ordinary least squares (OLS). 
The long run relationship is defined as follows: 
 
r
t p s  = β0 + β1πt 
a,r + β2(rt 
lt   rt 
st) + β3at  + β4opt  + εt    
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With  r
t p s , the (log of the) real stock price index; πt 
a,r, the real expected profits on the 
stock price index; (rt 
lt   rt 
st), the real interest rate spread; at, the productivity; opt, the oil price 
index; εt, an error term. 
 
We then test for stationary residuals in the long run relationships. Table H.3 shows 
that residuals in the long run relationships are stationary. 
 
Table H.3: Critical values for Augmented Dickey Fuller cointegration test 




Engle and Yoo (1987)  T = 330, N = 4    4,70    4,18    3,89   4,47   4,62 
Phillips and Oulliaris 
(1990) 
without constant, without trend    4,67    4,13    3,81   3,89   3,70 
with constant, without trend    5,07    4,45    4,16   4,47   4,62 
with constant, with trend    5,36    4,74    4,46   4,47   4,62 
McKinnon (1991) 
with constant, without trend    5,02    4,46    4,16   4,47   4,62 
with constant, with trend    5,33    4,76    4,47   4,47   4,62 
 
We therefore estimate the error correction models. The error correction model takes 
the following form: 
 
     ∆
r
t sp  = b1∆πt 
a,r + b2∆(rt 
lt   rt 
st)  + b3∆at + b4∆opt 
 
         + λ[ r
t p s 1 −    β0    β1 πt 1 
a,r   β2(rt 1 
lt   rt 1 
st)   β3at 1    β4opt 1] + εt 
 
The  estimation  of  the  error  correction  model  is  based  on  monthly  data  for  the 
Eurostoxx  and  the  S&P500.  The  period  runs  from  January  1975  to  December  2009.  We 
follow the traditional method of Engle and Granger (1987). We take account of the eventual 
presence  of  heteroskedasticity  and  autocorrelation  in  the  residuals  by  applying  the  HAC 
correction of Newey West (1987). Results are available in table H.4. 
 
Table H.4: Estimation output for the error correction models 
Model  λ  β0  β1  β2  β3  β4  R2adj  R2adj 
LT 
ARCH  LM  J&B 
RESET 
Test 
EU   0,035 


















NB: Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets; p values are mentioned in brackets; critical values for 
the test of Student amount to 1,96 at a 5 % confidence level and to 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level; 5 lags are 
considered for ARCH and LM tests. 
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Diagnostic  tests  show  the  presence  of  autocorrelation  (LM  tests)  and 
heteroscedasticity (ARCH tests) in the residuals despite the HAC correction. The Jarque and 
Bera  tests  confirm  the  non normality  of  the  residuals.  The  RESET  tests  accept  the 
specification of the models at a 5 % confidence level. 
Adjusted  R2  are  relatively  low  in  the  error  correction  models.  This  result  is  not 
surprising since it is difficult to explain the variation of stock prices with macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Adjusted R2 are more satisfying in the long run relationships since the models 
explain more than 90 % of the  variance of the (log of the) Eurostoxx and the S&P500. 
The coefficients associated to the long run relationships are negative and significant. 
In other words, stock prices can wander away from their fundamental value in the short run, 
but they will converge towards their fundamental value in the long run. 
  The  coefficients  in  the  long  run  relationships  are  correctly  signed:  an  increase  in 
expected profits leads to an increase in stock prices as well as an increase in productivity. 
Conversely, an increase in oil prices and a downward sloping interest rate curve ((rt 1 
lt   rt 1 
st ) 
< 0; meaning that investors expect a fall in economic activity
71) induce a decrease in stock 
prices. 
 
  We then convert the estimated fundamental real stock price index into a fundamental 
nominal stock price index with the following relationship: 
 
t p s =  r
t p s + pt 
 
We choose to smooth  t p s  with a Hodrick Prescott filter (λ = 7200 for the Eurostoxx 
and λ = 50000 for the S&P500) in order to isolate the permanent component of the stock price 







                                                           
71 Economic theory suggests that the interest rate spread forecasts future short term interest rates. A negative 
interest rate spread forecasts both a recession and lower interest rates, while a sharply rising interest rate spread 
forecasts an economic expansion and higher interest rates.   214
Figure H.1: S&P500 stock price index and 










































































Figure H.2: Eurostoxx stock price index 







































































NB: The actual series are in black; the estimated fundamental indices are in grey. 
 
  For  both  the  S&P500  and  the  Eurostoxx,  the  estimated  fundamental  stock  prices 
represent the overappreciation of the stock market during the internet bubble (January 1998  
December 2000) and the bubble induced by subprime assets (January 2007  December 2007). 
Estimations  also  represent  the  negative  overreaction  of  the  market  at  the  burst  of  the 
respective bubbles. Indeed, US and European stock markets fall beyond their fundamental 
value before reaching their respective fundamental value. 
 
I. Principle of the EM algorithm 
 
The Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster, Laird and Rubin (1977)) is 
an iterative optimization method that allows finding the maximum likelihood of parameters in 
probabilistic  models  where  the  model  depends  on  unobserved  latent  variables.  The  EM 
algorithm alternates between performing an expectation (E) step and a maximization (M) step. 
 
In the E step, the missing parameters are estimated given the observed data and current 
estimates of the model parameters. The E step introduces a hidden variable Z that makes the 
estimation of the likelihood function easier. 
Let X, be a vector of random variables and θ be a vector of parameters. The objective 
is to find the maximum likelihood estimate of θ. In other words, we wish to find θ in a set   
such that F(X, θ) is a maximum. The likelihood function is described as a function of the 
vector of parameters θ given the data X: 
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L(X,θ) = ln F(X, θ) = 
1





= ∑  
 
Since ln(x) is a strictly increasing function, the value of θ that maximises F(X, θ) also 
maximises ln F(X, θ). We define L(X, Z, θ) such that: 
 
L(X, Z, θ) = 
1 1




F X Z f z x f x θ θ θ
= =
= + ∑ ∑  
Hence:            L(X,θ) = L(X, Z, θ)   
1




f z x θ
= ∑  
 
The E step computes an expectation of the log likelihood function with respect to the 
current estimate of the distribution for the latent variables. The E step can be interpreted as 
building  a  local  lower bound  to  the  posterior  distribution.  This  is  achieved  by  using  the 
conditional expectation conditional on the present value of θ (θk): 
 
          E[L(X,θ/ θk)] = E[L(X, Z, θ/ θk)] – E[
1




f z x θ
= ∑ /θk]  
<=>                 L(X, θ, θk) = Q(θ, θk) – H(θ, θk) 
 
In the M step, the bound is optimised thus improving the estimate for the unknown 
parameters. The likelihood function is maximised under the assumption that the missing data 
are known. The M step computes the parameters which maximizes the expected log likelihood 
found in the E step. The next value of the vector of parameters θ, θk+1 is chosen such that: 
 
    L(X,θk+1/θk) ≥ L(X,θk/θk)                                 θ ∀ ∈  
 
In other words, the M step chooses the parameters’ values θk+1
 that maximises the 
quantity L(X, θk+1 /θk) computed in the E step: 
 
    { } 1 1 ( ) argmax ( , / ) k k k M L X
θ θ θ θ + + ∈  =  
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The vector of parameters θ is then used to determine the distribution of the latent 
variables in the next E step. The E and M steps are reiterated until the convergence of the 
algorithm.  The  convergence  is  achieved  for  the  vector  of  parameters  θ  that  provides  the 
maximum value of the likelihood function. Convergence is ensured since the algorithm is 
guaranteed to increase the likelihood at each iteration. 
 
The procedure of the EM algorithm can thus be summarised as follows. The vector of 
parameters θ is initialised: coefficients’ values based on the estimation of the state equations 
considered linearly  allow defining the vector θ0. The two steps of the algorithm are then 
computed. Whenever the algorithm has not converged we reiterate the procedure.  
 
The EM algorithm has the advantage to converge faster towards the optimal values of 
the log likelihood function. However, the major drawback associated to the EM algorithm is 
that it can provide only local maximum likelihood. To counter this drawback we compute the 
EM algorithm based on different initial parameters’ values in order to increase the probability 
to reach the global maximum likelihood. 
 
J. Description of the algorithm used to estimate the heterogeneous agents model 
 
  The  general  definition  of  a  two state  Markov  switching  model  is  given  by  the 
following model: 
 
   
1,0 1 , 1 , 1,
1





k t k t t t
k
t N










+ + =   = 






  The estimation of this model based on the EM algorithm implies several steps.  
 
Step 1: We start by computing the density function conditional on each state St: 
 
f(Yt / St = i , It 1 ; θ) = 
2
2










  with i = 1, 2 
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Step  2:  We  compute  the  joint  density  function  (or  unconditional  density  function) 
equal to the product of the conditional density times the ergodic probability:  
 
4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 1
Density nal Unconditio
1   t t t   )   ; /I   i     S  , f(Y θ   = =  4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 1
Density l Conditiona
1   t t t   ) I    , i      S /   f(Y θ ; = x 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 2 1
bability Pro Ergodic




− − = = =   =
2
1   j 
t t t 1   t t I j S i S P      )   ; /I   i     P(S ) , / , ( 1 1 θ θ      with i = 1, 2 
And  ) ; / ( ) / ( ) , / , ( 1 1 1 1 1 θ θ − − − = − − = = = = = t t t i t t t t I j S xP j S S P I j S i S P with i, j = 1, 2 
 
The probability  ) / ( 1 j S S P t i t = − = is the transition probability found in the vector θ. 
The probability  ) ; / ( 1 1 θ − − = t t I j S P  is the filtered probability obtained in the iteration t 1.  
 
To start the algorithm, the values of  ) / ( 1 j S S P t i t = − = and  ) ; / ( 1 1 θ − − = t t I j S P  are 
required. We initially set  ) / ( 1 j S S P t i t = − = = 0,95. Besides,  ) ; / ( 1 1 θ − − = t t I j S P  = P(S1 = j / 
I1,θ ) for j = 1,2; where P(S1 = j / I1,θ ) are the ergodic probabilities set initially (at t = 0) with 
the transition matrix. We have: 
 
P0(S1 = 1 / I1,θ ) =  
) 1 / 2 ( ) 2 / 1 ( 2
) 1 / 2 ( 1
1 0 1 0
1 0




t t t t
t t




And  P0 (S1 = 2 / I1,θ ) = 
) 1 / 2 ( ) 2 / 1 ( 2
) 2 / 1 ( 1
1 0 1 0
1 0




t t t t
t t






Step  3:  We  compute  the  log likelihood  function  by  summing  the  joint  density 
functions: 





1 ) ; / , ( ln
i
t t t I i S Y f θ  
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Step 4: The filtered probability is computed based on the conditional (Step 1) and 
unconditional (Step 2) density functions: 
 
) ; / (
) ; / , (











t t I Y f
I i S Y f
I i S P               with i = 1, 2 
   
We then iterate the four steps for t = t+1 to T (T = sample size) to get the full log 
likelihood function of the model: 




ln f(Yk / Ik 1 ; θ) 
 
Step 6: E step of the EM algorithm: 
 
The E step computes an expectation of the log likelihood function with respect to the 
current estimate of the distribution for the latent variables. The E step can be interpreted as 
building  a  local  lower bound  to  the  posterior  distribution.  This  is  achieved  by  using  the 
conditional expectation conditional on the present value of θ (θk): 




ln f(Yk / Ik 1 ; θ0)] 
 
Step 7: M step of the EM algorithm: 
 
In the M step, the bound is optimised thus improving the estimate for the unknown 
parameters.  The  M  step  computes  the  parameters  which  maximizes  the  expected  log 
likelihood function found in the E step. The next value of the parameter θ, θk+1 is chosen such 
that: 
    L(Y,θk+1/θk) ≥ L(Y,θk/θk)       
 
The  E  and  M  steps  are  reiterated  until  the  convergence  of  the  algorithm.  The 
convergence is achieved for the vector of parameters θ that provides the maximum value of 
the likelihood function. 
 
{ } 1 1 ( ) argmax ( , / ) k k k M L Y
θ θ θ θ + + ∈  =    219
K. The uncovered equity return parity (URP) 
 
  Although URP was highlighted in Hau and Rey (2006), the seminal paper of Cappiello 
and De Santis (2005) introduces the concept of uncovered equity return parity (URP). URP is 
an arbitrage relationship between the foreign exchange market and stock markets. URP tells 
that the expected exchange rate variation 
a
t s    must be equal to the differential between the 
expected domestic and foreign stock returns ( )
*






t r r s − =    
   
With 
a
t s   , the expected change in the exchange rate;  t r , the expected return in the 
domestic stock market; 
*
t r , the expected return in the foreign stock market 
 
Therefore,  if  stock  returns  in  the  domestic  country  are  higher  than  in  the  foreign 
country, agents will expect a depreciation of the domestic currency. The depreciation of the 
domestic  currency  ensures  that  stock  returns  are  equalised  between  the  domestic  and  the 
foreign economies. URP thus guarantees equilibrium in international financial markets. 
 
  Cappiello and De Santis test URP from January 1991 to December 2003 with monthly 
data. Spot exchange rates include the synthetic euro until December 1998 and thereafter the 
actual euro, the Japanese Yen, the British pound, the Swiss franc, the Canadian dollar, the 
French  franc  and  the  Deutsche  mark,  all  against  the  US  dollar.  Tests  are  based  on  the 
following equation: 
 




t r r s ε β α + − + =    
 
Estimations  based  on  GMM  with  HAC  correction  show  that  URP  is  verified  for 
European  currencies  against  the  US  dollar  but  not  verified  for  the  Japanese  yen  and  the 
Canadian  dollar.  Besides,  for  the  euro/dollar  exchange  rate,  URP  provides  better  out of 
sample forecasts than the naïve random walk model. 
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L. The implied volatility on option prices as an indicator of risk aversion 
 
  A lot of indicators can be used to measure risk aversion (Coudert and Gex (2007)). A 
common indicator used in the literature to proxy risk aversion in the market is the implied 
volatility on option prices. The main advantage of computing the implied volatility on option 
prices is that it reflects market expectations of future volatility and it thus provides a measure 
of fear among investors the market. 
 
  Implied volatility can be computed via the Black Scholes (1973) model. Although 
there  are  a  lot  of  pricing  models  available,  the  Black Scholes  (1973)  model  is  the  most 
commonly used formula to price option contracts. This model assumes that the price of the 
underlying asset follows a geometric Brownian motion (GBM): 
 
dS =  Sdt + σDdw 
 
With     Sdt, the instantaneous expected drift rate 
σDdw, the instantaneous variance rate 
 
  According to Itô’s lemma, the geometric Brownian motion implies that the price of the 
underlying asset will be lognormally distributed and its return will be normally distributed 
with constant mean and constant variance: 
 




ln ST   → Φ[α, β] 
 












− −  
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  Black and Scholes (1973) show that the price of a European call option C can be 
written as: 
C(X, τ) = STN(d1) – exp
 r τXN(d2) 
 
Where N(x) is the cumulative probability density function for a standardised normal 
variable; d1 = [ln(ST/X) + (r + (1/2) σ
2)τ]/ σ(τ)
1/2 ; d2 = [ln(ST/X) + (r   (1/2) σ
2)τ]/ σ(τ)
1/2 = d1 
  σ(τ)
1/2 ; ST, the price of the underlying asset; X, the strike price; r, the risk free interest rate 
during the option’s life; τ, the option’s maturity or time to the expiration of the option (τ =T  t); 
T, the maturity of the option; σ, the volatility of the underlying asset during the life of the 
option (that is, the standard deviation of the return on the underlying asset). 
 
  Therefore, the price of the option is a function of five variables S, X, r, τ and σ. The 
values of all variables are known except the value of the volatility σ. To be able to price an 
option, market participants must therefore estimate the future value of the volatility during the 
life of the option. 
  Estimating σ necessitates assuming that the actual listed price of the call option is the 
correct price of the call option. Under this assumption, the only unknown variable in the 
Black Scholes formula is σ. The value of σ is estimated by rearranging the Black Scholes 
formula such that σ appears in the left hand side. This estimate of σ is called the implied 
volatility.  
 
Implied volatility is useful for investors since it reflects market expectations of future 
volatility. Given the fact that option prices are supposed to reveal the expectations of investors 
about future asset price dynamics, the measure of risk aversion as provided by the implied 
volatility on option prices can be viewed as a subjective measure of risk perception by agents 
in the market rather than an objective measure of risk aversion. However the literature seems 
to confuse the two concepts   risk aversion versus risk perception   and often considers risk 











Conventions in the Foreign Exchange Market:  






The present article provides an unorthodox model of exchange rate dynamics based on 
conventions that prevail among market agents. We build a theoretical model that highlights 
the mechanisms underlying the formation of market conventions. We then test this model 
empirically on the euro/dollar exchange rate between January 1995 and December 2008. We 
rely  on  two  alternative  methods:  a  macroeconomic  analysis  and  an  econometric  analysis 
based on the estimation of a time varying parameters model. Both methods show that market 
switches between fundamentals considered in a bull convention and in a bear convention 
explain  the  euro/dollar  dynamics  between  January  1995  and  December  2008.  Besides,  at 
horizons longer than 1 month, the out of sample forecasting power of the convention model 
beats the ones of the traditional exchange rate model and the random walk. 
 
Keywords: Exchange Rate Dynamics, Convention Theory, Imperfect Knowledge Economics, 






















Ce papier fournit une nouvelle explication de la dynamique des taux de change basée 
sur  les  conventions  prévalant  entre  agents  dans  le  marché.  Nous  construisons  un  modèle 
théorique décrivant le mécanisme associé à la formation des conventions dans le marché. 
Nous  testons  ensuite  ce  modèle  sur  le  taux  de  change  euro/dollar  entre  janvier  1995  et 
décembre 2008. Nous utilisons deux méthodes alternatives: une analyse macroéconomique et 
une approche économétrique basée sur l’estimation d’un modèle à coefficients variables. Les 
deux approches montrent que l’alternance du marché entre les fondamentaux considérés dans 
une convention optimiste et ceux considérés dans une convention pessimiste expliquent la 
dynamique du taux de change euro/dollar entre janvier 1995 et décembre 2008. Par ailleurs, 
pour des horizons supérieurs à 1 mois, le pouvoir prédictif en dehors  de l’échantillon du 
modèle à convention est supérieur à celui des modèles traditionnels de détermination des taux 
de change et au modèle de marche aléatoire. 
 
Mots Clés : Dynamique  des  Taux  de  Change,  Théorie  des  Conventions,  Imperfect 
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1. Introduction 
 
The  present  paper  provides  an  unorthodox  way  to  model  exchange  rate  dynamics 
based on conventions that prevail among market agents. The intuition behind the convention 
model is based on a stylised fact highlighted by De Grauwe (2000). De Grauwe argues that 
agents tend to look for fundamentals that confirm the observed movements in the exchange 
rate.  For  instance,  economists  attributed  the  large  depreciation  of  the  euro  relative  to  the 
dollar between January 1999 and December 2002 to the strong growth performances in the 
United States relative to the euro zone. On the contrary, the appreciation of the euro relative 
to  the  dollar  between  December  2002  and  December  2004  was  justified  by  large  current 
account deficits in the United States compared to the euro zone. Bachetta and van Wincoop 
(2005)  theorised  this  idea  in  the  scapegoat  model.  A  fundamental  variable  is  taken  as  a 
scapegoat to explain exchange rate dynamics in a given period of time. Our approach differs 
strongly  from  Bachetta  and  van  Wincoop  (2005).  Our  convention  model  borrows  more 
elements from the Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE) approach pioneered by Frydman 
and Goldberg (2007). 
We first build a theoretical model to explain the mechanisms underlying the formation 
of market conventions. The simulated exchange rate from the theoretical convention model 
replicates several stylised facts highlighted empirically in exchange rate dynamics. We then 
test this model empirically on the euro/dollar exchange rate. The period of analysis spans 
January 1995 to December 2008. We rely on two alternative methods. The first method is a 
macroeconomic analysis that aims at explaining the euro/dollar movements by relying on the 
consensus of economists. This method is based on the analysis of the fundamentals used by 
the economic and financial literature to justify the euro/dollar dynamics. The second method 
is based on an econometric approach. We estimate a time varying parameters model to find 
the conventions that drive the euro/dollar dynamics. 
Both methods show that market switches between fundamentals considered in a bull 
convention and in a bear convention explain the euro/dollar dynamics between January 1995 
and December 2008. More precisely, the model shows that during the period of analysis, the 
market puts a large accent on the US and European productivity indices and dividend yields in 
times of optimism while a large weight is put on the US and European external debts, oil 
prices and US house prices in times of pessimism. The analysis underlines the existence of a 
non linear  relationship  between  fundamentals  and  the  euro/dollar  exchange  rate.  In  other 
words,  some  fundamentals  may  be  more  important  at  some  periods  of  time  for  the   225
determination of exchange rate dynamics while other fundamentals are important at other 
periods of time. 
Both methods identify three major conventions in the euro/dollar market. The first 
convention is the new economy convention that covers the period January 1995   December 
2000. Investors are relatively more optimistic in the growth prospects of the US economy 
than in European economies. The dollar experiences a strong appreciating trend in this period. 
Between January 2001 and June 2003, the market relies on a bear convention based on the 
huge external debt of the US economy. The dollar starts a strong depreciating trend in this 
period. Then, between July 2003 and December 2005 two competing conventions prevail in 
the market. A bear convention that focuses mainly on the large US current account deficits; 
and a bull convention that points to the spectacular recovery of the US economy from the 
internet  bubble  burst.  During  this  period  the  dollar  alternates  between  short lasting 
appreciating and depreciating trends according to whether the bull convention dominates the 
bear one. After January 2006, fundamentals worsen in the US economy. The bear convention 
starts to dominate the bull one. The spark of the subprime crisis in June 2007 definitely leads 
to the domination of the bear convention in the market. 
The  article  compares  the  predictive  performances  of  the  convention  model  with 
regards to alternative models. Results show that at horizons longer than 1 month, the out of 
sample forecasting power of the convention model beats the ones of traditional models of 
exchange rate and the random walk. 
  The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the main pillars of convention 
theory and proposes a theoretical model that defines the mechanisms underlying the formation 
of market conventions. Sections 3 and 4 find the possible conventions that prevail for the 
euro/dollar exchange rate among market agents between January 1995 and December 2008. 
Section 3 identifies the conventions by relying on a macroeconomic analysis while section 4 
rests on an econometric approach based on the estimation of a time varying parameters model. 
Section  4  tests  the  out of sample  predictive  power  of  the  convention  model  relative  to 
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2. Theoretical concepts 
 
2.1 The main principles of convention theory 
 
  Convention  theory  has  been  developed  by  the  pioneered  work  of  Lewis  (1969), 
Sugden (1989) and Peyton Young (1996). Convention theory comes as an alternative to the 
traditional  theory  of  asset  pricing.  Traditional  models  of  asset  pricing  are  based  on  the 
efficient  market  hypothesis  (EMH)  and  the  rational  expectations  hypothesis  (REH).  Such 
models assume objectivity ex ante of the future and the existence of a unique intrinsic asset 
value (the fundamental value). In the tradition of the Arrow Debreu model, the REH states 
that a representative agent can predict the future value of an asset by associating ex ante 
predetermined probabilities to exogenous future events. A rational agent can hence assess the 
fundamental value of an asset by computing the expected returns of the asset in each state of 
the Nature conditional on the disposable stock of information. According to the EMH, every 
asset price has a unique fundamental value that includes all the relevant information of the 
asset. 
Models  based  on  the  EMH REH  paradigm  offer  poor  empirical  performances 
concerning the explanation and prediction of asset price dynamics, especially exchange rates 
(Meese and Rogoff (1983), Cheung, Chinn and Garcia Pascual (2005)). Such models led to 
unresolved asset pricing puzzles. Besides, assuming the existence of a unique fundamental 
value for an asset appears rather unrealistic. In a previous work, Bouveret and Di Filippo 
(2009) show that for the euro/dollar exchange rate, the market does not rely on a unique 
definition of the fundamental exchange rate but rather on a large panel of fundamental values. 
Each fundamental value belongs to a specific model designed by a particular agent. These 
facts cast doubts on the relevance of models based on traditional asset pricing theory. 
  Convention  theory  adopts  a  rather  opposite  view  to  traditional  theory.  Following 
Knight  (1921)  and  Keynes  (1936),  convention  theorists  claim  that  the  future  is  totally 
uncertain. No agent has the ability to know the probability distribution of future outcomes. 
The  future  is  here  shaped  by  the  heterogeneity  of  opinions  that  agents  frame  on  the 
fundamental value of an asset. There are as many fundamentals as there are opinions about 
the  fundamental  value  of  an  asset.  The  future  becomes  hence  subjective:  each  agent  has 
his/her own opinion about the future value of the asset. All these opinions   translated into 
models of exchange rate determination   lead to the existence of multiple asset price equilibria 
in  the  market.  The  key  question  is  how  do  these  opinions  converge  towards  a  particular   227
equilibrium? Individual opinions converge towards a particular equilibrium through a mimetic 
mechanism. This mechanism was early illustrated by Keynes (1936) in his beauty contest. 
The primary objective for an agent in the market is to anticipate the reaction of the majority of 
participants in the market. As a matter of fact, if a market is bull on a given asset, an agent 
will  have  to  buy  the  asset  even  if  fundamentals  tell  him/her  to  sell  the  asset.  This  self 
referential  behaviour  is  rational  at  an  individual  level  although  it  can  lead  to  irrational 
phenomena  (such  as  price  bubbles)  at  a  collective  level.  This  self referential  behaviour 
consists in detecting striking events that could catch the attention of the majority of agents in 
the market. The choice of striking fundamentals is based on a trial and error strategy. Agents 
bet on the possible striking fundamentals that could catch the attention of the majority of 
agents in the market. Agents then build a model based on the selected fundamentals. The 
revisions of mistaken bets (or of bad models) imply an increasing volatility in asset prices. 
The market will stabilise itself when all agents   through mimetism   will focus on a particular 
striking set of fundamentals. At this point, agents have found a particular model based on a 
specific set of fundamentals. All agents in the market legitimate this model. This model is 
called a convention. A convention is therefore a fundamental model legitimated by all agents 
in the market, in a given time period. A convention therefore creates a focal point that helps 
resolving the problem of multiple asset price equilibria in the market. Once a convention is 
determined in the market, asset price volatility decreases. A convention therefore acts as a 
guide through the uncertainty covering the future dynamics of asset prices. Indeed agents can 
rely on the convention to form their expectations on the future value of the asset. 
  A convention can thus be defined as a particular fundamental model adopted by the 
majority  of  agents  in  a  market  concerning  future  economic  prospects  (Orléan  (2006)).  A 
convention often ignores other fundamentals that go against it. In order to live long enough, 
the asset price dynamics fitted by the convention has to match the actual dynamics of asset 
prices. However, market agents will not abandon a convention at the first anomalies i.e. when 
the empirical dynamics of asset prices go against the ones assumed by the convention. Agents 
will do so when there will be a series of events that are in opposition to the fitted exchange 
rate provided by the current convention. Agents’ beliefs in the current convention vanish and 
the convention disappears from the market. The uncertainty on the future dynamics of asset 
prices increases, and with it, exchange rate volatility. Market participants will then have to 
find a new convention. 
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2.2 A simple theoretical exchange rate model based on conventions 
 
We set a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanisms underlying the formation 
of market conventions in the foreign exchange market. The model borrows elements from the 
Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE) approach by Frydman and Goldberg (2007).  
We  assume  two  countries  (domestic  and  foreign)  in  an  asymmetric  world.  The 
assumption of an asymmetric world implies that the influence of a given fundamental in the 
domestic and foreign countries does not have the same effect on exchange rate dynamics.  
Following the IKE approach, the model considers two types of representative agents in 
the market: an optimistic (or bull) agent and a pessimistic (or bear) agent. The model is based 
on the following mechanism. When agents are  relatively more optimistic in the domestic 
country than in the foreign country, they expect an appreciation of the domestic currency (and 
vice versa). Conversely, when agents are relatively more pessimistic in the domestic country 
than in the foreign country, they anticipate a depreciation of the domestic currency (and vice 
versa). 
Agents are characterised by bounded rationality. Following a trial and error strategy, 
agents choose a bunch of fundamentals among the available set of fundamentals that best 




  The first step of the genetic algorithm is the initialization of the variables. We assume 
a set of 8 pairs of fundamentals split into two subsets. 
 
 
Bull = {(f1, f2*), (f3, f4*), (f5, f6*), (f7, f8*)}        (1a) 
 
  
Bear = {(f9, f10*), (f11, f12*), (f13, f14*), (f15, f16*)}      (1b) 
 
The  bull  (bear)  subset  represents  the  stock  of  information  used  by  optimistic 
(pessimistic)  agents  to  forecast  future  exchange  rate  dynamics.  As  agents  have  bounded 
rationality, they rely on a particular stock of fundamentals to make their forecasts and ignore 
other  fundamentals.  In  other  words  agents  do  not  take  account  of  the  entire  stock  of 
information ( 
Bull and  
Bear) but rely instead on a particular subset of information to make 
their forecasts.   229
Agents  are  assumed  to  have  knowledge  of  economic  theory.  In  other  words,  they 
know the theoretical sign of the relationship between a given fundamental and the exchange 






























































































































For example, if f1,t and f2,t are considered respectively as the domestic and foreign 
interest  rates,  then  an  increase  in  the  interest  rate  differential  in  favour  of  the  domestic 
economy (d(f1,t – f2,t) > 0) will induce an appreciation of the domestic currency (dst > 0). Also, 
if f9,t and f10,t are considered respectively as the domestic and foreign stocks of external debt, 
then an increase in the stock of domestic debt other things being equal (d(f9,t – f10,t) > 0) leads 
the domestic currency to depreciate (dst < 0). 
 
Fundamentals are assumed to follow a random walk: 
 
k
t t , k t , k f f ε + = −1              (3) 
 
Where  t , k ε  mimics the impact of news on fundamentals  t , k ε → iidN(0,σk,ε
2) 
 
  The second step of the genetic algorithm is the selection of the variables. As agents 
cannot  take  account  of  all  fundamentals  due  to  bounded  rationality,  they  select  a  limited 
bunch  of  fundamentals.  We  assume  that  in  a  given  state,  agents  select  two  pairs  of 
fundamentals  among  the  four  pairs  available  in  the  state.  Thus,  agents  include  four 
fundamentals (either from  
Bull ; or from  
Bear) in their model. 
The  selection  of  fundamentals  that  in  turn  creates  a  model  of  exchange  rate 
determination  is  based  on  a  fitness  process.  Agents  first  test  the  in sample  historical 
explanatory power of each possible model based on the above pairs of fundamentals. They 
then select the model (or the fundamentals) that best explain past exchange rate dynamics.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
72 Indeed, this algorithm is very close to the building logic of market conventions.   230
Thus, each category of agents (optimistic or pessimistic) tests 6 possible models. We 
therefore end up with 12 models. 
 
Bull agents test the following models (bull models are indexed from 1 to 6): 
 
*
t , l t , l t , l t , l
*
t , k t , k t , k t , k t ,
i
t f f f f s 1 1 1 0 + + + − + − + = β β β β β     With k ≠ l  (4a) 
 
Where k =2a+1 and l = 2a (a = 0 to 4); i = 1 to 6;  t , 0 β is a constant 
  
       Bear agents test the following models (bear models are indexed from 7 to 12): 
 
*
t , n t , n t , n t , n
*
t , m t , m t , m t , m t ,
j
t f f f f s 1 1 1 1 0 + + + + − + − + = β β β β β   With m ≠ n   (4b) 
 
Where m =2b+1 and n = 2b (b = 5 to 8); j = 7 to 12;  t , 0 β is a constant 
 
In order to assess the fitness of the above models, each agent estimates the models by 
ordinary least squares (OLS). The aim is to find the coefficients β ˆ  that minimize the sum of 








t , h t




β   With h = 1 to 12  (5) 
 



















β   With h = 1 to 12  (6) 
 
























  With h = 1 to 12  (7) 
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− ∑ − =     With h = 1 to 12  (8) 
 
The selected bull and bear models satisfy the following conditions: 
 




t MSE Min s = =      With i = 1 to 6    (9a)  
 




t MSE Min s = =     With j = 7 to 12  (9b) 
 
The expected exchange rate from the model used by each agent is defined as: 
 
*
t , l t , l t , l t , l
*
t , k t , k t , k t , k t ,
i
1 t t o, f ˆ f ˆ f ˆ f ˆ ˆ     ) (s E 1 1 1 1 0 + + + + + − + − + = β β β β β    With i = 1 to 6  (10a) 
 
*
t , n t , n t , n t , n
*
t , m t , m t , m t , m t ,
j
1 t t p, f ˆ f ˆ f ˆ f ˆ ˆ   ) (s E 1 1 1 1 0 + + + + + − + − + = β β β β β With j = 7 to 12  (10b) 
 
 
  The third step of the genetic algorithm is the reproduction of the best model. Agents 
drop the fundamental variables that do not explain well the past dynamics of exchange rates 
and look for the ones that provide a better fit of past exchange rate dynamics. In other words, 
agents re iterate the procedure described above. 
 
  We  assume  that  the  proportion  of  optimistic  and  pessimistic  agents  in  the  market 
varies  trough  time.  We  define  the  proportion  of  optimistic  and  pessimistic  agents  in  the 
market as: 












=    and  












=  (11) 
 
Where ωo,t + ωp,t = 1 and 0 < γ < 1 
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The parameter γ represents the intensity at which agents revise their forecasting rules. 
Usually, we set γ close to zero and away from unity since as underlined in section 2.1, a 
convention does not disappear at the first anomalies between the fitted asset price dynamics 
by the convention and the actual asset price dynamics. 
 
The profitability π'i,t of each rule is evaluated according to the profit πi,t and the risk 
σ²i,t related to this rule: 
 
      π'i,t = π i,t    σ²i,t             i = o, p      (12)                  
 
The parameter   represents the coefficient of risk aversion. The risk associated to a 
forecasting rule is defined as the variance of the forecasting error: 
 
          σ²i,t = [E
i
t 1(st)   st]²        i = o, p      (13)               
 
  The profit π i,t related to a forecasting strategy is defined as the one period earnings of 
investing one unit of domestic currency in the foreign asset: 
 
    π i,t = [st(1 + r*)   st 1(1 + r)]sgn[E
i
t 1(st)(1 + r*)   st 1(1 + r)]   i = o, p  (14)         
 









0     x   if   1     sgn[x] 
0     x   if   0   sgn[x] 
0     x   if   1   sgn[x] 
 
 
We obtain the expected exchange rate at time t+1 by aggregating agents’ forecasts in 
the market: 
 
Et( st+1) = ωo,tEo,t( st+1) + ωp,tEp,t( st+1)      (15)                                         
 
  Hence:      st+1
Market =  ωo,t st+1
Bull+ ωp,t  st+1
Bear + εt+1    (16)                
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Figure 1.1 shows the simulations’ results of the theoretical convention model for 1000 
periods (we assume   = 5 and γ = 0,2). The blue margins mean that the market is in majority 
optimistic  (P(St=Bull/It) >  0,5)  while  the  white  margins  mean  that  the  market  is  globally 
pessimistic (P(St=Bull/It) < 0,5). 
 







































































































NB: The black line represents the market exchange rate (left scale); the blue line represents the probability to be 
in the bull state (right scale); the orange line represents the Hodrick Prescott filter (λ = 14400) of the probability 
to be in the bull state (right scale). 
 
  Figure  1.1  shows  that  the  simulated  exchange  rate  alternates  between  periods  of 
appreciating  and  depreciating  trends.  Also,  the  proportion  of  bull  and  bear  agents  in  the 
market varies through time. 
 
In this model, agents go through two selection processes that define two switching 
mechanisms. 
The first selection process (equations (1a) to (10b)) is the selection of the best model 
by  bull  and  bear  agents.  This  choice  is  based  on  the  relative  performances  of  the  past 
explanatory powers of exchange rate models based on fundamentals coming respectively from 
the bull and bear information stocks. Through time, bull and bear agents switch between their 
respective models and choose the model that provides the best explanatory power of past 
exchange  rate  dynamics.  Figure  1.2  represents  the  models  chosen  by  optimistic  and 
pessimistic agents through time. 
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Figure 1.2: Model chosen by optimistic agents (models 1 to 6)  



































































































































































































NB: The upper figure represents the model chosen by pessimistic agents (models 7 to 12); the lower figure 
represents the model chosen by optimistic agents (models 1 to 6). The left scale represents the models chosen; 
the horizontal scale represents the time period. 
 
Figure 1.2 shows that between t = 1 and t = 300 optimistic agents alternate between 
models 1, 2 and 3. Over the same period, pessimistic agents rely on model 12. Thus in this 
period, model 12 provides the best explanatory power of past exchange rate dynamics given 
the  stock  of  fundamentals  used  by  bear  agents.  Taking  a  backward  view,  the  convention 
model implies that there is not a unique fundamental model of exchange rate in the market but 
a variety of fundamental models of exchange rate in which agents rely on to determine the 
fundamental value of the exchange rate.  
 
 
The second selection process (equations (11) to (14)) is the choice of whether being 
bull or bear in the market. This choice depends on the relative profitability of the selected bull 
model relative to the selected bear model. Through time, agents can switch between being a 
bull or a bear agent given the profitability of the model selected by bull and bear agents.  
Figure 1.3 represents the relative profitability of being bull in the market (π'o,t   π'p,t). 
The green area means that the selected bull model generates a positive profitability relative to 
the selected bear model. Conversely, the red area means that being bull is less profitable than 
being bear. 
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NB:  The  black  line  represents  the  difference  between  the  profitability  of  the  selected  bull  model  and  the 
profitability of the selected bear model (left scale) ; the blue line represents the probability to be in the bull state 
(right scale) ; the orange line represents the Hodrick Prescott filtered probability (λ = 14400) to be in the bull 
state (right scale). 
 
  Figure 1.3 shows that when the selected model by bull agents generates a positive 
profitability relatively to the selected bear model, bull agents dominate the market. On the 
contrary, when the selected model by bull agents generates a negative profitability relatively 
to the selected bear model, bear agents become dominant in the market. 
 
  Figure  1.4  shows  the  relative  weights  put  by  agents  on  domestic  and  foreign 
fundamentals  for  model  1,  model  2,  model  8  and  model  12.  The  relative  weights  are 
computed as the contributions of the coefficients for the estimated models in the bull state 
(
Bull
Model1   ) and in the bear state (
Bear
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f ˆ f ˆ f ˆ f ˆ
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=      (17) 
 
 
Figure  1.4  shows  that  the  weights  agents  attribute  to  domestic  and  foreign 
fundamentals vary through time. In some periods, agents put a larger weight on domestic 
fundamentals  relative  to  foreign  fundamentals  while  at  other  periods,  agents  put  a  lower 
weight on domestic fundamentals relative to foreign fundamentals.   236
Figure 1.4: Relative weights put by agents on domestic and foreign fundamentals 




















































































































































































































NB: The black (grey) line represents the weight attributed to domestic (foreign) fundamentals. 
 
The paragraph below provides a key understanding of the results from figures 1.1, 1.2, 
1.3 and 1.4. We have here four cases in the market. 
First, in figure 1.1, an appreciation (a depreciation) of the domestic (foreign) currency 
in the bull state means that agents are relatively more optimistic in the domestic economy 
than in the foreign economy. For example, in figure 1.1, from t = 70 to 100, the market is bull 
(P(St=Bull/It)  >  0,5)  and  the  domestic  currency  appreciates.  Agents  are  in  majority  bull 
because being bull is more profitable than being bear (figure 1.3). Optimistic agents rely on 
model 1 in this period (figure 1.2) and put more weight on domestic fundamentals than on 
foreign fundamentals (figure 1.4.1). 
Secondly,  in  figure  1.1,  an  appreciation  (a  depreciation)  of  the  foreign  (domestic) 
currency  in  the  bull  state  means  that  agents  are  relatively  more  optimistic  in  the  foreign 
economy than in the domestic economy. For instance, in figure 1.1, from t = 450 to 525, the 
market is bull and the domestic currency depreciates. Figure 1.3 shows that over the period 
the profitability of being bull is higher than the one of being bear. The best model selected by 
bull agents in this period is model 2 (figure 1.2). Based on model 2, bull agents put more 
weight on foreign fundamentals than on domestic fundamentals (figure 1.4.2). 
Thirdly,  in  figure  1.1,  a  depreciation  (an  appreciation)  of  the  domestic  (foreign) 
currency in the bear state means that agents are relatively more pessimistic in the domestic   237
economy than in the foreign economy. As a matter of facts, from t = 580 to 620 in figure 1.1, 
the market is bear (P(St=Bull/It) < 0,5) and the domestic currency depreciates over the period. 
The profitability of being bear is higher than the one of being bull (figure 1.3). The selected 
model  by  bear  agents  is  model  8  (figure  1.2).  Model  8  puts  more  weight  on  domestic 
fundamentals than on foreign fundamentals (figure 1.4.3). 
Fourthly,  in  figure  1.1,  a  depreciation  (an  appreciation)  of  the  foreign  (domestic) 
currency in the bear state means that agents are relatively more pessimistic in the foreign 
economy than in the domestic economy. For instance, we observe in figure 1 from t = 150 to 
200 that the market is bear and that the domestic currency appreciates. Being bear is indeed 
more profitable than being bull in this period (figure 1.3). The model chosen by bear agents is 
model  12  (figure  1.2).  Model  12  puts  a  lower  weight  on  domestic  fundamentals  than  on 
foreign fundamentals (figure 1.4.4). 
 
Finally,  the  theoretical  convention  model  shows  that  exchange  rate  dynamics  are 
driven  by  the  time varying  fundamental  models  or  equivalently  by  convention  models 
selected by market agents through time. 
The  convention  model  offers  several  advantages  compared  to  recent  models  of 
exchange rate such as the heterogeneous agents models (De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2007)). 
Heterogeneous agents models explain exchange rates dynamics based on the behaviour of 
fundamentalist  and  chartist  agents.  Such  models  fully  predetermine  the  behaviour  of 
economic agents by  associating an exogenous rule to each agent. Agents therefore act as 
robots in these models. On the contrary, the convention model follows the IKE approach by 
partially predetermining the behaviour of agents. Indeed, agents can use whatever rules or 
investment strategies. Such rules are allowed to evolve over time based on a trial and error 
strategy. Moreover, the convention model does not rely on the controversial definition of a 
fundamental exchange rate. On the contrary, heterogeneous agents models have to specify an 
arbitrary value for the fundamental exchange rate in the fundamentalist rule. 
 
Having highlighted the mechanisms behind the formation of market conventions, we 
now test the theory of conventions in the foreign exchange market. The asset of interest is the 
euro/dollar exchange rate. The period of analysis runs from January 1995 to December 2008.  
We rely on two methods to identify the fundamentals considered in conventions by 
market  agents.  The  first  method  is  a  macroeconomic  analysis.  This  method  analyses  the 
weight  given  to  a  particular  macroeconomic  fundamental  by  the  economic  and  financial   238
literature in a given period of time. Results are presented in section 3. The second method 
relies on the estimation of a time varying parameters model. This method computes the time 
varying dynamics of the coefficients’ value associated to a particular fundamental through 
time. Results are presented in section 4. 
 
3. A macroeconomic analysis of market conventions 
 
  This  section  highlights  the  conventions  that  prevail  in  the  euro/dollar  market  by 
relying on a macroeconomic analysis. The aim is to rely on the consensus of the market 
concerning the fundamentals that best explain the euro/dollar exchange rate dynamics. We 
rely on major articles from financial journals (Wall Street Journal and The Economist) as well 
as academic ones. We justify each argument by using figures from Thomson Datastream and 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
73. The results of this analysis are organised in the 
following five sections. 
 
3.1 January 1995   December 2000: the internet convention or the superiority of 
the US economy compared to the euro zone 
 
  In the second half of the 1990s, the US economy experienced a stronger growth rate 
than Europe (an average of 8,3 % for the United States versus 5 % for Europe (figure 1)). 
Stronger growth in the United States was attributed to larger investments in new technologies 
compared to Europe. Such investments helped increase the productivity differential in favour 
of the United States (figure 2). In December 2008, the differential in productivity growth rates 
amounted to 3 %. Numerous economists praised the glorious prospects offered by the US 
economy. Some economists (of whom Jeremy Rifkin) even claimed that the US economy had 
reached a higher structural growth rate. The market was clearly in presence of a convention 






                                                           
73 For  figures  1  to  23,  data  come  from  Thomson  Datastream;  and  from  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis 
concerning capitals flows (figures 3, 7 and 21).   239
Figure 1: Annual real growth rate of  























































































































































































































NB: The dashed grey line refers to the euro zone (left scale); the solid grey line refers to the United States (left 
scale) and the solid black line represents the euro/dollar nominal exchange rate (right scale). 
 
Financial investors therefore expected higher returns in US stocks than in European 
stocks. They invested massively in US stocks, especially in companies belonging to the sector 
of  the  new  economy  (the  ever known  start ups).  Net  equity  flows  in  the  United  States 
increased  by  an  average  of  24  %  a  year  between  1998  and  2000  (figure  3).  The  annual 
average growth rate of the S&P500 between January 1995 and December 2000 amounted to 
21 % a year (figure 23). 
The birth of the euro zone in 1999 and the youth of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
  which had to set its credibility among market agents   led investors to be more timorous in 
the European economy than in the US economy. 
 
Figure 3: Net equity flows in the  
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NB:  For  figure  3,  the  dark  grey  represents  the  US  current  balance;  the  light  grey  represents  net  flows  of 
investment in Treasury bills and government bonds; the black represents net flows of investment in equities and 
foreign direct investment. For figure 4, the dashed grey line refers to the euro zone; the solid grey line refers to 
the United States and the solid black line represents the euro/dollar nominal exchange rate. 
 
  The net inflows of capitals in the United States led to an appreciation of the dollar 
against  the  euro  between  January  2001  and  December  2000.  This  appreciation  was  also 
induced by an interest rate differential in favour of the United States.   240
 
  Therefore, between January 1995 and December 2000, markets were relatively more 
optimistic on the prospects of the US economy relative to the ones of the European economy. 
The  bull  sentiment  that  prevailed  in  the  market  was  referred  to  as  the  new  economy 
convention or the internet convention. 
 
  3.2 January 2001 June 2003: the burst of the internet bubble and the end of the 
new economy convention 
 
The over optimistic sentiment in the US economy led to a bubble in stock prices: the 
internet bubble. This bubble burst in January 2001. This shock put an end to the new economy 
convention. Investors realised that their expectations on the prospects of the US economy 
were too optimistic. 
Financial  papers  began  to  put  the  accent  on  variables  hidden  during  the  internet 
convention. The stronger US growth rate was gauged on a growing debt in the public and 
private sectors. US companies over estimated the future demand and faced higher debt and 
excess capacities. The high level of US consumption had rested on an increasing debt allowed 
by the positive wealth effect induced by the rise in stock prices during the inflating phase of 
the internet bubble. 
  The  increase  in  public  and  private  debts  induced  mechanically  an  increase  in  the 
deficit of the current account balance (figure 6) and induced the return of the twin deficits. A 
lot of economists began to ask about the sustainability of US deficits (Mann (2002)) and a 
possible fall in the dollar. 
  To counter the economic slowdown induced by the internet bubble burst, the Federal 
Reserve decreased dramatically its main interest rate. The interest rate differential became 
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NB: For figure 5, the dashed grey line refers to the euro zone; the solid grey line refers to the United States and 
the solid black line represents the euro/dollar nominal exchange rate. For figure 6, the dark grey represents the 
US current balance and the light grey represents the European current balance; the solid black line represents the 
euro/dollar nominal exchange rate. 
 
Investors  became  thus  relatively  less  confident  in  the  US  economy  than  in  the 
European economy. They reduced investments in stocks and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in the United States. Between January 2001 and June 2003, the S&P500 lost 44 % and the 
Eurostoxx 60 %. The financial scandals of Enron and Worldcom and then the attacks of the 
11
th September 2001 kept increasing the bear sentiment on the US economy. Equity flows in 
the United States decreased (figure 7) and the dollar stopped its appreciating trend begun 
earlier  in  January  1995  (figure  8).  The  dollar  started  to  depreciate  in  June  2002.  This 
depreciation was however contained by interventions of East Asian central banks. Indeed, 
East Asian central banks bought US bonds to prevent a severe appreciation of their currency 
against the dollar. 
The bear sentiment of investors on the US economy does not mean that investors 
became bull in the European economy. Indeed, the excess in the current balance experienced 
by the euro zone at that period (figure 6) suggests that the growth rate has been very low and 
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Figure 7: Net equity flows and net bond 
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NB:  For  Figure  7,  the  dark  grey  represents  the  US  current  balance;  the  clear  grey  represents  net  flows  of 
investment in Treasury bills and government bonds; the black represents net flows of investment in equities and 
foreign direct investment. For Figure 8, the dashed grey line refers to the euro zone; the solid grey line refers to 
the United States and the solid black line represents the euro/dollar nominal exchange rate. 
 
  As a result, between January 2001 and June 2003, financial markets faced an increase 
in uncertainty concerning economic recovery either in the euro zone or in the United States. 
Deflation  fears  induced  by  lower  growth  rates  prevailed  among  economists  and  central 
bankers. The market definitely abandoned the internet convention. Agents became bear either 
in the United States and or in the euro zone. The bear sentiment was however relatively 
stronger in the United States than in the euro zone. 
 
  3.3 July 2003 December 2005: The birth of two competing conventions: the US 
consumption as the engine of the world economy versus the US as a net debtor 
 
From July 2003, fears  of deflation induced by the bubble burst vanished. The US 
economy was recovering surprisingly fast from the burst of the internet bubble (figure 9). 
Factors  behind  the  US  recovery  were  the  large  decrease  of  interest  rates  by  the  Federal 
Reserve (figure 10) coupled with an increase in public spending (through the decrease in taxes 
under the Bush government and the increase in military spending (related to wars in Iraq and 
in Afghanistan)). 
Conversely, the euro area was dealing with a weaker growth rate. Economists started 
to ask about the relevance of the institutional structure of the euro zone. They began to blame 
the  Growth  and  Stability  Pact  because  this  pact  could  prevent  the  euro  area  from  higher 
growth rates. Members of the euro zone seemed unable to lead a relevant fiscal policy to 
counter the economic slowdown. Between July 2003 and December 2005 the annual growth 
rate reached 1,7 % in the euro zone compared to 4,8 % in the United States (figure 9). Lower   243
interest rates associated to surging house prices (figure 13) allowed US households to ease 
their access on credit and to increase their consumption. At that time, financial papers argued 
that the US consumption was the engine of the world economy. 
 




















































































































































































































NB: The dashed grey line refers to the euro zone; the solid grey line refers to the United States and the solid 
black line represents the euro/dollar nominal exchange rate. 
 
However, several factors seemed to limit investors’ confidence in the US economy. 
Indeed, the US consumption was gauged on a higher level of debt for US households. Besides, 
the return of growth in the United States generated no increase in US employment. As shown 
in figure 11, the growth rate of US employment was close to the one in the euro zone although 
the growth differential was strongly in favour of the United States (figure 9). This fact was 
partly explained by relocations of US firms to China. Such relocations led the US economy to 
increase imports of Chinese goods which contributed to the increase of the US deficit (figure 
12). In 2005, the US current deficit reached 6 % of GDP.   
All these factors can explain why the dollar still depreciates even after the recovery of 
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NB: For Figure 11, the dashed grey line refers to the euro zone; the solid grey line refers to the United States and 
the solid black line represents the euro/dollar nominal exchange rate. For Figure 12, the dark grey represents the 
US current balance and the light grey represents the European current balance; the solid black line represents the 
euro/dollar nominal exchange rate. 
 
At the beginning of 2004, higher growth in the US and increasing oil prices led the 
Federal Reserve to increase its main interest rate (figure 10). The interest rate differential 
became in favour of the US economy in December 2004. 
 
  Finally, between July 2003 and December 2005, two competing conventions appeared 
in  the  market.  A  first  convention  (bear  convention)  focused  mainly  on  large  US  current 
deficits and expected a fall in the dollar. A second convention (bull convention) pointed to the 
fast recovery of the US economy after the bubble burst and its good resistance with regards to 
the increase in oil prices (figure 14). The bull sentiment was also attributed to the success of 
the fine monetary policy by Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve at that time. 
The domination of the bear convention may explain the depreciation of the dollar between 
July  2003  and  December  2004.  Conversely,  the  domination  of  the  bull  convention  may 
explain the appreciation of the dollar between January 2005 and December 2005. 
 
3.4 January 2006   June 2007: the weakening of the bull convention 
 
  Between January 2006 and June 2007, the bull sentiment associated to the resistance 
and  the  high  potential  of  the  US  economy  became  more  and  more  threatened  by  several 
negative news about the US economy. 
  Indeed, the sustained growth in the United States between July 2003 and December 
2005  was  gauged  on  a  positive  growth  rate  of  house  prices.  Between  January  2006  and 
September 2007, the growth rate of US house prices decreased (figure 13). Economists began 
to warn about a possible burst of a bubble in US house prices.    245
  On the other hand, oil prices were surging and acted as a burden on the budget of US 
households. The barrel of Brent reached 96,05 $ in November 2007 (figure 14). Investors 
feared a decrease in US households’ consumption either by the decrease in house prices that 
could reduce or even close access to credit for US households or by the increase in oil prices 
that would reduce the disposable income of US households. Fears were also accentuated by 
the increase in the main interest rate by the Federal Reserve (figure 18) which raised the 
burden of debt for US households. 
 
Figure 13: US house prices  































































































































































































































































NB: For Figure 13 and 14, the solid black line represents the euro/dollar nominal exchange rate. 
 
  Negative news about the US economy were also illustrated by the worrying concerns 
about the sustainability of the US debt. US current deficits were evaluated at more than 6 % 
of US GDP in 2006 and at about 5,5 % of US GDP in 2007 (figure 15). Fears increased 
among  investors  about  a  possible  fall  in  the  dollar  and  hence  in  the  value  of  assets 
denominated in dollars. Threats by Chinese authorities to convert part of their huge stock of 
accumulated dollars (figure 16) in another currency accentuated fears by investors about a 
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Figure 16: Chinese dollar reserves  
































































































































NB: For figure 15, the dark grey represents the US current balance and the light grey represents the European 
current balance; the solid black line represents the euro/dollar nominal exchange rate. For figure 16, the solid 
grey line refers to Chinese reserves and the solid black line represents the euro/dollar nominal exchange rate. 
 
The  rising  bear  sentiment  in  the  US  economy  led  investors  to  be  relatively  more 
optimistic about the prospects of the euro zone. Investors became aware that the US economy 
had not significantly outperformed the European economy in the recent years. Growth in the 
euro area was at its fastest pace since January 2002 and the growth differential between the 
United States and the euro zone became very thin from January 2007 to December 2007 
(figure 17). In 2007, inflation fears related to the increase in oil prices led the ECB to increase 
its main interest rate. At the end of 2007, the interest rate differential became in favour of the 
euro zone (figure 18). 
 
Figure 17: Annual real growth rate of 





























































































































































































































































NB: The dashed grey line refers to the euro zone; the solid grey line refers to the United States and the solid 
black line represents the euro/dollar nominal exchange rate. 
 
In December 2007, investors became uncertain about the prospects offered by the US 
economy. Economists and central bankers began questioning whether the US economy would 
experience a soft landing or a hard landing. The bull convention that appeared between July 
2003 and December 2005 in the United States was fading out at an increasing pace. The   247
increasing domination of the bear convention may explain why the dollar depreciates between 
January 2006 and December 2007. 
 
  3.5  June  2007     December  2008:  the  subprime  crisis  and  the  end  of  the  bull 
convention in the US economy 
 
  The bankruptcy of two investment funds of Bear Stearns in June 2007 sparked a major 
financial crisis in the United States. In spring 2007, the Federal Reserve along with the ECB 
intervened massively in the interbank market to prevent a liquidity crisis. 
The Federal Reserve began to decrease its main interest rate in June 2007 (figure 20) 
while the ECB kept its rates unchanged because of inflation fears caused by increasing oil 
prices and also because growth forecasts were still more optimistic in the euro zone than in 
the United States (figure 19). 
In October 2007, the bubble on US house prices burst (figure 13). Investors faced a 
great uncertainty about the future prospects of the US economy. Nobody really knew how bad 
the subprime crisis would have hurt the US economy. Support brought by the Federal Reserve 
and the ECB to bad banks in the second half of 2007 prevented both economies from a large 
financial  crisis.  However,  concerns  were  now  surging  about  a  possible  contagion  of  the 
financial turmoil to the real economy. Economists feared especially a credit crunch triggered 
by unhealthy banks that invested in subprime assets. A credit crunch would indeed end access 
of US households to credit, hence stopping US consumption; one of the main components that 
sustained US growth until then. 
In  April  2008  growing  evidence  raised  that  the  US  economy  was  in  recession. 
Conversely, the European economy seemed at a first time less affected by the financial crisis. 
Figure 22 shows that European employment still raised when unemployment in the United 
States  increased.  Newspapers  pointed  to  the  relative  resistance  of  European  economies 
although the growth rate in the euro zone lowered. With oil prices still surging and preventing 
the ECB to decrease its main interest rate, economists feared the return of stagflation in the 
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Figure 19: Annual real growth rate of 































































































































































































































































NB: The dashed grey line refers to the euro zone; the solid grey line refers to the United States and the solid 
black line represents the euro/dollar nominal exchange rate. 
 
  The growth rate in the United States became negative and US unemployment surged 
in August 2008 (figures 19 and 22). Later, in November 2008, the Euro zone experienced a 
negative GDP growth rate (figure 19). The ECB started to decrease its main interest rate in 
December 2008 (figure 20). 
A  bear  sentiment  prevailed  among  financial  markets  concerning  the  economic 
prospects  either  in  the  euro  zone  or  in  the  United States.  Stock  indices  started  to  fall  in 
October 2008.  Investors became more averse to risky assets. Net flows of equities in the 
United States became negative in 2008 (figure 21) and US investors retrieved their liquidities 
from  the  euro  area.  This  outflow  of  capitals  from  the  euro  zone  partly  explains  the 
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
 
NB:  the  dark  grey  represents  the  US  current  balance;  the  light  grey  represents  net  flows  of  investment  in 
Treasury bills and government bonds; the black represents net flows of investment in equities and foreign direct 
investment. 
 
From  September  2008  until  June  2009  the  US  and  European  governments  were 
beginning  to  set  plans  to  put  an  end  to  the  financial  crisis  and  to  counter  the  economic 
recession.  However,  market  agents  cast  doubts  on  the  relevance  of  the  successive  plans 
proposed  by  both  governments  (especially  the  US  government).  In  May  2009,  some 
economists feared a W shaped recession such as in the 1939 financial crisis. From the peak of 
June 2007 to the trough of March 2009, the S&P500 fell by 50 % (figure 23). Over the same 
period, the Eurostoxx fell by 57 %. 
 






































































































































































































































































NB: The dashed grey line refers to the euro zone; the solid grey line refers to the United States and the solid 
black line represents the euro/dollar nominal exchange rate. 
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  3.6 Conventions highlighted by the macroeconomic analysis  
 
  The above analysis allows distinguishing 5 phases and three main conventions for the 
euro/dollar exchange rate between January 1995 and December 2008. 
 
  The  new  economy  convention  prevailed  from  January  1995  to  December  2000. 
Investors were relatively more optimistic on the prospects of the US economy than on the 
ones of the European economy. Investors were fascinated by stronger US growth rates and 
higher  expected  profits  offered  by  the  US  economy.  The  dollar  experiences  a  strong 
appreciating trend during this period. In January 2001, the burst of the internet bubble put an 
end to the new economy convention. 
Between January 2001 and June 2003, investors were bear either in the United States 
or in the euro zone. The market was looking for a new convention. The market started to build 
a bear convention based on the high external deficits of the US economy. The dollar starts a 
strong depreciating trend in this period. 
From  July  2003  to  December  2005  two  competing  conventions  prevailed  among 
market participants. A bear convention focused mainly on large US current deficits and a bull 
convention pointed notably to the spectacular recovery of the US economy from the internet 
bubble burst. During this period the dollar stops its strong depreciating trend and alternates 
between  short lasting  appreciating  and  depreciating  trends  according  to  whether  the  bull 
convention dominates the bear one. 
Between January 2006 and June 2007, the bear convention started to dominate the bull 
one. Indeed, several factors came against the bull convention notably the possible burst of the 
US house price bubble that could trigger an economic downturn in the United States and the 
surge in oil prices that acted as a burden on US households’ disposable income. 
In June 2007, the subprime crisis put an end to the bull convention. Investors became 
bear  in  the  United  States  as  well  as  in  the  Euro  zone.  The  bear  convention  definitely 
dominates the market at that time. 
 
  The next step of the analysis aims at testing the degree of relevance of the conventions 
highlighted by the macroeconomic analysis. We rely on an econometric approach based on 
the estimation of a time varying parameters model. 
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4. An econometric analysis of market conventions 
 
To test the significancy of the results highlighted in the macroeconomic analysis we 
define an alternative and more objective approach. We use econometric tools and estimate a 
time varying  parameters  model.  The  aim  is  to  identify  the  most  important  fundamentals 
among all the fundamentals considered in the macroeconomic analysis. We compute the time 
varying  dynamics  of  the  coefficients’  value  associated  to  macroeconomic  fundamentals 
through time. To give credit to the econometric approach, we build a research procedure close 
to the theoretical convention model presented in section 2. The research procedure follows 
three steps. The first step identifies the most important fundamentals in the determination of 
the euro/dollar exchange rate. The second step builds all the models that can be built with the 
selected fundamentals. The third step analyses the predictive power of each model and selects 
the model that offers the best predictions for the euro/dollar exchange rate dynamics. 
 
  4.1 Analysis of the time varying weight of macroeconomic fundamentals 
 
  The quest for the most important fundamentals in the determination of the euro/dollar 
exchange rate is based on the estimation of a time varying parameters model. We use a state 
space model estimated with a Kalman filter. The state space model allows us to find the 
variables that have the highest weight (i.e. the highest coefficient) in the determination of the 
euro/dollar exchange rate through the period of analysis.  
  The  measurement  equation  includes  all  the  fundamentals  considered  in  the 
macroeconomic analysis (section 3). We consider the following fundamentals: the industrial 
production (indprod); the productivity (pdty); the net investment position over GDP (niipgdp); 
the number of employed people (employ); the price of oil (op); the house price index (hpi); 
the stock price index (sp); the expected profits on the related stock indices (expprofit); the 
dividend yield on the related stock indices (divyield); the short run (3 months) interest rate 
(stinrate); the long run (10 years) interest rate (lgintrate). These fundamentals are the ones 
considered by the literature concerning the determination of the euro/dollar exchange rate at a 
monthly frequency (Camarero et al. (2005), Bouveret and Di Filippo (2009)). 
  State space  models  are  composed  by  two  equations:  a  measurement  equation  that 
describes the relation between observed variables (exogenous fundamentals) and unobserved 
state variables; and a state equation (or transition equation) that defines the dynamics of the 
state variables.   252










t t , t , t pdty pdty indprod indprod s 4 3 2 1 0 α α α α α + + + + =  








t t , employ employ niipgdp niipgdp 8 7 6 5 α α α α + + + +  






t t , t t , sp sp hpi op 12 11 10 9 α α α α + + + +  




t t , profit exp profit exp 14 13 α α + +  




t t , divyield divyield 16 15 α α + +  




t t , rate int st rate int st 18 17 α α + +  




t t , rate int lg rate int lg ε α α + + + 20 19       (18) 
 
We assume that the coefficients in the state equations follow a random walk: 
 
    t , i t , i t , i ε α α + = −1   with i = 0 to 21      (19) 
 
  Table 1 shows the estimation output for the coefficients over the period January 1995 




Table 1: Estimation output of the time varying parameters model 
Variables  niipgdpus  niipgdpeu  divyieldus  divyieldeu  stintrateus  stintrateeu  pdtyeu 














Variables  lgintrateeu  lgintrateus  pdtyus  spus  speu  hpius  op 














Variables  employus  expprofitus  indprodus  employeu  indprodeu  expprofiteu  chineseres 














NB: Student statistics are mentioned in bracket; critical values for the test of Student amount to 1,96 at a 5 % 
confidence level and to 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level; the estimations are implemented and run in MATLAB. 
 
  Table  1  shows  that  in  majority,  US  fundamentals  have  larger  coefficients  than 
European fundamentals. Thus, news coming from the United States have a larger impact on 
the euro/dollar exchange rate than news coming from the euro zone. This result has been 
found in earlier studies that analyse the effect of news on the euro/dollar exchange rate (Prast 
                                                           
74 Other results relative to the state space model such as the classification of the fundamentals through time are 
available upon author request.   253
and De Vor (2000), Galati and Ho (2001) and Andersen et al. (2003)). The fact that investors 
react asymmetrically to  news on a  given fundamental between two  countries justifies the 
assumption of an asymmetric world in the convention model. 
  The selection of the fundamentals to be included in the convention model obeys to the 
following procedure. We consider only the dominant fundamentals i.e. the fundamentals that 
have  the  largest  coefficients.  Fundamentals  characterised  by  the  lowest  coefficients  i.e. 
dominated fundamentals are rejected. Also, for sake of parsimony, we drop the dominated 
fundamentals that are correlated to dominant variables or that cover the same information set 
as  dominant  variables.  For  example,  in  table  1  the  dividend  yields  divyield  have  larger 
coefficients relative to expected profits expprofit and to stock indices sp. As these variables 
cover the same information set   information relative to the stock market   we consider only 
the dividend yield in the convention model. Also, the productivity pdty (defined as the gross 
domestic product over the number of employed people) has a higher  coefficient than the 
industrial production indprod and the number of employed people employ. As these variables 
are highly correlated among each other we only select the variable pdty. 
  Besides, we do not select either the short run or the long run interest rates. Indeed the 
short and long run interest rates differentials between the United States and the euro zone are 
too low over the estimation period to explain the dynamics of the euro/dollar exchange rate. 
  Following this selection procedure, we end up with the following main fundamentals 
for  the  determination  of  the  euro/dollar  dynamics  in  the  sample  period:  the  net  external 
position over GDP (netiipgdp), the productivity (pdty), the dividend yield (divyield), the US 
house price (hpi) and the price of oil (op). 
   The next step is to build all the possible fundamental models that can be built based on 
the selected fundamentals. We will then keep the models that offer the best predictive power 
of the euro/dollar exchange rate dynamics. 
 
  4.2 Analysis of the predictive performances of the fundamental models 
 
  We test the predictive power of all the possible models that can be built with the 
fundamentals selected with the time varying parameters model. In line with the theoretical 
convention model exposed in section 2, we include the respective couples of domestic and 
foreign fundamentals in the models. We thus end up with 6 possible convention models (table 
2,  column  2).  We  analyse  the  performance  of  the  one  month  out of sample  recursive   254
forecasts
75. For example, for model 1, the one month out of sample exchange rate forecast is 
given by: 
 
1 4 3 2 1 0
1










t divyield ˆ divyield ˆ pdty ˆ pdty ˆ ˆ s ˆ ε α α α α α  
 
The predictive performance is assessed based on three statistics: the root mean squared 
error (RMSE), the mean average error (MAE) and the prediction of the direction of change 
(DoC).  Models  are  estimated  in sample  from  January  1995  to  December  1995  based  on 
monthly data. The out of sample period runs from January 1996 to December 2008. Forecast 
statistics of the different models are shown in table 2. 
 
  Table 2: Predictive power of the fundamental models 
No  Models  RMSE  MAE  DoC 
1  s = f(pdtyeu, pdtyus, divyieldeu, divyieldus)  0,0883  0,0666  0,5714 
2  s = f(pdtyeu, pdtyus, niipgdpeu, niipgdpus)  0,0641  0,0514  0,4870 
3  s = f(pdtyeu, pdtyus, op, hpius)  0,0785  0,0600  0,5195 
4  s = f(divyieldeu, divyieldus, niipgdpeu, niipgdpus)  0,0826  0,0572  0,5714 
5  s = f(divyieldeu, divyieldus, op, hpius)  0,0916  0,0675  0,5844 
6  s = f(niipgdpeu, niipgdpus, op, hpius)  0,0720  0,0578  0,6039 
NB: RMSE stands for the root mean squared error; MAE stands for the mean average error; DoC stands for the 
direction of change. 
 
  Table 2 shows a lot of heterogeneity in the predictive performances of the models. For 
instance, model 2 has the lowest mean average error but only predicts the right direction of 
change of the euro/dollar exchange rate in 48,70 % of cases. Also, model 6 provides the 
highest performance in terms of the prediction of the direction of change. However model 6 
has a lower performance relative to other models when predicting the value of the exchange 
rate (RMSE and MAE). Table 3 classifies the models according to their respective statistics.  
 
Table 3: Classification of the fundamental models 
Statistics  RMSE  MAE  DoC 
Model Classification 
Model 2  Model 2  Model 6 
Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Model 6  Model 6  Model 1 and Model 4 
NB: RMSE stands for the root mean squared errors; MAE stands for the mean average errors; DoC stands for the 
direction of change. 
  
 
                                                           
75 Recursive forecasts aim at estimating the model in sample for a given period of time and forecasting the 
endogenous variable out of sample. We then estimate the model by adding one observation to the previous in   255
  Table 3 indicates that model 2 offers the best predictions of the future value of the 
exchange rate (RMSE and MAE) but performs poorly in the prediction of the direction of 
change of the euro/dollar exchange rate (DoC). Considering all statistics, model 6 appears as 
the best classified model relative to the other models. 
  As  our  theoretical  model  assumes  that  convention  models  do  not  share  the  same 
fundamentals, the other selected model has to be model 1. Indeed, model 1 shares a different 
set of fundamentals compared to model 6. 
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t PI H op niipgdp niipgdp s η β β β β β + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0
6       (21) 
 
Because market conventions are models used by agents in a given period of time, they 
can be econometrically interpreted as long term relationships between the exchange rate and 
the  fundamentals  considered  in  the  conventions.  We  therefore  test  whether  the  selected 
convention models (equations (20) and (21)) have a significant long run relationship with the 
euro/dollar exchange rate. We follow the method of Engle and Granger (1987). We estimate 
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β β β
+ − − − − − +
  +   +   +   =  
− − − − − 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 1
3 2 1
6
    (23) 
 
The estimation period runs from January 1995 to December 2008. As all variables are 
stationary in the ECM (see appendices B and C), the estimation method is based on ordinary 
least  squares  (OLS).  We  take  account  of  the  eventual  presence  of  heteroskedasticity  and 
autocorrelation in the residuals by applying the HAC correction of Newey West (1987). Table 
4 shows the estimation output. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
sample period (the initial date of the in sample period remains the same). We iterate this procedure until the end 
of the sample period.   256
Table 4: Estimation output of the error correction models 
Models  λ  α0  α1  α2  α3  α4  R2adj  R2adj 
LT 

























NB: Student statistics are mentioned in square brackets; p values are mentioned in brackets; critical values for 
the test of Student amount to 1,96 at a 5 % confidence level and to 1,64 at a 10 % confidence level; 5 lags are 
considered for ARCH and LM tests. 
 
Diagnostic tests show that although there is heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in 
the residuals for models 1 and 6 (in spite of the HAC correction), RESET tests do not reject 
the specification of the selected models. 
Adjusted R2 associated to the error correction models are rather weak (lower than 
15 %). This result, often found in the literature (Camarero et al. (2005), Bouveret and Di 
Filippo  (2009)),  is  related  to  the  difficulty  of  explaining  exchange  rate  returns  based  on 
macroeconomic  fundamentals.  Conversely,  adjusted  R2  associated  to  the  long  run 
relationships are more satisfying since both models explain at least 78 % of the variance of 
the euro/dollar exchange rate. 
  For both models, the coefficients λ are significant and negative. This result validates 
the  existence  of  a  significant  long  run  relationship  between  the  exchange  rate  and 
fundamentals considered in model 1 and in model 6. This fact justifies the persistence of the 
selected convention models through time. 
However,  the  coefficients  in  the  long  run  relationship  are  not  correctly  signed. 
Subperiods  tests  for  both  models  indicate  large  changes  in  the  coefficients’  value
76.  This 
instability in the coefficients’ value   often found in the literature   is justified by the high 
instability in the empirical link between a given fundamental and the exchange rate. Also, the 
asymmetric structure considered in models 1 and 6 fosters the presence of multicollinearity 
between the exogenous variables i.e. the fundamental variables. Multicollinearity is another 
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4.3 Lessons from the convention model: can conventions explain the euro/dollar 
dynamics? 
 
We present in figure 24 the dynamics of the euro/dollar exchange rate as well as the 
respective errors of the long term relationships of the selected convention models (model 1 
(equation (20)) and model 6 (equation (21)); with: 
 
          1 ˆModel
t t t s s − = ε     (24) 
 
          6 ˆModel
t t t s s − = η     (25) 
 
The blue margins indicate the periods where errors from models 1 are lower than 
errors from model 6. Thus in the blue margins model 1 provides a better explanatory power of 
the euro/dollar dynamics than model 6 (and vice versa for the white margins). 
 
Figure 24: Euro/dollar dynamics and time varying explanatory powers 






























































































































































































NB: the bold black line represents the dynamics of the euro/dollar exchange rate (right scale); the grey line 
represents the errors relative to model 6 (left scale); the black line represents the errors relative to model 1 (left 
scale); the blue margins represent the periods in which errors from model 1 are lower than errors from model 6. 
 
  Figure 24 shows that the relative explanatory power of model 1 and model 6 varies 
through time. More precisely, one can observe that model 1 dominates in the explanation of 
the euro/dollar exchange rate in periods of optimism (i.e. in bull periods; blue margins in   258
figure 24) while model 6 dominates in the explanation of the euro/dollar exchange rate in 
periods of pessimism (i.e. in bear periods; white margins in figure 24). 
Indeed, from January 1995 to December 2000, model 1 provides on majority the best 
explanatory power relative to model 6. During this period, investors were globally optimistic. 
The internet convention prevailed at that time.  Investors were optimistic about the future 
growth prospects and the returns (or dividend yields) offered by the US and the European 
stock markets. The dollar has a strong appreciating trend during this period. 
We  notice  however  that  the  explanatory  power  of  model  6  is  higher  between 
September 1997 and March 1999. This observation is related to the Asian crisis of 1997 and 
then  the  Russian  crisis of  1998  that  causes  financial  turmoil  in  the  US  financial  markets 
through the quasi bankruptcy of the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) fund. 
The  burst  of  the  internet  bubble  in  January  2001  led  to  the  collapse  of  the  new 
economy convention. This convention suddenly disappeared from the market. The market 
became more pessimistic about the prospects of both the US economy and the European 
economy. Between January 2001 and January 2003, the fundamentals considered in model 6 
offer the best explanatory power. As mentioned in the macroeconomic analysis, the market 
was at that time concerned by the large external debt of the US economy   a fundamental 
variable found in model 6. The dollar starts a strong depreciating trend in this period. 
From February 2003 to December 2005, the US economy recovers from the internet 
bubble burst. However, investors were still concerned about the increasing external debt of 
the US economy. During this period, the best explanatory power of the euro/dollar exchange 
rate  dynamics  is  offered  alternatively  by  model  1  and  model  6.  As  a  result,  the  market 
alternates between two convention models. On the one hand, there are agents who believe in a 
bull convention (model 1) based on the resistance of the US economy, its fast recovery from 
the internet bubble burst and the induced returns (dividend yields) offered by the US economy. 
On the other hand, there are agents who believe in a bear convention (model 6) related to 
concerns about the sustainability of the large US debt. During this period the dollar stops its 
strong depreciating trend and alternates between short lasting appreciating and depreciating 
trends according to whether the bull convention dominates the bear one. 
From January 2006 until December 2008, model 6 provides in the majority of times, 
the best explanatory power of the euro/dollar exchange rate. The accumulation of negative 
news concerning the US economy after January 2006 (larger US current account deficits, 
increasing fears about a possible burst of the US house price bubble, surge in oil prices) puts 
an end to the bull convention (model 1) shared by agents in the previous period. The start of   259
the  subprime  crisis  in  June  2007  definitely  led  to  the  domination  of  the  bear  convention 
(model 6) in the market. The dollar starts a significant depreciating trend in this period. 
 
  The analysis of the econometric results shows that the euro/dollar market alternates 
between bull and bear periods. Model 1 provides a high explanatory power in periods of 
optimism while model 6 offers a high explanatory power in periods of pessimism. Therefore, 
model  1  and  model  6  can  be  considered  respectively  as  a  bull  convention  and  as  a  bear 
convention.  Globally,  the  convention  model  explains  the  euro/dollar  dynamics  by  the 
switches between fundamentals considered in the bull and in the bear conventions. More 
precisely, the market puts a large accent on the US and European productivity indices and 
dividend yields in times of optimism while in times of pessimism the market puts a large 
weight on the US and European external debt, oil prices and US house prices. This result 
provides evidence of the existence of a non linear relationship between fundamentals and the 
euro/dollar dynamics. In other words, some fundamentals are important at some periods of 
time in the determination of exchange rate dynamics but less important at other periods of 
time. 
  The  econometric  analysis  ends  up  with  the  same  results  as  the  macroeconomic 
analysis. Indeed, as in the macroeconomic analysis, the econometric analysis highlights five 
phases and three main conventions for the euro/dollar exchange rate between January 1995 
and December 2008: a bull convention based on the new economy between January 1995 and 
December 2000 (with a bear subperiod between September 1997 and March 1999 due to the 
contagion effects of the Asian crisis); a bear convention based on the large US external debt, 
the fears about a possible house price bubble burst and the negative effect of the increase in 
oil  prices  on  the  US  economy  between  January  2001  and  December  2008;  and  a  bull 
convention based on the spectacular recovery of the US economy from the stock market crash 
caused  by  the  collapse  of  the  internet  convention  (February  2003 December  2005).  The 
econometric  analysis  thus  validates  empirically  the  macroeconomic  analysis  of  market 
conventions. It validates also the theoretical model of conventions. As a result, the euro/dollar 
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4.4 Assessing the predictive power of the convention model  
 
We compare the predictive performances of the convention model with regards to four 
alternative models. The considered models are defined below: 
 
  Model 1 assumes a linear structure and a symmetric world. Model 1 thus represents 
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    (26) 
 
   Model  2  rests  on  a  linear  structure  and  an  asymmetric  world.  By  assuming  an 
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  Model 3 relies on a non linear structure and an asymmetric world. Model 3 is the 
convention model. Model 3  assumes that the dynamics between  exchange rates  and their 
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4 3 2 1 0 3   (28) 
 
  Model 4 is the simple random random walk without drift: 
 
          k , t t
Model
k t s s + + + =   ε
4   Where  t k ε + → iidN(0, σε
2)              (29)                
 
We first estimate in sample the four models from January 1995 to December 1999. 
We then forecast out of sample the exchange rate of our respective models between January 
2000 and December 2008. We use recursive forecasts
77 based on  OLS  methods. Forecast 
                                                           
77Recursive forecasts aim at estimating the model in sample for a given period of time and forecasting the 
endogenous variable out of sample. We then estimate the model by adding one observation to the previous in   261
horizons are 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 2 years and 5 years. Table 5 shows the 
forecast errors of the models
78. 
 
Table 5: Comparative forecast performances between the convention model 
and alternative specifications 
Statistics 
          Horizon 
 
Model 
1 month  3 months  6 months  1 year  2 years  5 years 
RMSE 
Model 1  0,0569  0,0590  0,0591  0,0614  0,0672  0,0756 
Model 2  0,0565  0,0601  0,0603  0,0650  0,0827  0,2152 
Model 3  0,0573  0,0581  0,0576  0,0585  0,0607  0,0640 
Model 4  0,0306  0,2651  0,3511  0,4748  0,6216  0,7518 
MAE 
Model 1  0,0378  0,0416  0,0416  0,0452  0,0532  0,0588 
Model 2  0,0372  0,0435  0,0428  0,0478  0,0587  0,1175 
Model 3  0,0386  0,0399  0,0389  0,0406  0,0442  0,0462 
Model 4  0,0235  0,1126  0,1690  0,2838  0,4558  0,6227 
DoC 
Model 1  0,4481  0,4675  0,4740  0,3896  0,3442  0,3182 
Model 2  0,3961  0,4610  0,4286  0,4026  0,3961  0,3442 
Model 3  0,3052  0,3506  0,3506  0,2662  0,2403  0,2532 
Model 4  0,6111  0,5648  0,5185  0,4815  0,3704  0,2037 
 NB: RMSE stands for root mean squared errors; MAE stands for mean absolute errors; DoC stands for the 
average percentage of right directions in the forecasts of future prices. 
 
  Table 5 shows that for short run horizons i.e. at 1 month, the randow walk beats all the 
fundamental  models.  As  long  as  the  horizon  increases     from  3  months  to  5  years    
fundamental models start to beat the random walk in term of exchange rate value forecasts 
(RMSE and MAE). The convention model (model 3) provides the best out of sample exchange 
rate  value  forecasts  from  3  months  to  5  years.  The  convention  model  provides  however 
unsatisfying results concerning direction forecasts (DoC). Indeed, the random walk provides 
the best out of sample direction forecasts from 1 month until 1 year. This result is probably 
due to the momentum  effect peculiar to the  exchange rate dynamics at  short/medium run 
horizons. As long as the horizon extends, the  momentum effect becomes weaker.  Indeed, 
between 2 years and 5 years, model 2 provides the best out of sample direction forecasts. We 
notice also that the traditional model of exchange rate (model 1) provides the worst forecasts 
whatever  horizon  considered.  Therefore,  table  5  proves  that  to  improve  exchange  rate 
forecasts one can rely on a model that assumes a nonlinear and asymmetric structure i.e. a 
structure close to the empirical stylised facts observed in exchange rate dynamics. Indeed, the 
best predictions of future exchange rates values based on fundamental variables are offered by 
model 3   the convention model (nonlinear and asymmetric structure). Traditional models of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
sample period (the initial date of the in sample period remains the same). We iterate this procedure until the end 
of the sample period.  
78 Forecasts series are computed in Eviews and MATLAB.   262






This paper provides an unorthodox way to model exchange rate dynamics based on 
conventions that prevail among market agents. The paper presents a theoretical model that 
describes  the  formation  of  conventions  by  agents  in  the  market.  The  structure  of  the 
theoretical model borrows elements from the Imperfect Knowledge Economics approach by 
Frydman and Goldberg (2007). The simulated exchange rate from the theoretical convention 
model replicates several stylised facts highlighted empirically in exchange rate dynamics. We 
test empirically the theoretical model on the euro/dollar exchange rate between January 1995 
and December 2008. In a first step, we make use of a macroeconomic analysis to highlight the 
conventions  that  prevail  on  the  euro/dollar  exchange  rate.  In  a  second  step,  we  build  an 
econometric approach to find market conventions. We use a time varying parameters model 
to find the most important fundamentals in the determination of the euro/dollar exchange rate. 
The macroeconomic analysis and the econometric approach end up with the same conclusions. 
Both analyses show that the market tends to switch between periods of optimism and periods 
of pessimism. Moreover, switches between fundamentals associated to a bull convention and 
to a bear convention explain the dynamics of the euro/dollar exchange rate. Finally, we show 
that the convention model offers the best exchange rate forecasts at horizons longer than 1 
month relative to traditional models of exchange rate and to the random walk. 
As the convention model offers promising results in the explanation and the prediction 
of the euro/dollar exchange rate dynamics, it could be interesting to extend the convention 
model to other exchange rates or even to other assets in order to assess the robustness of 
convention theory. As a matter of facts, Schulmeister (2009) shows that asset price dynamics 
in  the  foreign  exchange  market,  stock  markets  and  commodity  markets  exhibit  the  same 
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A. Variables considered in the convention model 
 
The period of analysis spans January 1995 to December 2008 on a monthly frequency. 
Data  come  from  the  following  sources:  Thomson  Datastream  and  US  Federal  Housing 
Finance Agency. 
 
Table A: Description of the series 
Type of Variable  Name  Model Name  Source 
Endogenous  euro/dollar exchange rate  st  Datastream 
Exogenous  productivity  pdtyt  Datastream 
Exogenous  dividend yield  divyieldt  Datastream 
Exogenous  net external investment position  niipgdpt  Datastream 
Exogenous  oil prices (North Sea Brent)  opt  Datastream 
Exogenous  US house prices  HPIt  US Federal Housing 
Finance Agency 
NB: We do not consider the European house price index since house prices did not experience a bubble (only 
perhaps in the Spanish economy negligible at a European level). 
 
  A.1 Endogenous variable: the euro/dollar exchange rate 
 
  The endogenous variable is the variation in the (log of the) nominal exchange rate st: 
 
         st = log(St/St 1)                               
   
With S, the euro/dollar nominal exchange rate (listed as 1 euro per S dollars). 
 
  A.2 Exogenous variables 
 
    The industrial production (INDPROD) which plays the role of a proxy for GDP:  
         
       indprodt = log(INDPRODt/INDPRODt 1)                       
 
  With INDPROD, the monthly index of industrial production. This series is available in 
monthly frequency. 
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      The expected profits (PROFIT
a): 











PROFIT =        
With SPI, the stock price index (we consider respectively, the Eurostoxx for the euro 
zone and the S&P500 for the United States); and PER, the price earning ratio related to the 
respective stock indices. This series is available in monthly frequency. 
 
    The external debt (NIIPGDP): 
 
 niipgdpt = NIIPGDPt   NIIPGDPt 1                                   
 
  With  NIIPGDP,  the  net  international  position  over  the  GDP  of  the  respective 
economic zones. These variables are available only at an annual frequency. The series were 
transformed  in  a  monthly  frequency  through  a  Quadratic  Match  Average  filter.  For  the 
building  of  the  ECM  model,  we  smoothed  this  series  with  a  Hodrick Prescott  filter  (we 
considered λ=14400). 
 
  Oil prices (OP): 
 
     opt = log(OPt/OPt 1)                                                                
 
  With OP, the oil price as listed for the barrel of Brent of the North Sea. This series is 
available in monthly frequency. 
 
  House prices in the United States (HPI). 
 
     HPIt = log(HPIt/HPI t 1)                                                          
 
  With HPI, the house price index IAS360 delivered by the US Federal Housing Finance 
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  A.3 Remarks 
 
Concerning the euro zone, when data is not available before 1999, we compute an 
artificial euro zone composed by a weighted average of GDP in Germany (
1
t GDP ), France 
(
2
t GDP ) and Italy (
3









































+ + =  
 
  For the external debt, we rely partly on data by Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2007). For 
sake of precisions, we compare the computed series with variables computed for the Area 
Wide Model of the euro zone (Fagan, Henry and Mestre (2001)).  
 
B.  Stationarity tests for the error correction models 
 
  Stationarity tests are based on three tests: the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, 
the Phillips Perron (PP) test and the Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin (KPSS) test. Results 
are presented in tables B.1 and B.2. 
 
Table B.1: Stationarity tests for the endogenous variable of the convention model 





(0,00)  0,09* 
NB: For the ADF test the Akaike criteria with 2 lags is considered; p values are mentioned in brackets; stars 
denote a stationary series at a 1 % (***), 5 % (**), 10 %(*) confidence level. 
 
Table B.2: Stationarity tests for the exogenous variables of the convention model 
Bull State  Bear State 
Variables  ADF  PP  KPSS  Variables  ADF  PP  KPSS 
 pdty
EU   2,59 
(0,28) 
 6,75*** 
(0,00)  0,08*   niipgdp
EU   5,33*** 
(0,00) 
 47,43*** 











(0,00)  0,12 
 divyield
EU   10,75*** 
(0,00) 
 55,18*** 
(0,00)  0,12   op   9,73*** 
(0,00) 
 9,82*** 










(0,00)  0,31 
NB: For the ADF test, the Akaike criteria with 2 lags is considered; p values are mentioned in brackets; stars 
denote a stationary series at a 1 % (***), 5 % (**), 10 %(*) confidence level. 
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  Stationarity tests validate the stationarity of the series considered in the fundamental 
models. 
 
C. Estimation procedure for the ECM model 
 
The estimation procedure of the ECM models follows three steps. The first step checks 
whether all series have the same order of integration. Table C.1 shows that all series are 
integrated of order one.  
 
Table C.1: Integration order of the series used in the convention model 
Variables  ADF  PP  KPSS 
st  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
pdtyt
EU  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
pdtyt
US  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
divyieldt
EU  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
divyieldt
US  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
niipgdpt
EU  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
nipgdpt
US  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
opt  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
HPIt
US  I(1)  I(1)  I(1) 
 
  In a second step, we look for the number of cointegrated vectors by applying Trace 
tests and Maximum Eigenvalue tests. Results available in table C.2 (column 4) validate the 
presence of at most one cointegrated vector between the exchange rate and its fundamentals. 
We therefore estimate a univariate error correction model. 
 
Table C.2: Number of cointegrated vectors at a 5 % confidence level  
for the convention model 
Model 1 
Data Trend  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 










Trace  2  1  1  1  1 
Max Eigenvalue  1  2  1  1  2 
Model 6 
Data Trend  None  None  Linear  Linear  Quadratic 










Trace  5  3  1  1  0 
Max Eigenvalue  2  2  1  1  1 
NB: Critical values are based on the tables of MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999). 
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In a third step, we estimate the long run relationships by ordinary least squares (OLS). 












t divyield divyield pdty pdty s ε α α α α α + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0










t PI H op niipgdp niipgdp s η β β β β β + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0
6  
 
We then test for stationary residuals in the long run relationships. Table C.3 shows that 
residuals in the long run relationships are stationary. We can therefore estimate the error 
correction models for the respective models. The estimation output is available in the core text. 
 
Table C.3: Critical values for Augmented Dickey Fuller cointegration test 







Engle and Yoo (1987)  T = 330, N = 4    4,70    4,18    3,89   5,36   4,35 
Phillips and Oulliaris 
(1990) 
without constant, without trend    4,67    4,13    3,81   5,38   4,35 
with constant, without trend    5,07    4,45    4,16   5,38   4,35 
with constant, with trend    5,36    4,74    4,46   5,36   4,34 
McKinnon (1991) 
with constant, without trend    5,02    4,46    4,16   5,38   4,35 
with constant, with trend    5,33    4,76    4,47   5,36   4,34 
 
D. Principles of the Kalman Filter 
 
State space  models  deal  with  dynamic  time  series  models  that  involve unobserved 
variables (Kim and Nelson (1998)). The basic tool to estimate standard state space model is 
the Kalman filter. The Kalman filter is a recursive procedure for computing the estimator of 
the unobserved component or the state vector at time t, based on all available information at 
time t. State space models are composed by two equations: a measurement equation and a 
state equation (or transition equation). 
 
D.1 Measurement equation 
 
The  measurement  equation  describes  the  relation  between  observed  variables 
(exogenous fundamentals) and unobserved state variables: 
 
t t t t t t t t t t t t t x x x ... x x y ε β β β β β β + + + + + + + = 20 20 19 19 18 18 2 2 1 1 0    271
  Hence, under a vector form: 
 






















































20 19 18 2 1 1  
   
↔  t t t t x y ε β + =  
 
With  t y , the endogenous variable (the exchange rate) ;  t x , the exogenous variables 
(the fundamentals) ;  t ε → iidN(0,Rt) ;  t t lar tdceurodol y = ; 
EU
t t indprod x = 1 ; 
US
t t indprod x = 2
EU
t t pdty x = 3  ; 
US
t t pdty x = 4  ;
EU
t t niipgdp x = 5  ; 
US
t t niipgdp x = 6  ; 
EU
t t employ x = 7  ; 
US
t t employ x = 8  ;  t t op x = 9  ;
US
t t hpi x = 10  ; 
EU
t t sp x = 11  ; 
US
t t sp x = 12  ; 
EU
t t profit exp x = 13  ; 
US
t t profit exp x = 14  ; 
EU
t t divyield x = 15  ; 
US
t t divyield x = 16  ; 
EU
t t rate int st x = 17  ;
US
t t rate int st x = 18  ; 
EU
t t rate int lg x = 19  ; 
US
t t rate int lg x = 20  .  
 
  D.2 State equations 
 
The state equations (or transition equations) define the dynamics of the state variables. 
We assume state variables follow a random walk: 
 
it it it ν β β + = −1   
 
With  it ν → iidN(0,  t Q ),    i = 0 to 20 
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D.3 Description of the Kalman filter 
 
The Kalman filter is a recursive procedure for computing the optimal estimate of the 
unobserved state vector  t β , t = 1,2,...,T, based on the appropriate information set, assuming 
that Ft, Rt and Qt are known. The Kalman filter provides a minimum mean squared error 
estimate of  t β  given the appropriate information set. Depending upon the information set 
used, we have the basic filter and the smoothing filter. The basic filter refers to an estimate of 
t β  based on information available up to time t. The smoothing filter is an estimate of  t β  
based on all the available information in the sample through time T. 
The basic Kalman filter is described by two steps: the prediction step and the updating 
step. 
 
D.3.1 The prediction equations 
 
The  prediction  equations  form  at  the  beginning  of  time  t,  an  optimal  predictor  of 
t y based  on  all  the  available  information  up  to  time t 1  ( 1 − t / t y ).  To  do  this,  we  need  to 
calculate  1 − t / t β . The prediction equations are defined below:  
 
1/ The estimate of  t β  conditional on information up to time t 1 
 
1 1 1 − − − = t / t t t / t F β β    273




t t / t t t / t Q F P F P + = − − − 1 1 1  
 
Where Qt  is the covariance of shocks to  t β  
 
3/ The prediction error 
 
1 1 1 − − − − = − = t / t t t t / t t t / t x y y y β η  
 
4/ The conditional variance of the prediction error 
 
t t t / t t t / t R x P x f + = − − 1 1  
 
      Where Rt is the variance of  t ε  
 
D.3.2 The updating equations 
 
  Once  t y  is realized at the end of time t, the prediction error  1 − t / t η  can be calculated. 
This  prediction  error  contains  new  information  about  t β  beyond  that  contained  in  1 − t / t β . 
Thus after observing  t y , a more accurate inference can be made of  t β :  t / t β . An inference of 
t β  based on information up to time t, may be of the following form:  1 1 − − + = t / t t t / t t / t K η β β  
where  t K  is the weight assigned to new information about  t β , contained in the prediction 
error. The updating equations are defined below: 
 
5/ The estimate of  t β  conditional on information up to time t  
 
1 1 − − + = t / t t t / t t / t K η β β  
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6/ The covariance matrix of  t β  conditional on information up to time t   
 
1 1 − − − = t / t t t t / t t / t P x K P P  
 




− − = t / t t t / t t f ' x P K  
 
The Kalman filter is a recursive procedure for computing the optimal estimate of the 
unobserved state vector  t β , t = 1,2,...,T, based on the appropriate information set, assuming 
that Rt and Qt are known. The parameters to be estimated are the following ones : 
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21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
ν ν ν ν ν ν ν ν ν ν ν
ν ν ν ν ν ν ν ν ν ν ν
ε
σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ
σ β β β β β β β β β β β
β β β β β β β β β β β θ =
 
 
  The parameters can be estimated by maximising the following log likelihood function 





















t / t t / t f ) f ln( L ln η η π  
 











   275
General Conclusion: 
What Lessons can we Draw from this Thesis? 
 
 
For more than four decades now, economists stick to the REH EMH hypotheses for 
lack of better alternative hypotheses but also because assuming economic agents are rational 
is  convenient  from  a  modelling  perspective.  The  REH EMH  paradigm  is  the  basis  of 
traditional models of exchange rate determination. However, Meese and Rogoff (1983) and 
later Cheung, Chinn and Garcia Pascual (2005) show that exchange rate models based on the 
REH EMH theory provide low explanatory and predictive powers concerning exchange rate 
dynamics. Besides, the REH EMH paradigm is unable to resolve exchange rate puzzles such 
as the disconnection puzzle, the excess volatility puzzle and the forward premium puzzle. 
Many  researchers  ask  about  the  relevance  of  the  REH EMH  hypotheses  and  have 
reconsidered such hypotheses. 
 
In  this  thesis  we  have  attempted  to  provide  an  alternative  way  of  thinking  about 
exchange rate dynamics. The aim of this thesis is to provide advances in the modelling of 
exchange rate dynamics. The objective is to set models that provide better explanatory and 
predictive powers of currency movements than traditional exchange rate models. To achieve 
this task, we depart from the hypotheses assumed by traditional models   the REH EMH 
paradigm and the linear structures. Instead, we draw inspirations from behavioural finance 
and non linear econometrics. The main result of this thesis is that market agents’ behaviours 
and macroeconomic fundamentals are both important determinants of exchange rate dynamics. 
We emphasise in this thesis that beyond macroeconomic fundamentals, researchers should 
consider market agents’ behaviours in order to understand exchange rate dynamics. 
 
The first article analyses the efficiency of the foreign exchange market and sets the 
limits of the REH EMH paradigm. 
Starting from the internal contradictions of Fama (1965)’s definition of efficiency, we 
split  market  efficiency  into  multiple  and  independent  forms:  fundamental  efficiency, 
speculative efficiency, macroeconomic efficiency and pure inefficiency. We associate a set of 
empirical tests to each form of efficiency. Results show that in the short run (between 1 month 
and 1 year) pure inefficiency prevails in the foreign exchange market. In the medium run 
(between 1 year and 2 years), speculative efficiency characterises foreign exchange market   276
efficiency. In the long run (from 5 years on), macroeconomic efficiency holds in the foreign 
exchange  market.  Fundamental  efficiency     Fama’s  efficiency     is  rejected  in  the  foreign 
exchange market at all horizons. The rejection of fundamental efficiency is due to the fact that 
the REH EMH paradigm does not hold empirically in the foreign exchange market. 
This  article  argues  that  exchange  rate  dynamics  are  determined  not  solely  by 
fundamentals forces (macroeconomic variables) but also by non fundamental forces (agents’ 
behaviours).  Non fundamental  forces  tend  to  dominate  fundamental  forces  in  the 
determination  of  exchange  rates  at  short/medium  run  horizons,  while  in  the  long  run 
fundamental forces contribute more to explain currency movements than non fundamental 
forces. 
There  are  several  possible  extensions  to  this  work.  First,  tests  of  foreign  market 
efficiency can be extended to other types of exchange rates (for instance, effective exchange 
rates)  or  other  bilateral  exchange  rates  (for  example,  exchange  rates  from  emerging 
economies). Secondly, one could provide better empirical tests for each form of efficiency by 
relying on new datasets or new econometric techniques. For instance, testing UIP and REH at 
higher frequencies by relying on tick by tick data could be the start of an interesting way of 
research. 
 
The second article provides elements to understand the impressive success of order 
flows models in the determination of exchange rates. We investigate inside the black box of 
order flows models to understand why order flows provide better explanatory and predictive 
powers of exchange rate dynamics relative to traditional models. 
  We set a theoretical model that regroups a behavioural exchange rate model and a 
microstructure model. Our objective is to observe how new information is embedded into the 
final price of currencies. The article offers three results. First, simulations of the theoretical 
model replicate important stylized facts observed empirically in the foreign exchange market. 
In the short run, the exchange rate is disconnected from its fundamentals but not from order 
flows. In the long run, the exchange rate returns towards its fundamental value and remains 
still close to order flows. Secondly, the article argues that the foreign exchange market is 
intrinsically inefficient. Indeed, information is distorted at two levels in the market. On the 
one hand, information is distorted by behavioural noise triggered by agents’ behaviours. On 
the  other  hand,  information  is  distorted  by  microstructure  noise  generated  by  the  trading 
mechanism  peculiar  to  the  foreign  exchange  market.  Thirdly,  the  article  claims  that  the 
outstanding performances of order flows models relative to traditional models of exchange   277
rate are attributed to the fact that order flows models do not share the same information set. 
Order flows contain information that has been processed by market agents while traditional 
models  only  consider  unprocessed  information  about  exchange  rate  fundamentals.  More 
precisely, processed information covers the time varying weight of fundamental information 
(both  public  and  private),  behavioural  information  (both  public  and  private)  and 
microstructure  information.  Unprocessed  information  includes  only  public  fundamental 
information. 
This article argues that the main advantage of order flows models is to take account of 
market agents’ behaviours. This argument explains why order flows offer more satisfaying 
results  in  the  determination  of  exchange  rate  dynamics  at  (very)  short  run  horizons  than 
traditional exchange rate models. 
The  first  extension  of  this  work  is  to  define  empirical  tests  to  check  whether  the 
conclusions from the theoretical model hold empirically. The second extension could aim at 
countering the black box problem of order flows. Researchers could develop a full model of 
order flows determination and test it empirically. 
  
The third article identifies the determinants of heterogeneous behaviours in the foreign 
exchange market and in stock markets. 
We show that behaviours’ heterogeneity significantly explains asset price dynamics in 
the foreign exchange market and in stock markets. Moreover, heterogeneous behaviours are 
homogenous across markets. This homogeneity becomes more acute through the process of 
financial  integration  between  the  foreign  exchange  market  and  stock  markets.  We  then 
analyse which variables are likely to determine heterogeneous behaviours. We find that risk 
aversion (as proxied by implied volatility on option prices) is more likely to explain agents’ 
behaviours in financial markets than macroeconomic fundamentals. When risk aversion is 
high, fundamentalists dominate the market. Conversely, when risk aversion is low, the market 
is globally chartist. In other words, fundamentalists dominate in times of crisis (when risk 
aversion increases) while chartists dominate in times of economic boom (when risk aversion 
decreases). From a behavioural perspective, agents seem therefore more rational in times of 
crisis (since they rely more on fundamentals to forecast asset prices) than in times of booms 
(where agents rely more on chartist analysis and ignore fundamentals). 
Based on this stylised fact we build a behavioural forecasting rule. This rule provides 
better out of sample forecasts of future asset prices than the random walk. This observation 
stands in the long run as well as in the short run.    278
This article thus proves that taking account of stylised facts in agents’ behaviours is 
useful for explaining and forecasting asset price dynamics. 
Further research is needed to find other determinants of heterogeneous behaviours in 
financial  markets.  One  could  also  refine  the  testing  procedure  used  to  identify  the 
determinants of heterogeneous behaviours. For sake of precisions, one could test in STAR 
models  a  time varying  value  for  the  threshold  parameter  (instead  of  a  constant  one,  as 
considered in our analysis). 
 
The fourth article sets an unorthodox model of exchange rate determination based on 
conventions that prevail among agents in the foreign exchange market. 
The paper proposes a theoretical model to show how conventions are built by agents in 
the  market.  The  structure  of  the  theoretical  model  borrows  elements  from  the  Imperfect 
Knowledge Economics approach (Frydman and Goldberg (2007)). The simulated exchange 
rate  from  the  theoretical  convention  model  replicates  several  stylised  facts  highlighted 
empirically  in  exchange  rate  dynamics.  We  test  empirically  the  theoretical  model  on  the 
euro/dollar exchange rate between January 1995 and December 2008. In a first step, we rely 
on  a  macroeconomic  analysis  to  highlight  the  conventions  that  prevail  on  the  euro/dollar 
exchange rate. In a second step, we build an econometric approach to find market conventions. 
We use a time varying  parameters model to  find the most important fundamentals in the 
determination  of  the  euro/dollar  exchange  rate.  The  macroeconomic  analysis  and  the 
econometric approach end up with the same results. Both analyses show that the market tends 
to  switch  between  periods  of  optimism  and  periods  of  pessimism.  Moreover,  switches 
between fundamentals considered in a bull convention and in a bear convention explain the 
dynamics of the euro/dollar exchange rate. Finally, forecasting tests show that the convention 
model  offers  better  exchange  rate  forecasts  at  horizons  longer  than  1  month  relative  to 
traditional models of exchange rate and to the simple random walk. 
Several  improvements  can  be  brought  to  the  convention  model.  First,  one  can 
endogenise  the  choice  of  fundamentals  in  the  convention  model  by  relying  directly  on  a 
financial media. Indeed, as financial media play a major role in the building and the collapse 
of market conventions, one could think about an algorithm that select the most cited news in 
financial media (such as Reuters or Bloomberg) and then put this news as an explanatory 
variable into the convention model. Secondly, instead of relying on fundamentals released at 
low frequencies by Datastream (monthly or annually), one could consider scheduled news 
about exchange rate fundamentals that hit the market periodically at higher frequencies. Such   279
scheduled news are available in Bloomberg at daily frequencies. Thirdly, as the convention 
model offers promising results to explain and predict exchange rate dynamics, it could be 
interesting to extend the convention model to other assets (stocks and commodities) in order 
to assess the robustness of convention theory.  
 
Still, at shorter horizons a lot of research remains to be done to improve asset pricing 
models based on agents’ behaviours. This thesis provides only modest advances in this field 
of research. At longer horizons researchers could implement asset pricing models based on 
behavioural finance into more complex models such as economy wide models. These more 
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Conclusion Générale :  
Quels Enseignements Peut on Tirer de cette Thèse ? 
 
 
  Depuis  maintenant  plus  de  quatre  décennies,  les  économistes  s’appuient  sur  le 
paradigme de l’HAR HEM pour construire leurs modèles. L’HAR HEM constitue la base des 
modèles  traditionnels  de  détermination  des  taux  de  change.  Meese  et  Rogoff  (1983)  puis 
Cheung, Chinn et Garcia Pascual (2005) montrent cependant que les modèles de change basés 
sur l’HAR HEM fournissent de faibles pouvoirs explicatifs et prédictifs des mouvements du 
change. De plus, le paradigme de l’HAR HEM n’a pas apporté de solutions aux énigmes du 
change telles que l’énigme de la déconnexion des taux de change ; l’énigme de l’excès de 
volatilité du change ou encore l’énigme de la prime de terme. En conséquence, nombreux sont 
les chercheurs à s’interroger sur la pertinence de l’HAR HEM. 
  Dans cette thèse, nous avons introduit une manière alternative de penser la dynamique 
des taux de change. L’objectif est de construire des modèles de change qui fournissent des 
pouvoirs explicatifs et prédictifs meilleurs que ceux des modèles traditionnels de change. Pour 
répondre à cet objectif, nous délaissons les hypothèses de base des modèles traditionnels de 
change     l’HAR HEM     et  l’hypothèse  de  linéarité  entre  dynamique  du  change  et 
fondamentaux macroéconomiques. Nous tirons plutôt des leçons des enseignements apportés 
par la finance comportementale et l’économétrie non linéaire. 
  Le résultat principal de cette thèse est que les fondamentaux macroéconomiques ainsi 
que  les  comportements  des  agents  sont  des  déterminants  essentiels  pour  comprendre  la 
dynamique des taux de change. 
 
  Le premier article analyse l’efficience du marché des changes et établit les limites du 
paradigme de l’HAR HEM. Partant des contradictions internes de la définition de l’efficience 
selon Fama (1965), nous décomposons l’efficience des marchés en des formes multiples et 
indépendantes:  l’efficience  fondamentale,  l’efficience  spéculative,  l’efficience 
macroéconomique et l’inefficience pure. Nous définissons des tests empiriques pour chaque 
forme  d’efficience.  Les  résultats  montrent  que  le  marché  des  changes  est  caractérisé  par 
l’inefficience pure à court terme (entre 1 mois et 1 an); l’efficience spéculative à moyen terme 
(entre  1  an  et  2  ans)  et  l’efficience  macroéconomique  à  long  terme  (à  partir  de  5  ans). 
L’efficience fondamentale est rejetée pour tous les horizons sur le marché des changes. Ce   281
dernier résultat est justifié notamment par le rejet de l’hypothèse d’anticipations rationnelles 
quelque soit l’horizon considéré. 
  Cet article suggère que la dynamique des taux de change est déterminée non seulement 
par des forces fondamentales (les fondamentaux macroéconomiques) mais également par des 
forces  non fondamentales  (les  comportements  des  agents  sur  les  marchés  financiers).  Les 
forces fondamentales dominent celles fondamentales dans la détermination du taux de change 
à  court/moyen  terme ;  alors  qu’à  long  terme  les  forces  fondamentales  contribuent  plus  à 
expliquer les mouvements du change que les forces non fondamentales. 
  Plusieurs  extensions  de  l’article  sont  possibles.  En  premier  lieu,  les  tests  de 
l’efficience du marché des changes peuvent être appliqués à d’autres types de taux de change 
(les taux de change effectifs par exemple) ou à d’autres taux de change bilatéraux (notamment 
les taux de change des économies émergentes). En second lieu, des tests plus robustes peuvent 
être définis pour chaque forme d’efficience. Nous pouvons ainsi se baser sur de nouveaux 
échantillons  de  données  et/ou  de  nouvelles  techniques  économétriques.  Par  exemple,  la 
PTINC ainsi que l’HAR pourraient être testées sur des horizons de très court terme, en tenant 
compte de données tick by tick. 
 
  Le deuxième article fournit des éléments pour comprendre le succès des modèles à 
flux d’ordre dans la détermination des taux de change. Nous enquêtons à l’intérieur de la boîte 
noire des modèles à flux d’ordre afin de comprendre pourquoi les flux d’ordre fournissent des 
pouvoirs explicatifs et prédictifs plus élevés que les modèles traditionnels de taux de change. 
  Nous  construisons  un  modèle  théorique  se  composant  d’un  modèle  à  agents 
hétérogènes  et  d’un  modèle  de  microstructure.  L’objectif  est  d’observer  comment 
l’information nouvelle est introduite dans le prix final des devises. Cet article présente trois 
résultats  principaux.  Premièrement,  les  simulations  du  modèle  théorique  répliquent 
d’importants faits stylisés observés empiriquement sur le marché des changes. Ainsi à court 
terme, le taux de change apparaît déconnecté des fondamentaux alors qu’à long terme, il 
retourne vers sa valeur fondamentale. Les flux d’ordre sont quant à eux fortement corrélés à la 
dynamique du change, à court terme comme à long terme. Deuxièmement, l’article suggère 
que  le  marché  des  changes  est  intrinsèquement  inefficient.  En  effet,  l’information  est 
déformée à deux niveaux dans le marché. L’information est déformée d’une part par le bruit 
lié au comportement des agents et d’autre part par le bruit de microstructure généré par le 
mécanisme  d’échange  propre  au  marché  des  changes.  Troisièmement,  l’article  justifie  les 
meilleures performances empiriques des modèles à flux d’ordre relativement aux modèles   282
traditionnels de change par la considération d’un stock d’information différent entre les deux 
modèles. En effet, les flux d’ordre contiennent de l’information qui a déjà été traitée par les 
agents sur le marché. Cette information traitée recouvre l’information fondamentale (publique 
et  privée),  l’information  liée  aux  comportements  des  agents  et  l’information  propre  à  la 
microstructure du marché. A contrario, les modèles traditionnels considèrent uniquement une 
information  brute,  non  traitée  par  les  agents ;  soit  l’information  publique  sur  les 
fondamentaux. Cet article suggère que l’avantage principal des modèles à flux d’ordre est de 
tenir compte de la composante psychologique du change (i.e. le comportement des agents). 
Cet argument explique le succès des modèles à flux d’ordre dans la prévision du change à 
(très) court terme relativement aux modèles traditionnels de change. 
  Une  première  extension  de  cet  article  consisterait  à  tester  empiriquement  les 
conclusions  issues  du  modèle  théorique.  Une  seconde  extension  serait  de  développer  un 
modèle plus complet décomposant toute l’information contenue dans le flux d’ordre et de 
tester ce modèle empiriquement. 
 
  Le troisième article identifie les déterminants des comportements hétérogènes dans le 
marché des changes et sur les marchés boursiers. Nous montrons que les modèles à agents 
hétérogènes expliquent significativement la dynamique des prix des devises et celle des actifs 
boursiers. De plus, les comportements hétérogènes sont homogènes entre marchés financiers. 
Cette homogénéité reflète le processus d’intégration financière entre le marché des changes et 
les  marchés  boursiers.  Nous  analysons  également  les  déterminants  des  comportements 
hétérogènes.  Les  résultats  montrent  que  l’aversion  au  risque  (approchée  par  la  volatilité 
implicite  sur  les  prix  d’option)  explique  la  dynamique  des  comportements  hétérogènes 
contrairement aux fondamentaux macroéconomiques. Ainsi, lorsque l’aversion au risque est 
élevée, les fondamentalistes dominent le marché tandis que lorsque l’aversion au risque est 
faible, les chartistes dominent le marché. En d’autres termes, les fondamentalistes dominent 
en temps de crise (quand l’aversion au risque augmente) alors que les chartistes dominent en 
temps d’expansion économique (lorsque l’aversion au risque est faible). D’un point de vue 
comportemental, cela signifie que les agents sont plus rationnels en temps de crise (puisqu’ils 
tiennent compte des fondamentaux pour former leurs anticipations) qu’en temps d’expansion 
économique (où les agents s’appuient sur des techniques chartistes et ignorent l’information 
sur les fondamentaux). Sur la base de ce fait stylisé, nous construisons une règle de prévision 
basée sur les comportements des agents. Cette règle fournit de meilleures prévisions en dehors   283
de l’échantillon que le modèle de marche aléatoire. Ce fait est observé à long terme comme à 
court terme. 
  Cet article montre ainsi que la prise en compte de faits stylisés sur les comportements 
des agents est utile pour expliquer et prévoir la dynamique des prix d’actifs. Des travaux 
complémentaires sont nécessaires afin de trouver d’autres déterminants des comportements 
hétérogènes. Egalement, les tests économétriques pourraient être affinés en considérant par 
exemple une valeur seuil variable dans le temps dans le modèle STAR (dans notre article, 
cette valeur seuil est constante dans le temps). 
 
Le quatrième article construit un nouveau modèle de détermination des taux de change 
basé sur les conventions prévalant entre agents dans le marché des changes. L’article propose 
un modèle théorique qui décrit la formation des conventions dans le marché des changes. Le 
taux  de  change  simulé  à  partir  du  modèle  théorique  réplique  d’importants  faits  stylisés 
observés sur la dynamique du change au niveau empirique. Nous testons empiriquement le 
modèle à convention sur le taux de change euro/dollar entre janvier 1995 et décembre 2008. 
Nous considérons deux approches.  
  Dans un premier temps, nous utilisons une analyse macroéconomique pour mettre en 
évidence les conventions présentes sur le taux de change euro/dollar. Dans un second temps, 
nous construisons une approche économétrique afin de mettre en évidence les conventions 
présentes dans le marché. Nous estimons pour cela un modèle à coefficients variables dans le 
temps. L’analyse macroéconomique et l’approche économétrique débouchent sur les mêmes 
conclusions. Le marché tend à alterner entre des périodes d’optimisme et des périodes de 
pessimisme. Plus précisément, la dynamique du taux de change euro/dollar est expliquée par 
l’alternance  entre les fondamentaux considérés  dans la convention optimiste et dans celle 
pessimiste. Enfin, les tests de prévisions montrent que pour des horizons supérieurs à 1 mois 
le modèle à convention fournit de meilleures prévisions en dehors de l’échantillon que les 
modèles traditionnels de change et que la marche aléatoire. 
Nombreuses sont les améliorations qui peuvent être apportées au modèle à convention. 
Une première extension vise à endogénéiser le choix des fondamentaux dans le modèle à 
convention en s’appuyant directement sur les sociétés d’information financière. En effet, ces 
sociétés d’information financières jouent un rôle majeur dans la formation et la disparition des 
conventions.  Nous  pourrions  ainsi  construire  un  algorithme  qui  sélectionne  les  nouvelles 
macroéconomiques  les  plus  citées  de  la  part  des  médias  financiers  (tels  que  Reuters  ou 
Bloomberg) puis qui les inclut dans le modèle à convention en tant que variables explicatives.   284
Deuxièmement, au lieu d’utiliser des fondamentaux publiés à des fréquences mensuelles voire 
annuelles  par  Datastream,  nous  pourrions  considérer  les  nouvelles  périodiques  sur  les 
fondamentaux macroéconomiques du taux de change publiées à des fréquences plus élevées. 
De  telles  données  sont  disponibles  sur  Bloomberg  à  des  fréquences  journalières. 
Troisièmement,  étant  donné  que  le  modèle  à  convention  offre  des  résultats  satisfaisants 
concernant l’explication et la prédiction des taux de change, ce modèle pourrait être appliqué 
à  d’autres  actifs  financiers  (tels  que  les  actions  et  les  matières  premières).  Ces  travaux 
permettraient de tester la robustesse du modèle à convention. 
 
 
  En somme, de nombreux travaux sont encore nécessaires à court terme pour améliorer 
la spécification des modèles de détermination des prix d’actifs basés sur les comportements 
des agents sur les marchés financiers. Cette thèse fournit quelques avancées, sommes toutes 
modestes. A plus long terme, les chercheurs pourraient intégrer les modèles comportementaux 
de  détermination  des  prix  d’actifs  dans  des  modèles  plus  complexes  représentant  une 
économie dans son intégralité. Ces modèles plus complexes tiendront  compte de tous les 
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Essays in Exchange Rate Dynamics Modelling  





The starting point of the thesis is the failure of traditional exchange rate models to 
explain and forecast exchange rate dynamics. The challenge of the thesis is therefore to look 
for models that provide better explanatory and predictive powers of exchange rate dynamics 
than traditional exchange rate models. In an attempt to build such models, we draw lessons 
from behavioural finance and nonlinear econometrics. 
The  first  article  justifies  the  failure  of  traditional  models  by  showing  that  the 
hypotheses  underlying  these  models  (EMH  and  REH)  are  not  verified  empirically  in  the 
foreign  exchange  market.  It  also  shows  the  limit  of  considering  only  macroeconomic 
fundamentals as a determinant of exchange rate dynamics. The second article analyses the 
success of order flows models and shows the necessity of considering agents’ behaviours 
(market psychology) to find a robust and successful model of exchange rate determination. 
The third article explains exchange rate dynamics by modelling heterogeneous behaviours. It 
shows that a forecasting rule based on stylised facts about agents’ behaviours in the market 
provides better forecasts of future exchange rates than the simple random walk at short and 
long  run  horizons.  The  fourth  article  proposes  an  unorthodox  model  of  exchange  rate 
dynamics based on conventions that prevail in the foreign exchange market. Results show that 
based  on  the  same  information  set,  the  convention  model  significantly  improves  the 
performances of traditional models when it comes to forecasting exchange rates. 
The main message of the thesis is that macroeconomic fundamental as well as agents’ 
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Essais sur la Modélisation de la Dynamique du Taux de Change  





Le point de départ de la thèse est l’échec des modèles traditionnels de détermination 
des taux de change dans l’explication et la prédiction de la dynamique des taux de change. 
L’objectif de la thèse est de trouver un modèle qui fournit de meilleurs pouvoirs explicatifs et 
prédictifs des taux de change relativement aux modèles traditionnels de change. Pour cela, 
nous  tirons  des  enseignements  de  la  finance  comportementale  et  de  l’économétrie  non 
linéaire. 
Le premier article justifie l’échec des modèles traditionnels de change en montrant que 
les  hypothèses  sous jacentes  à  ces  modèles  (HAR  et  HEM)  ne  sont  pas  vérifiées 
empiriquement. L’article montre également que la considération unique des fondamentaux 
macroéconomiques est insuffisante pour expliquer correctement la dynamique des taux de 
change. Le deuxième article analyse le succès des modèles à flux d’ordre. Cet article montre 
la  nécessité  de  considérer  le  comportement  des  agents  (la  psychologie  du  marché)  pour 
construire un modèle de détermination des taux de change robuste et satisfaisant. Le troisième 
article  explique  la  dynamique  des  taux  de  change  en  modélisant  les  comportements 
hétérogènes des agents. Cet article montre qu’une règle de prévision basée sur un fait stylisé 
concernant les comportements des agents sur le marché fournit de meilleures prévisions des 
taux de change futurs que le modèle de marche aléatoire pour des horizons de court terme et 
de long terme. Le quatrième article propose un modèle non conventionnel de détermination 
des  taux  de  change  basé  sur  les  conventions  prévalant  entre  agents  dans  le  marché  des 
changes.  Cet  article  montre  qu’en  considérant  le  même  stock  d’information,  le  modèle  à 
convention  fournit  de  meilleures  performances  prédictives  des  taux  de  change  que  les 
modèles traditionnels. 
  Le message principal de la thèse est que les fondamentaux macroéconomiques et les 
comportements  des  agents  sont  tous  deux  des  déterminants  essentiels  pour  expliquer  et 
prévoir la dynamique des taux de change. 
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Essays in Exchange Rate Dynamics Modelling  




The starting point of the thesis is the failure of traditional exchange rate models to explain and 
forecast exchange rate dynamics. The challenge of the thesis is therefore to look for models that 
provide better explanatory and predictive powers of exchange rate dynamics than traditional exchange 
rate  models.  In  an  attempt  to  build  such  models,  we  draw  lessons  from  behavioural finance  and 
nonlinear econometrics. The first article justifies the failure of traditional models by showing that the 
hypotheses  underlying  these  models  (EMH  and  REH)  are  not  verified  empirically  in  the  foreign 
exchange  market.  It  also  shows  the  limit  of  considering  only  macroeconomic  fundamentals  as  a 
determinant of exchange rate dynamics. The second article analyses the success of order flows models 
and shows the necessity of considering agents’ behaviours (market psychology) to find a robust and 
successful model of exchange rate determination. The third article explains exchange rate dynamics by 
modelling heterogeneous behaviours. It shows that a forecasting rule based on stylised facts about 
agents’ behaviours in the market provides better forecasts of future exchange rates than the simple 
random walk at short and long run horizons. The fourth article proposes an unorthodox model of 
exchange rate dynamics based on conventions that prevail in the foreign exchange market. Results 
show  that  based  on  the  same  information  set,  the  convention  model  significantly  improves  the 
performances of traditional models when it comes to forecasting exchange rates. The main message of 
the  thesis  is  that  macroeconomic  fundamental  as  well  as  agents’  behaviours  are  both  essential 
components to explain and forecast exchange rate dynamics. 
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Le point de départ de la thèse est l’échec des modèles traditionnels de détermination des taux 
de change dans l’explication et la prédiction de la dynamique des taux de change. L’objectif de la 
thèse est de trouver un modèle qui fournit de meilleurs pouvoirs explicatifs et prédictifs des taux de 
change relativement aux modèles traditionnels de change. Pour cela, nous tirons des enseignements de 
la finance comportementale et de l’économétrie non linéaire. Le premier article justifie l’échec des 
modèles traditionnels de change en montrant que les hypothèses sous jacentes à ces modèles (HAR et 
HEM) ne sont pas vérifiées empiriquement. L’article montre également que la considération unique 
des fondamentaux macroéconomiques est insuffisante pour expliquer correctement la dynamique des 
taux de change. Le deuxième article analyse le succès des modèles à flux d’ordre. Cet article montre la 
nécessité de considérer le comportement des agents (la psychologie du marché) pour construire un 
modèle de détermination des taux de change robuste et satisfaisant. Le troisième article explique la 
dynamique des taux de change en modélisant les comportements hétérogènes des agents. Cet article 
montre qu’une règle de prévision basée sur un fait stylisé concernant les comportements des agents sur 
le marché fournit de meilleures prévisions des taux de change futurs que le modèle de marche aléatoire 
pour des horizons de court terme et de long terme. Le quatrième article propose un modèle non 
conventionnel de détermination des taux de change basé sur les conventions prévalant entre agents 
dans le marché des changes. Cet article montre qu’en considérant le même stock d’information, le 
modèle  à  convention  fournit  de  meilleures  performances  prédictives  des  taux  de  change  que  les 
modèles traditionnels. Le message principal de la thèse est que les fondamentaux macroéconomiques 
et les comportements des agents sont tous deux des déterminants essentiels pour expliquer et prévoir la 
dynamique des taux de change. 
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